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Abstract
Interdomain routing is a key element in the global Internet routing infrastructure. A resilient
interdomain routing framework is required, in order to deliver reliable and dependable data
communication services. However, because the existing routing system has evolved to a
large scale and legacy protocols have been widely deployed, building a resilient interdomain
routing framework is challenging.
In this thesis, we focus on modeling and improving the resilience of the Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP). BGP is the de facto standard of Internet interdomain routing and is used
in tens of thousands of Internet routers. It is prohibitively expensive and diﬃcult to build
a new interdomain routing protocol from scratch in the near future. Thus, we take an evo-
lutionary approach to improve the reliability of BGP routing. Our research demonstrates
that the robustness and the performance of interdomain routing can be increased by under-
standing the network routing and transport protocols rigorously and by further engineering
the protocol stack system appropriately.
Speciﬁcally, our investigation on the resilience of BGP falls into three aspects: robustness
of BGP sessions, reliability of internal BGP (IBGP) networks, and advertising interdomain
QoS routing information.
First, we study the robustness of BGP sessions in temporarily failed or severely congested
networks. We apply empirical and model-based approaches. These approaches allow us to
systematically analyze impacts on BGP sessions, coming from (a) BGP behaviors, (b) TCP
behaviors, (c) network failures, and (d) network congestion. For example, we show that
the retransmission mechanism of the existing TCP is too conservative for supporting BGP
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sessions; but we can properly conﬁgure and augment TCP to make BGP sessions much
more robust in stressful network situations. Our results thus provide a guide for the precise
conﬁguration of network protocols to improve the BGP session robustness.
Second, we focus on the reliability modeling and topology optimization in IBGP route
reﬂection networks, which provides references for designing route reﬂection topologies, es-
pecially in the transition from the fully meshed topologies to route reﬂection IBGP. We
characterize the resilience of IBGP networks with several reliability metrics, such as the con-
nectivity of IBGP routers and the severeness of session loss. Based on these metrics, IBGP
topologies are optimized for typical network failure scenarios. The topology optimization
problems are systematically studied, including heuristic solutions, hardness, and other prop-
erties. Our experiments conclude that the resilience of IBGP route reﬂection networks can
be signiﬁcantly improved by conﬁguring route reﬂection topologies properly.
In addition, BGP is a natural medium for advertising interdomain QoS routing infor-
mation which includes network resource availability, communication reliability, etc. This
information can help to route and manage Internet traﬃc eﬃciently and reliably. For exam-
ple, using interdomain QoS routing information, we can better control resource reservation
and traﬃc engineering processes to make the Internet routing more stable. In order to ad-
vertise QoS routing information by BGP, we propose a series of statistical metrics which
abstract QoS information into one or several probability intervals, so that the heterogeneous
and dynamic information can be ﬂexibly and precisely represented. Moreover, by capturing
the statistical property in QoS routing information, these new metrics can highly decrease
the message overhead in routing updates, thereby making the QoS advertising more scalable.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The present Internet has evolved to a large scale. It consists of about 10,000 Autonomous
Systems (AS). Because of the large scale and independent management in diﬀerent ASes, how
to provide a resilient data communication service over the Internet becomes a challenging
task. In this chapter, we introduce the motivations and the rationales of our research in
resilient Internet routing, discuss the research problems and our contributions, and ﬁnally
outline the rest of the thesis.
1.1 Research Motivation and Rationales
The resilience of interdomain routing involves multiple factors, such as reliability, availabil-
ity, and security, with regard to network failures and attacks. Traditionally, the Internet
infrastructure was built in a best-eﬀort fashion; speed and scale were the primary concerns.
Reliability has not been a key design goal until recent years, which makes the Internet subject
to various failures and attacks.
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the de facto standard of the interdomain routing
and is widely deployed in today’s Internet. BGP has its own vulnerabilities for exchanging
routing information in scenarios of network failures and severe congestion. The reliability
of BGP operation is inﬂuenced by the behaviors of the networking transport layer and the
conﬁguration of BGP routers. Moreover, the dynamic Quality-of-Service (QoS) routing
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information at the interdomain level is not always available, but this knowledge is important
for traﬃc balancing and packet forwarding optimization.
However, in the present literature, the reliability issues of BGP have not attracted suﬃ-
cient emphasis. In general, the inﬂuence from protocol design upon Internet routing reliabil-
ity is unclear. The existing methods in protocol design and conﬁguration are mainly ad-hoc
or heuristic. We claim and show systematically in this thesis that, by engineering reliabil-
ity in the network protocols, the resilience of the Internet networking can be signiﬁcantly
improved.
This thesis thus focuses on the control plane of BGP, in which we primarily investigate
two important issues: BGP routing reliability and interdomain level QoS routing. BGP
reliability directly aﬀects the stability and availability of Internet routing service. The failure
of BGP sessions or the inappropriate conﬁguration of BGP networks can result in high
rates of BGP route withdrawals and routing oscillation. It can further lead to problems in
data plane, such as unreachable network addresses and congestion. In addition, the QoS
information of interdomain routes is needed for optimizing the processes of route selection,
resource reservation, and traﬃc load balancing. BGP is a natural medium to distribute this
information.
Two rationales underlie our BGP research. The ﬁrst rationale is that new modules
or protocol extensions based on BGP have to be scalable and deployable. BGP routing
infrastructure is currently the largest distributed system in the world. To rebuild a new BGP
routing system from scratch is extremely diﬃcult. Therefore, it is meaningful to improve the
robustness of BGP in the context of the existing framework, by studying conditions of BGP
failures and then engineering or extending the BGP protocol appropriately. The second
rationale is that the network robustness can be improved by carefully considering typical
network failures in protocol design, i.e., ensuring network performance in both normal state
and the failure states that may occur. The tradeoﬀ has to be made between the computing
overhead and statistical coverage of all possible failure scenarios. We also need to compromise
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between the tractability of the model and the model applicability.
Resilient BGP Routing
Control Plane
TCP/IP
Physical Networks (Wired)
Reliable Internal BGP
Networks
Robustness of BGP Sessions
Exchanging Inter-domain
Route QoS
Figure 1.1: Thesis research on resilient BGP Routing.
The framework of the thesis research is shown in Fig. 1.1. The BGP routing control
plane is supported by TCP/IP and wired physical networks. The instability and failures
of the underneath network protocols or components inﬂuence the performance of the BGP
networks. For example, the long disruption of IP routing may break a BGP session, which
may further cause routing oscillation. On the other hand, the failures in BGP control plane
also inﬂuence the quality of data communication at TCP/IP layer. To improve the resilience
of BGP routing control plane is important for achieving a resilient Internet routing.
1.2 Resilient BGP Routing
The goal of this research is to improve the resilience of interdomain routing within the ex-
isting Internet routing infrastructure. The thesis proves that BGP resilience is increasingly
important and it can be dramatically improved by using extensions to the existing protocols
in conjunction with appropriate protocol conﬁguration, such as topology optimization. More-
over, these protocol extensions and conﬁguration can be implemented in a deployable and
scalable way in the real Internet environment. For this purpose, we identify three important
problems in the BGP control plane:
1. BGP sessions are sensitive to transient network failures or severe network congestion.
How can we model and improve the robustness of BGP sessions in these scenarios?
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2. The conﬁguration of internal BGP (IBGP) networks inﬂuences the resilience of IBGP
operation. How can internal BGP networks be appropriately conﬁgured to increase
the IBGP reliability?
3. Reliable Internet routing and delivery are sensitive network resource availability, such
as routing availability, bandwidth, delay, etc. How can we exchange resource availabil-
ity information of interdomain routing (route QoS) by BGP? The extension should be
scalable and address the heterogeneity problems of the global Internet.
1.2.1 Robustness of BGP Sessions
BGP sessions use TCP as the transport layer support. At ﬁrst glance, TCP can provide
the reliable communication service by retransmitting packets. However, the delivery of
BGP messages can be delayed in some adverse circumstances, such as network failures or
severe network congestion, which may further result in BGP session reset. The reliability of
BGP sessions is thus intertwined with TCP and network errors. We quantitatively establish
the relations between the BGP session reliability and the inﬂuential factors: BGP timer
conﬁguration, TCP retransmission behaviors, network congestion, and failures. Based on
this result, it is possible to conﬁgure BGP timers according to desired reliability levels, while
in the past it could be done by heuristics only. Moreover, we analyze the impact from TCP
behavior on the BGP session reliability and propose modiﬁcations of TCP to signiﬁcantly
increase the BGP session robustness. Let us brieﬂy discuss this research in two aspects as
follows.
• BGP sessions may fail when IP routing is disrupted because of network failures. The
conservative behavior of TCP retransmission actually exacerbates the instability of
BGP sessions and thus makes BGP sessions more fragile in scenarios of network failures.
In order to improve BGP session robustness, we slightly modify TCP by scheduling
one additional packet retransmission right before the reset of the BGP session. This
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modiﬁcation incurs practically no extra message overhead, but it increases the BGP
session robustness to the highest level. In addition, it only needs to be implemented
incrementally at BGP routers, and it is thus deployable.
• BGP sessions are also sensitive to severe network congestion, because BGP messages
are usually not diﬀerentiated from the normal data packets in Internet packet for-
warding. Using statistical analysis based on intensive simulation results, we ﬁnd that
in most cases of network congestion, BGP session lifetime can be characterized using
exponential distributions and Weibull distributions. Furthermore, in order to get a
deep understanding of BGP session robustness, we give an approximate model for the
expected lifetime of BGP sessions, and demonstrate that by slightly changing TCP
retransmission parameters, the robustness of BGP sessions in congested networks can
be improved by multiple orders of magnitude.
1.2.2 Reliability of Internal BGP Networks
BGP networks consist of a large number of network components, such as routers and links.
It is impossible to guarantee that these components work properly at 100% of the time.
The network failures may result in routing ﬂaps (route withdrawal and re-advertising) and
temporary packet forwarding errors in some network addresses.
Traditionally, all BGP routers in one AS form a full mesh via IBGP sessions. Later, route
reﬂection [1] and confederation [2] are proposed to solve the scalability problem in IBGP.
Since BGP sessions are inﬂuenced by network failures, the reliability of IBGP network, which
consists of a number of BGP sessions and routers, is aﬀected by failures, as well as protocol
design and conﬁgurations. However, so far, the reliability evaluation of IBGP networks and
the reliability-aware design of IBGP topologies have not been well studied. When a domain
switches from the full mesh IBGP to route reﬂection, the guideline for setting up reﬂection
topology is usually to follow the physical topology [3].
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More speciﬁcally, the reliability of IBGP operation is inﬂuenced by the route reﬂection
topology design, because the topology determines route reﬂector placement and IGP (Interior
Gateway Protocol) paths used for transmitting BGP messages. Some powerful routers, which
possess a large amount of resources (such as memory and CPU), are more reliable and thereby
more likely to survive in some stressful situations. Also, IP links may have diﬀerent failure
rates and some links are much more stable than others [4]. Thus, to evaluate and design a
reliable IBGP network based on faulty 1 IP networks is important.
Several key issues need to be considered in designing a reliable IBGP route reﬂection
topology:
1. How many reﬂectors are needed? The use of too few reﬂectors may cause single point of
failure problem. On the other hand, increase of reﬂector numbers leads to more IBGP
sessions, which increases router workload and introduces more unreliable components
into the IBGP system. We will show later that the optimum number of reﬂectors
depends on the reliability of links or routers and the redundancy of the IP network
topology.
2. Where to place reﬂectors? Intuitively, more reliable routers are more appropriate to be
reﬂector candidates, because reﬂectors are critical components in reﬂection networks.
However, the IP network topology and the connection reliability between diﬀerent
routers also should be considered.
3. How to assign clients to reﬂectors? The assignment of clients determines which IGP
paths are used to deploy IBGP sessions. Diﬀerent IGP paths may provide diﬀerent
qualities to support IBGP sessions, due to the diﬀerent characteristics of link failures
or transport layer instability.
4. How to use redundant reﬂectors or IBGP sessions? It is interesting to know whether
redundant reﬂectors and IBGP sessions can always increase IBGP reliability. Also,
1We consider single IP link failures and single router failures in this thesis.
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how are the redundant elements placed?
Our research on the reliable IBGP networks involves two major steps. First, models and
metrics are developed to evaluate the reliability of IBGP route reﬂection topologies. Second,
IBGP networks are optimized based on the IP network topology and IGP routing results.
The beneﬁts of reliable route reﬂection topology design are twofold: (1) Increase of
network availability: Since IBGP session failures may cause route withdrawals that make
some network addresses unreachable, the reliable route reﬂection design increases the network
availability by reducing the impact of IBGP network failures. (2) Increase of BGP routing
stability and decrease of computing overhead: Because IBGP session failures result in route
ﬂaps which may further incur routing oscillation and large computing cost, improving the
reliability of reﬂection topology can increase the BGP routing stability and reduce computing
overhead at routers.
1.2.3 Advertising Interdomain QoS Routing Information
In this thesis, QoS routing information represents the performance related properties of Inter-
net routes for forwarding data packets, such as network resource availability, communication
reliability, etc. Network resource availability means the network’s ability to provide resource
for data communication purpose. Speciﬁcally, how much resource, such as the available
bandwidth, can be provided on a route. Obviously, QoS routing information is crucial for
the resilient path selection process, resource reservation, and eﬀective traﬃc load balancing.
The application of QoS routing has been well investigated in the intradomain level, such
as the OSPF QoS extension. However, in the global Internet, exchanging QoS information is
diﬃcult. Two major challenges are observed. First, BGP protocol needs to be kept scalable
with respect to processing dynamic QoS routing information. In Internet, the QoS routing
information changes over time. If we advertise the routing information immediately after
a QoS change occurs, the system becomes overloaded. On the other hand, if we advertise
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the QoS routing information infrequently, the advertised routes become obsolete. Second,
the QoS representation should be able to handle the heterogeneity of BGP routes. For
example, some BGP routers may be connected by direct IP links, while some may use the
paths provided by IGP routing. Moreover, the route updating periods may be diﬀerent in
diﬀerent ASes. Thus, the QoS information obtained from diﬀerent ASes has diﬀerent degrees
of precision.
Our solution to these challenges is the statistical QoS representation for the interdomain
QoS routing information. Conventional QoS metric for dynamic information is either the
instantaneous value or the average value over time. The instantaneous values can not be
updated too frequently, because too much overhead is introduced. However, if they are
updated infrequently, they may be out-of-date. The time average values can not give the
dynamic range of ﬂuctuation, and they are not ﬂexible either. In our approach, we represent
the network resource availability information as an interval [l, u] and the probability p for
the instantaneous values to belong to the interval. This composite metric can also repre-
sent various precisions in the measurement of diﬀerent types of links between BGP routers.
Furthermore, we extend the idea of probability interval to distribution histograms, so that
multiple intervals can be used to make the representation more precise.
Exchanging QoS routing information at interdomain level has two major beneﬁts: First,
it provides bases for improving packet forwarding eﬃciency. A path with large available
bandwidth or less delay can be selected as the default route, if there are multiple choices.
Second, dynamic QoS information is needed by other protocols or network management pro-
cesses, such as resource reservation and traﬃc engineering, to perform their own functional-
ities. Without the knowledge on routing QoS, these networking modules can not properly
allocate network resource or balance traﬃc, and thus cause network traﬃc ﬂuctuations and
instability.
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1.2.4 Thesis Contributions
In this thesis, we demonstrate that the resilience of the interdomain routing can be signif-
icantly improved by engineering reliability and network protocols appropriately within the
existing Internet infrastructure. The speciﬁc contributions are summarized as follows.
First, we propose models to evaluate the reliability of BGP sessions in transient network
failures and severe network congestion. We demonstrate that the retransmission behavior of
TCP is too conservative to support BGP sessions appropriately and it makes BGP sessions
less robust. Therefore, we design augmentations based on the existing TCP to improve the
BGP session robustness. Second, we study reliability models for IBGP networks, deﬁne
several IBGP reliability metrics, and formulate the IBGP topology optimization problems.
These problems are proven to be NP-hard. Thus, we design and implement heuristic algo-
rithms that can solve the problems eﬃciently with satisfying performance. Third, we propose
four statistical QoS metrics for interdomain QoS routing information advertising. Our new
statistical metrics are more eﬃcient and ﬂexible than the traditional QoS metrics. They can
also characterize the heterogeneity of routing information in the interdomain networks and
thus contribute to resilience of Internet routing.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview on BGP
and related research on routing dynamics and QoS routing. In Chapter 3, we study the
robustness of BGP sessions in transient network failures and propose a modiﬁcation of the
transport protocol to improve the BGP session robustness. In Chapter 4, we analyze the
behaviors of BGP sessions in severely congested networks and give a model to tune TCP
parameters for improving BGP session reliability. Chapter 5 discusses the reliability models
and optimization for IBGP networks. In Chapter 6, QoS extensions based on BGP are
presented for advertising interdomain level QoS routing information. Chapter 7 concludes
9
the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries and Related Work
2.1 BGP, EBGP and IBGP
The Internet consists of many Autonomous Systems (AS) and each AS is managed indepen-
dently. An Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP), such as OSPF, is used to ﬁnd routes inside
an AS. Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [5] is the routing protocol for exchanging network
reachability information between ASes.
In BGP, the network reachability information, which is formatted in the UPDATEmessages,
is used to advertise or withdraw a route to a network destination. The UPDATE messages,
also called advertisements, contain necessary information for ﬁnding routes at the interdo-
main level: the addresses of the network destinations, the paths represented in AS numbers
(AS PATH), and the next hop addresses (NEXT HOP), etc. Each AS calculates the degree of
preference for each route it has received according to some local path selection policies, in-
stalls the most preferred one into the local forwarding table, and propagates such routing
decisions to neighboring ASes.
BGP is running on millions of routers, called BGP speakers in the Internet. Fig. 2.1
shows an example of BGP networks. BGP speakers communicate with each other via TCP
connections, which are called BGP sessions. According to the relation between two BGP
speakers which are connected by a BGP session, BGP can be divided into two parts: External
BGP (EBGP) and Internal BGP (IBGP). An EBGP session connects two speakers which
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Figure 2.1: An example of BGP networks.
reside in diﬀerent ASes; an IBGP session links two speakers which belong to the same AS.
The speaker which runs EBGP sessions is a border router.
In the conventional design of IBGP, all IBGP sessions in one AS form a full mesh over the
BGP speakers, as shown in AS 1 of Fig. 2.1. The full mesh IBGP design is not scalable [6][7].
For example, if there are n BGP speakers in a domain, the total number of IBGP sessions is
(n2 − n)/2 and each speaker has to handle n − 1 IBGP sessions concurrently, which incurs
high workload and administration burden at routers. There are two practical techniques
to solve this scalability problem: route reﬂection [1] and confederation [2]. We will further
introduce and investigate the details of IBGP in Chapter 5 based on the route reﬂection
IBGP networks.
2.2 Reliability of BGP
A BGP speaker could fail due to the software and hardware bugs in routing modules or
operating system, and diﬀerent routers, which have diﬀerent software or hardware platforms,
may show diﬀerent levels of reliability in hosting BGP operations. Moreover, speciﬁc router
conﬁgurations, such as computing capacity and workload, also aﬀect the reliability of BGP
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routers.
BGP routers detect the failure of BGP sessions based on a timeout mechanism. Each
BGP speaker maintains a KeepAlive timer and a Hold timer for each BGP sessions it
possesses. On every expiration event of the KeepAlive timer, a KEEPALIVE message is sent
to the peer speaker associated with the session. When receiving a KEEPALIVE message or
any other BGP messages, the related Hold timer is reset. If the Hold timer is expired, the
BGP speaker assumes the peer speaker can not response correctly, and thus closes the BGP
session. Therefore, a BGP speaker expects to receive at least one message from every peers
in any time period before the Hold timer expires; otherwise, the BGP sessions fail.
BGP routers communicate via TCP connections, and thus the BGP sessions suﬀer poten-
tially from any lower level faults in the networking stack, such as IP link failures and transport
layer instability (severe congestion). Although TCP/IP provides reliable data communica-
tion by retransmission and re-routing, the network recovery takes certain amount of time.
If the BGP Hold timer expires due to long recovery time or network partitions, the IBGP
sessions may be interrupted. Therefore, the transient network failures can lead to the failures
of those BGP sessions that are aﬀected. We will develop models for the reliability of BGP
sessions in scenarios of transient network failures in Chapter 3.
Transport layer instability also inﬂuences the reliability of IBGP sessions. In the existing
Internet, the packets carrying routing control messages (such as BGP UPDATE message) are
forwarded in the same channel as other data packets. Under some stressful conditions, such
as severe congestion, BGP messages may be dropped as usual data packets, and it can
potentially cause BGP session reset. Jahanian et al. [8][9] show that the network congestion
can break BGP sessions by consecutively dropping BGP messages between the BGP peers.
Shaikh [10] uses analytical models and experiments to show that the BGP session stability
is inﬂuenced by traﬃc load, buﬀer size, dropping polices, link propagation delay, etc. For
example, the expected lifetime of a BGP session decreases as the congestion level increases;
larger network propagation delay also leads to smaller expected lifetime of a BGP session.
13
Wang [11] shows that a BGP session is sensitive to the transport session reliability. A BGP
session may break due to severe congestion and other factors. In their observations, 27 out
of 30 session resets are caused by transient link congestion or routing problems. Especially,
an IBGP session may cross multiple IP hops, which makes IBGP operation more sensitive to
the transport layer instability. We will study the behavior of BGP sessions when networks
are severely congested in Chapter 4.
In terms of improving BGP routing reliability, some research exists. Sangli [12] proposes
a graceful restart mechanism for BGP to alleviate the impact of BGP session failures. BGP
Scalable Transport (BST) [13] uses application-level replication and ﬂooding to substitute
TCP for reliable and scalable BGP message distribution. However, besides the deployment
diﬃculties, BST can not replace the hierarchical IBGP design (e.g., route reﬂection) because
a BGP router can not handle a large number of BGP peers. Therefore, we still need to
consider how to construct a reliable IBGP hierarchy to provide robust route distribution.
In addition, the rerouting-based fast IP recovery is proposed to decrease the recovery
time of the intradomain routing, which can help to improve the reliability of IBGP sessions.
However, a notable fraction of routing failures are caused by the errors in software and
equipment implementations and conﬁgurations, which makes IGP routing recovery time
unexpectedly prolonged. For example, minute level (even greater than 10 minutes) routing
outage is reported from a real measurement in an IP backbone [14].
Diﬀerent from these existing approaches, our research aims to increase BGP routing
reliability by modifying the existing protocols slightly or by conﬁguring the protocols and
IBGP networks appropriately, so that the rate and impact of BGP failures are minimized.
2.3 BGP and QoS Extensions
Several related works have been done on interdomain QoS routing. Bonaventure [15] fo-
cuses on how to distribute QoS information ﬂexibly by BGP in various network scenarios.
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Cristallo [16] proposes a new attribute for BGP UPDATE message, QOS NLRI, to record
QoS related information. Abarbanel [17] utilizes BGP to propagate Traﬃc Engineering
weight, which represents the summary of the traﬃc condition in an AS. These three Internet
drafts use either static QoS metrics or simple statistics of dynamic metrics, such as the aver-
age value or the minimum value. Therefore, they can not advertise ﬁne-grained properties of
dynamic QoS information. They also can not address the heterogeneity problems introduced
by IGP routes and incremental QoS deployment. Fei [18] extends MBGP (Multi-protocol
Extension to BGP4) for interdomain QoS Multicast. However, the paper does not give an
eﬀective method to control the overhead of exchanging QoS update.
With respect to using statistical QoS metrics in QoS routing, some related research
work exists. Lorenz and Guerin propose QoS routing algorithms based on the probability
density function in [19][20]. However, obtaining and processing such density function would
bring too much computation and communication overhead. Actually, in practice, it is not
realistic to assume the distribution function is known. In [21], Chen and Nahrstedt model the
imprecise QoS attributes by intervals calculated from the exponential average. Diﬀerent from
our approach which will be introduced later, their interval representation is a deterministic
bound and can be viewed as a special case of our model.
2.4 Other Issues on BGP
We discuss some other issues, such as routing convergence, in BGP research which are related
to the BGP reliability. We view them as parallel objectives in the design of resilient BGP
networks. In practice, multiple factors should be considered in determining working BGP
conﬁgurations. In this thesis, we focus on the reliability issue.
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2.4.1 Correctness of BGP conﬁgurations
The convergence of a routing protocol requires that by a ﬁnite number of messages ex-
changed among collaborated routers, the routing table of the network can reach a stable
state. Bertsekas [22] gives a proof that the distributed Bellman-Ford shortest path algo-
rithm is convergent. However, the BGP routing is not of the exact Bellman-Ford type. In
BGP, the path selection process is allowed to use local preferences instead of the globally
conformed metrics. The local preferences at diﬀerent routers may lead to conﬂicts in the
path preference order. In some scenarios, the stable state may never be reached, and the
routing table keeps changing as the arrivals of new routing update messages. Varadhan [23]
points out that if unconstrained selection policy is allowed in an AS, the protocol may be
susceptible to route oscillations. In [24], Griﬃn et al. classify the methods for detecting
BGP divergence into two categories: static solutions and dynamic solutions. In the static
solutions, a program, which has global routing policy information, scans the whole network
to ﬁnd out if there exists any policy conﬂict that could lead to routing divergence. Grif-
ﬁn [25] provides the suﬃcient conditions that guarantee the routing convergence. Moreover,
in [24], it is shown that most of the static convergence checking problems in BGP are ei-
ther NP-complete or NP-hard. On the other hand, the dynamic solutions try to suppress
or completely prevent the routing divergence at run time. Route ﬂap dampening is one of
the examples. Griﬃn [26] simpliﬁes BGP into a Simple Path Vector Protocol, and extend
BGP with dynamically calculated attribute, route history, so that the policy conﬂicts can
be detected and suppressed. In [27], Gao et al. provides a set of guidelines for an AS to set
its path selection policies taking the collaboration with other ASes into consideration. They
prove that the guidelines guarantee the routing convergence. Furthermore, in [28], they relax
the peer-to-peer restriction to establish backup paths and modify the path selection rules
so that the routing is convergent inherently, which means that the network will keep stable
even if some links fail.
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The above results all ignore the IBGP routing, and assume that each domain can be
abstracted into a single node. Further research considers the impact of IBGP. Based on
the route reﬂection [1] in IBGP, Basu [29] extends the BGP route reﬂection to prevent
route oscillations. The basic idea is to advertise not only the best route but also other re-
ceived routes. Without considering the eﬀect of Multi-Exit Discriminator (MED), Griﬃn [30]
presents suﬃcient conditions that guarantee the deterministic and unique IBGP routing and
avoid forwarding deﬂections. The oscillation problem caused by MED, called MIRA, is dis-
cussed in [31]. The MIRA problem may appear in the fully meshed IBGP networks, as well
as in the route reﬂection networks, and even spans to several domains. In the paper, how to
contain the MIRA inside a domain by enforcing special route import and export policies at
the domain borders is studied.
2.4.2 BGP Routing Dynamic Behaviors
Even though BGP is conﬁgured correctly and the persistent route oscillations are eliminated,
some temporary route oscillations still exist on some link failure or route change events, which
leaves BGP a long time to reach the stable state. Labovitz [32] demonstrates theoretically
that in fully connected Autonomous Systems, the BGP convergence time is factorial to the
number of ASes in the Internet. In practice, the average time for interdomain path failovers is
in minute level, 3 minutes on average and 15 minutes in the worst case. The further research
in [33] shows that the failover routing convergence time is proportional to the length of
the longest backup path, and it is also related to the minimum time interval between two
continuous advertisements.
There are several research works focusing on decreasing BGP convergence time by ﬁnely
tuning BGP parameters and policies. Griﬃn [34] analyzes the impact of some parameters.
Minimum Router Advertisement Interval (MRAI) is one of the most important ones. A
properly chosen MRAI can dramatically decrease the convergence time, but the optimal
MRAI value depends on network topologies and router workload and it is diﬃcult to be
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eﬀectively tuned in practice. The strategy of sender-side loop detection can also decrease
the convergence time slightly in some cases. Pei [35] proposes two consistency assertions to
improve the BGP convergence by avoiding unnecessary path explorations. Mao [36] shows
that the interaction between route ﬂap dampening and the path exploration caused by route
withdraw can signiﬁcantly exacerbate convergence time. The selective route ﬂap dampening
can avoid over-penalties to ﬂaps in useful path exploration process, and thus it solves this
problem.
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Chapter 3
Robustness of BGP Sessions in
Transient Network Failures
Reliable BGP operations are very important to the quality of Internet routing. When a BGP
session fails, all the related routes, which are advertised previously with this session, have to
be withdrawn. The route withdrawal messages may further trigger a huge amount of route
re-computations and result in route ﬂaps and even unreachable network addresses. It takes
a long time and lots of network resource to re-establish this session. On the other side, the
reliability of BGP sessions also depends on the correct operations of underlying TCP and
intradomain routing (Interior Gateway Protocol). BGP sessions are sensitive to transport
layer stability and routing layer reliability [10][11], especially the IBGP sessions which can
cross multiple hops in IP networks.
In this chapter, we investigate the robustness of BGP sessions, more speciﬁcally, the fail-
ure probability of BGP sessions when the communication between two peering BGP routers
is temporarily disrupted. We study the relationship between BGP session failure probability
and BGP timers and TCP retransmission behaviors. In addition, a simple modiﬁcation of
the existing TCP is proposed to increase the robustness of BGP sessions signiﬁcantly.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: in Section 3.1, we discuss the motivation of
studying the behavior of BGP sessions in scenarios of transient network failures. In Section
3.2, we present the network models and the failure detection mechanism of BGP. Section 3.3
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discusses the probability of Hold Timer expiration. In Section 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6, we present
the reliability models for BGP sessions, give a modiﬁcation of TCP to improve the robustness
of BGP sessions, and validate the models by simulations. Section 3.7 concludes the chapter.
3.1 Motivations
The purpose of heart-beat messages in BGP is to ensure the correct functioning of the peering
BGP routers and the related IP links. If either the IP links or BGP routers misbehave, it is
likely that the underlying IP forwarding path along the routers and IP links has problem, and
thus we need to reset the inﬂuenced BGP sessions and withdraw the related BGP routes. For
example, in Fig. 3.1, BGP router A uses path A→ B → E → F to reach the destination F .
If the IP link between B and E fails, the data forwarding path from A to F breaks. At the
level of interdomain routing, BGP tries to recover this failure by closing the session between
B and E. The BGP routes from A and B to F are thus withdrawn. After BGP re-routing
completes, the backup path A→ C → D → F is used in instead of the failed default path.
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Figure 3.1: Impact of transient network failures on BGP. The solid lines stand for IP links;
the dotted lines represent BGP sessions; the line with arrow stands for a data ﬂow.
However, if the IP link between B and E is subject to a transient failure and it is
recovered in only tens of seconds, the BGP session reset and the traﬃc re-rerouting are not
worthwhile. Because after the BGP session between B and E is re-established, the traﬃc
has to be shifted from the backup path to its original one. As a result, the interdomain
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routing shows temporary instability and BGP recomputing incurs large overhead at routers.
Therefore, in these scenarios of transient failures, BGP sessions are required to be robust
and keep alive to avoid unnecessary interdomain level route ﬂaps.
TCP enables BGP sessions to tolerate certain level of network failures, which is achieved
by packet retransmissions. However, the delivery of BGP messages may be delayed due to
the packet retransmissions. Because every BGP router should receive at least one message
from any of its peers in certain period of time (controlled by Hold Timer) to keep the session
alive, the delayed message delivery may cause BGP session reset and thus those two BGP
routers lose contact. Therefore, it is necessary to quantitatively study the BGP session
reliability and the impact from BGP timer conﬁgurations and the recovery time of network
failures. In addition, the existing TCP retransmits packets in an exponential backoﬀ manner
and the retransmission interval is up to 64 seconds. We ﬁnd that, this conservative behavior
actually exacerbates the delay of BGP message delivery and thus makes BGP sessions more
fragile if network failures happen.
The main contributions of this chapter are as follows. (1) We propose a reliability model
for BGP sessions, which gives quantitative relations between the session failure probability
and the inﬂuential factors: BGP timers, network failure recovery time and TCP retransmis-
sion behaviors. Based on these results, we can conﬁgure BGP timer appropriately, so that
BGP sessions can tolerate certain level of transient network failures. (2) A simple modiﬁ-
cation to the existing TCP is presented, which can improve the robustness of BGP sessions
without introducing extra message overhead.
Please notice that we can always make BGP session more ‘robust’ by increasing the
expiration time of the Hold Timers. However, it also enlarges the time needed for detecting
real long-term network failures at BGP routers and thus the interdomain re-routing may be
delayed. We have to make a trade-oﬀ between BGP robustness and interdomain re-routing
delay. Our model for BGP session failure probability provides a guideline to conﬁgure these
BGP timers by quantitatively understanding the trade-oﬀ. Furthermore, our augmentation
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on TCP provides a way to increase BGP session robustness without increasing either the
BGP re-routing delay or the message overhead.
3.2 System Model
An IP network is represented by graph G(V,E), where V and E are the sets of routers and
IP links, respectively. (u, v) represents the IP link from router u to router v. IGP path from
u to v is denoted as Puv, which is a set of routers and IP links on the path. BGP sessions
are virtual links overlaid on the IP network. We denote BGP session between u and v by
〈u, v〉. If u and v are inside one AS, IGP paths Puv and Pvu are used to support this session.
In the following discussion of this chapter, we focus on IBGP sessions. An EBGP session
cross only one IP hop and has the similar results.
Let us denote the period of KeepAlive Timer and Hold Timer as Tk and Th, respectively.
In any period of Tk, a BGP router sends at least one message to any of its peers; a BGP
router also expects to receive at least one message from the peer in any period of Th. Any
reasons, which cause BGP message delays or losses, may further lead to the related BGP
session reset. In IETF RFC, the default timer values are: Th = 90 seconds and Tk = 30
seconds.
For convenience, we use pse to denote the failure probability of BGP session e in IP
network failure state s, i.e.,
pse = P [BGP session e fails | IP components in Fs fail and other components are up] ,
where Fs ⊆ V ∪ E and Fs is the set of the failed IP components in failure state s.
Given that the components in Fs fail, session failure probability pse is determined by the
IGP paths used by e, TCP retransmission behavior and BGP timers. The calculation of pse
can be divided into three cases as follows. Suppose session e is shared by router u and router
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v, i.e, e = 〈u, v〉.
1. If u ∈ Fs or v ∈ Fs, then pse = 1, i.e., an IBGP session deﬁnitely fails if its owner
router fails.
2. If Fs ∩ Puv = ∅ and Fs ∩ Pvu = ∅, then pse = 0. That is, the IBGP sessions, that do
not pass the failed components, will not be inﬂuenced.
3. Otherwise, IBGP session e could survive with certain probability, because the IGP
routing between u and v could be recovered by either IP rerouting or physical layer
repairing before the session is reset. In this scenario, pse depends on the period (Th) of
Hold Timer, the period (Tk) of KeepAlive Timer, IGP routing recovery time Tc, and
TCP retransmission behavior.
We have several comments on the recovery time Tc. IGP routing failure and recovery are
complex processes inﬂuenced by protocol design, routing software and hardware implemen-
tations and conﬁgurations. The recovery time is speciﬁcally determined in diﬀerent failure
scenarios. Thus, Tc should be taken as an average value for typical failure cases. Moreover,
when we investigate the reliability of BGP sessions, Tc can be understood as the possible
degree of network failures that a BGP session is designed to tolerate. For instance, the BGP
timers can be conﬁgured based on a given Tc in the worst failure scenario. We assume Tc
is known for the following BGP session reliability analysis. Moreover, we assume that a
network failure happens at a time instance that is distributed uniformly on the time line.
Table 3.1 summaries the major notations used in this chapter.
In the following parts of this chapter, we will focus on the analysis of pse of the third
scenario. Before that, we discuss the probability that a BGP Hold Timer expires.
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Table 3.1: Table of notations for Chapter 3.
Th Hold Timer expiration period
Tk KeepAlive Timer expiration period
R0 TCP retransmission timeout value
Rm TCP maximum retransmission timeout value
pse Failure probability of BGP session e in IP network failure state s.
tf Occurrence time of network failures
Tc IGP recovery time
i∗ The last admissible TCP retransmission
tr(i) The time of the i
th TCP retransmission
3.3 BGP Hold Timer Expiration Probability
Let us suppose the IGP path used by BGP session e is (u, . . . , r1, r2, . . . , v). In failure state
s, the physical links between r1 and r2 fail, i.e., Fs = {(r1, r2), (r2, r1)}. After time Tc, the
IGP routing between u and v recovers. Because of the delayed delivery of the KEEPALIVE
message, the Hold Timers at u and v may expire. We denote their expiration probability
as qsu and qsv, respectively.
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Figure 3.2: A typical case of transmitting KEEPALIVE messages when network failures occur.
We only consider the KEEPALIVE messages between u and v in the following analysis.
A typical packet transmission process, which is interfered by network failures, is shown in
Fig. 3.2. Router u sends KEEPALIVE message ka1 to v successfully and receives the TCP
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acknowledgment ack1 after one round trip time RTT . Links (r1, r2) and (r2, r1) fail at time
tf . Message ka2, which is sent out at time Tk, is lost. TCP tries to recover the packet loss
by retransmitting ka2. At time tf + Tc, IGP routing recovers. u delivers ka2 ﬁnally at the
third retransmission. Thus, since ka1 is received, it takes td for v to receive ka2. If there
is no network failure at all, td should be around Tk, because KEEPALIVE messages are sent
every Tk seconds. However, in a failure state, td is prolonged. If td is greater than Th, the
Hold Timer at v expires. Thus, qsv = P [td > Th] .
The IGP routing between u and v is interrupted from time tf to tf + Tc. tf is a random
variable at the time line. We divide the time line into the following intervals: (H1, H2, H3 . . .),
by the events that KEEPALIVEmessages leave router r2. Therefore, the network failures should
occur in one of these intervals, which is marked by H in Fig. 3.2. According to renewal
theory [37], tf is distributed uniformly in H, because the length of each time interval (|Hi|)
is a ﬁxed value Tk. Next, we will calculate qsv based on the distribution of tf .
In the renewable interval H, in which the network failure happens, we further divide the
time into two segments: Ar and Al (as shown in Fig. 3.2). If tf ∈ Ar, ka1 and ack1 are
both delivered successfully; if tf ∈ Al, ka1 is received by v, but ack1 is lost in the network.
We will analyze these two cases as follows.
(1) Case of Ar: This case is shown in Fig. 3.2. ka1 is sent out at time 0, it is delivered
and acknowledged successfully. u sends ka2 out at time Tk. Due to the network failure, ka2
is lost in transit, and it is retransmitted by u. Since TCP guarantees the ordered packet
delivery, no other BGP messages will be delivered to v before ka2. We focus on analyzing
the retransmission of ka2.
In TCP implementations [38], the retransmission timeout (RTO) value R0 is calculated
as max(RTT +4RTTVAR,minrto), where RTTVAR is the variance of RTT estimation and
minrto is the minimum value of R0. Packets are retransmitted in an exponential backoﬀ
manner, i.e., RTO′ = min(2RTO,Rm), where Rm is the maximum retransmission timeout
limit. The default values of minrto and Rm are 1 second and 64 seconds.
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Denote the time of the ith retransmission of ka2 as tr(i). u begins the ﬁrst retransmission
at time Tk + R0, i.e., tr(0) = Tk + R0. Based on the exponential backoﬀ property, we have
the equations for tr(i):
tr(i) =
i∑
k=1
min(2k−1R0, Rm) + Tk (3.1)
=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(2i − 1)R0 + Tk : If i ≤ ρ
(2ρ − 1)R0 + (i− ρ)Rm + Tk : otherwise
where ρ = 1 + log2 RmR0 .
In order to avoid the Hold Timer expiration, v must receive ka2 before Th +RTT/2. So,
u must send out ka2 successfully before Th. We call the retransmissions, which can arrive
before the Hold Timer expires, the admissible retransmissions. In this case, the admissible
retransmissions must be sent out before Th. Let i
∗ be the last admissible retransmission
iteration, i.e.,
i∗ = max {i : tr(i) ≤ Th} (3.2)
It is easy to derive i∗ and tr(i∗) as follows:
If Th ≤ (2ρ − 1)R0 + Tk, then
i∗ =
⌊
log2
(
Th − Tk
R0
+ 1
)⌋
(3.3)
tr(i
∗) = Tk + (2i
∗ − 1)R0 (3.4)
otherwise,
i∗ =
⌊
Th − Tk − (2ρ − 1)R0
Rm
⌋
+ ρ (3.5)
tr(i
∗) = (i∗ − ρ)Rm + (2ρ − 1)R0 + Tk (3.6)
Based on the concept of the last admissible retransmission, we have the following lemma.
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Lemma 3.1 If tf ∈ Ar, then the probability of the Hold Timer expiration at router v is
qArsv =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 : if Tc ≤ tr(i∗)− Tk − dur2
1 : if Tc ≥ tr(i∗)− |Al| − dur2
Tc+Tk+dur2−tr(i∗)
|Ar| : else
(3.7)
where dur2 is the delay of IGP path Pur2. |Ar| and |Al| are the lengths of time interval Ar
and Al, respectively.
Proof: The expiration of the Hold Timer at v is equivalent to the fact that the last admissi-
ble retransmission is sent before the recovery of IGP routing, i.e., tr(i
∗) < tf +Tc. Therefore,
qsv = P [tf > tr(i
∗)− Tc]. Because tf is uniformly distributed in the interval of Ar,
qsv =
Tk + dur2 − [tr(i∗)− Tc]
|Ar|
By limiting the value qsv into [0, 1] interval, we obtain Equation 3.7. 
(2) Case of Al: If tf ∈ Al, ka1 is received by v, but ack1 is lost due to the network
failure. Thus, ka1 is not successfully delivered in the view of router u. u begins to retransmit
ka1 at time R0. We can calculate the retransmission time sequence as follows:
tr(i) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(2i − 1)R0 : If i ≤ ρ
(2ρ − 1)R0 + (i− ρ)Rm : otherwise
where ρ = 1 + log2 RmR0 .
Similarly, an admissible retransmission is the retransmission that can arrive before the
Hold Timer expires. In this case, the admissible retransmission of ka1 must be sent before
Th − RTT , so that ka2 can be delivered in time. Thus, the last admissible retransmission
i∗ = max{i : tr(i) ≤ Th −RTT} and we have following equations for tr(i∗):
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If Th ≤ (2ρ − 1)R0 + RTT , then
i∗ =
⌊
log2
(
Th −RTT
R0
+ 1
)⌋
(3.8)
tr(i
∗) = (2i
∗ − 1)R0 (3.9)
otherwise,
i∗ =
⌊
Th − (2ρ − 1)R0 −RTT
Rm
⌋
+ ρ (3.10)
tr(i
∗) = (i∗ − ρ)Rm + (2ρ − 1)R0 (3.11)
The following lemma gives the probability that the Hold Timer expires in the case of Al.
Lemma 3.2 If tf ∈ Al, then the probability of the Hold Timer expiration at router v is
qAlsv =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 : if Tc ≤ tr(i∗)− |Al| − dur2
1 : if Tc ≥ tr(i∗)− dur2
1− tr(i∗)−Tc−dur2|Al| : else
(3.12)
where dur2 is the delay of IGP path Pur2.
Proof: Similar to Lemma 3.1, qsv = P [tf > tr(i
∗)− Tc]. Because tf is uniformly distributed
in the interval of Al,
qsv =
|Al|+ dur2 − [tr(i∗)− Tc]
|Al|
By normalizing the value of qsv into [0, 1] interval, we obtain Equation 3.12. 
Because tf is uniformly distributed in the interval H, we combine the results from previous
two cases to obtain the probability of the Hold Timer expiration as follows.
qsv = (|Al|qAlsv + |Ar|qArsv )/Tk (3.13)
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The calculation of qsv can be simpliﬁed when RTT is small, especially in an intradomain
backbone network, where the IBGP overlay network is applied. Compared with Th and Tk
(the default values are 30 seconds and 90 seconds, respectively), RTT , |Al| and dur2 are small
enough and can be ignored. Thus, the case of Al does not have signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
calculation of BGP session reliability. We can thereafter simplify the calculation of qsv.
qsv =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 : if Tc ≤ tr(i∗)− Tk
1 : if Tc ≥ tr(i∗)
1− tr(i∗)−Tc
Tk
: else
(3.14)
Our simulation results show that the simpliﬁcation obtains satisﬁable precision when RTT
is small.
3.4 BGP Session Failure Probability
In this section, we apply the previous results on the Hold Timer expiration to study the
failure probability of BGP sessions.
BGP session e (shared by u and v) is terminated, if any of the two Hold Timers associated
with e expires. Let us suppose both u and v send KEEPALIVE message to each other at the
same period of Tk. Without the loss of generality, the time, when u sends out the message
in each period, is θ seconds earlier than that of v, where θ is the phase diﬀerence and
θ ∈ [0, Tk). Fig. 3.3 shows the time sequence of sending KEEPALIVE messages from u
and three corresponding sequences of v based on diﬀerent values of θ. Each vertical arrow
represents one sending of a KEEPALIVE message. For the Hold Timer expiration probability,
we only consider the case of Ar, which dominantly inﬂuences the calculation. Thus, in the
renewable time interval [0, Tk), if the network failure happens in the shaded region on the
time line of either u or v, BGP session e will fail. Because the shaded regions are inﬂuenced
by θ, the session failure probability pse is the function of θ, written pse(θ). By analyzing the
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Figure 3.3: Time sequence of sending KEEPALIVE messages.
three scenarios in the ﬁgure, we can derive the formula for pse(θ) as follows.
pse(θ) =
τ +min(θ, Tk − τ)−max(0, θ − τ)
Tk
(3.15)
where τ is the length of a shaded region and τ = Tk − tr(i∗) + Tc.
KeepAlive timers are reset whenever a KEEPALIVE or UPDATEmessage is sent out. Because
u and v send UPDATE packets independently and θ changes randomly. We can safely model
θ by the uniform distribution in interval [0, Tk). Thus, we have the following theorem for
BGP session reliability.
Theorem 3.1 Let us assume that IGP routing between node u and v is interrupted in net-
work failure state s; Tc is the recovery time of the routing between u and v after the failure.
If the communication latency between u and v is small enough, then the failure probability
of BGP session 〈u, v〉 is
pse =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 : if Tc ≤ tr(i∗)− Tk
1 : if Tc ≥ tr(i∗)
1−
[
tr(i∗)−Tc
Tk
]2
: else
(3.16)
where Tk and Th are the expiration periods of the KeepAlive Timer and Hold Timer, re-
spectively. tr(i
∗) is the time of the last admissible retransmission, which can be calculated
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from Equations 3.3-3.6.
Proof: When RTT is small, Equation 3.15 can be used to calculate the session failure
probability. Because θ is uniformly distributed in [0, Tk),
pse =
1
Tk
∫ Tk
0
pse(θ) dθ
By plugging in pse(θ) from Equation 3.15 and simplifying the above equation, we get the
BGP session failure probability in Equation 3.16. 
By comparing the above theorem (Equation 3.16) with Equation 3.14, it is shown that
the Hold Timers at u and v expire independently under the assumption that the phase
diﬀerence is uniformly distributed. Thus, pse can also be calculated as follows.
pse = qsu + qsv − qsuqsv (3.17)
This equation is also applicable to the scenario where RTT is very large and thus the inﬂuence
of Al case is non-negligible, though in most of scenarios of BGP networks, Equation 3.16 can
be applied with satisfying precision.
Theorem 3.1 is derived based on the single link failures. It is also applicable to the
failures of multiple links or routers, if the Tc can be applied accordingly. Furthermore, pse
can also be understood as a function of Tc, standing for the robustness of BGP sessions that
are subjected to various transient network failures.
Next, we investigate some characteristics of the BGP session reliability, as well as the
inﬂuences from BGP timers and IGP recovery time. In our numerical experiments, the
failure probabilities of BGP sessions (pse) are calculated by the formulas derived above. The
round trip time between node u and v is 40 milliseconds. R0 = 1 second and Rm = 64
seconds.
In Fig. 3.4(a), the contour of pse as a function of Th and Tc is presented, where Tk = 30
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Figure 3.4: BGP session failure probability. (Time unit: second)
seconds. The curves are the level set of pse. This ﬁgure shows that a larger Th or a smaller
Tc results in a lower session failure probability, which is intuitively correct. In the default
BGP timer conﬁgurations (Tk = 30 seconds and Th = 90 seconds, as indicated by the dotted
line in the ﬁgure), when Tc increases from 33 to 55 seconds, pse changes from 0.1 to 0.96. If
we want to prevent session failures, IGP path recovery process has to ﬁnish in less than 31
seconds and we call this time interval the repairing window. The interesting thing in this
ﬁgure is that the curves of pse exhibit a ‘staircase’ pattern behavior, i.e., the increase of Th
may lead to invariable pse. This is because pse is determined by tr(i
∗), when Tc and Tk are
ﬁxed. Due to the time interval between two consecutive TCP retransmissions, the increase
of Th may not change the time of the last admissible retransmission tr(i
∗). For example,
when Th ∈ [93, 157), tr(i∗) is ﬁxed at 93 seconds. Therefore, pse does not change, if the time
of the last admissible retransmission keeps constant.
The impact of Tk on the BGP session failure probability is shown in Fig. 3.4(b), where
Th = 90 seconds and the contour of pse with respect to Tc and Tk is displayed. The middle
section of pse, where 0 < pse < 1 (shown in the ﬁgure as the dotted lines), narrows when
Tk decreases (i.e., the contour curves are closer to each other at smaller Tk). The intuitive
explanation for this characteristic is that the decrease of Tk shrinks the length of the renew-
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able interval H and thus reduces the randomness of the system. When Tk is small enough,
the fate of BGP sessions becomes deterministic. In addition, we can observe from the ﬁgure
that pse is not a monotonic function of Tk. Equation 3.1 shows that the retransmission
time sequence ({tr(i)|i ≥ 0}) is shifted as we change Tk. This shift action could increase or
decrease tr(i
∗), and thus the session failure probability may become larger or smaller. But,
in a large scope, a smaller Tk leads to more reliable BGP sessions.
3.5 Improving Robustness of BGP Sessions
In this section, we discuss the negative impact of TCP on BGP session reliability and study
the methods for improving the BGP session robustness.
3.5.1 Aggressive Packet Retransmission
The reliability of a BGP session is inﬂuenced by the retransmission behavior of TCP. TCP
retransmits packet in a conservative way (exponential backoﬀ) and the time interval between
two retransmissions is up to 64 seconds. This behavior may miss some critical opportunities
to get BGP message delivered in time. Thus, it is possible to improve the session robustness
by using diﬀerent transport protocols. As an extreme case, when the packet loss is detected,
an aggressive transport protocol can retransmit the lost packet as frequent as possible, so
that the packet is guaranteed to be delivered successfully as soon as the IGP paths are
recovered. Thus, in the scenario of aggressive retransmission, tr(i
∗) = Th. From Equation
3.16, the BGP session failure probability can be calculated as follows:
pse =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 : if Tc ≤ Th − Tk
1 : if Tc ≥ Th
1−
[
Th−Tc
Tk
]2
: else
(3.18)
Obviously, the method of aggressive packet retransmission is not practical, because it
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incurs too much message overhead. However, it provides the lower bound for the BGP session
failure probability, i.e., the highest robustness that can be achieved by any transport layer
protocol. Fig. 3.4(c) shows the contour of pse, where the aggressive packet retransmission
is used. First, diﬀerent from Fig. 3.4(b), pse in Fig. 3.4(c) decreases monotonously as Tk
decreases. Because of aggressive packet retransmission, tr(i
∗) is ﬁxed at Th, and thus pse
is a monotonic function of Tk. Second, the session reliability is much improved due to the
aggressive packet retransmission. In the default BGP timer conﬁgurations (indicated by the
dotted line in Fig. 3.4(c)), when Tc increases from 62 to 84 seconds, pse changes from 0.12 to
0.96. The repairing window is 60 seconds, which is almost twice as large as that of normal
TCP (31 seconds) in Fig. 3.4(a). This shows that the conservative retransmission behavior
of TCP does exacerbate the reliability of BGP sessions when BGP network is in a failure
state.
We will next present a simple modiﬁcation of TCP, which achieves the lowest BGP session
failure probability without introducing extra message overhead.
3.5.2 TCP Augmentation
Three controllable factors inﬂuence BGP session reliability: Hold Timer, KeepAlive Timer
and TCP retransmission behavior. Hold Timer expiration period Th is set to detect un-
healthy BGP peers. Equation 3.18 demonstrates that a larger Th enables BGP sessions to
tolerate longer IGP routing interruptions. However, it also makes BGP routers insensitive
to detect misbehaving peers. Similarly, a very small Tk (the KeepAlive Timer expiration
period) can reduce session failure probability, but it may incur a large amount message over-
head. Therefore, we have to make a compromise between the BGP session reliability and
other issues when adjusting the values of Th and Tk. Our model can therefore be used as a
reference to BGP session reliability in various circumstances. For example, Fig. 3.4(c) can
be used to choose an appropriate Tk so that the BGP session can tolerate certain level of
network failures, when Th is ﬁxed at 90 seconds.
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TCP retransmission behavior can also be tuned to make BGP sessions more robust
against transient network failures. From Equation 3.16, pse is a decreasing function of the
last admissible retransmission time tr(i
∗). If tr(i∗) reaches its maximum value Th, the session
failure probability pse is minimized, which is equivalent to the scenario of the aggressive
packet retransmission. Thus, in order to improve the session robustness, we can regulate
tr(i
∗) by modifying the TCP implementations on BGP routers as follows, so that tr(i∗) is as
close to Th as possible.
We enforce a TCP retransmission right before the Hold Timer expires at the peer BGP
router, which is Th seconds after the successful delivery of the previous BGP message. In
TCP, the time of receiving the ACK (including acknowledgments for both KEEPALIVE and
UPDATE messages) from the peer router is recorded as tp. Then, the time interval between
the kth and the (k − 1)th retransmissions is min(rto, Th + tp − RTT − tr(k − 1)), where rto
is the retransmission timeout value in the original TCP, i.e., rto = min(2k−1R0, Rm).
By the above augmentation of TCP, the KEEPALIVE packet can be delivered right before
the Hold Timer expires, if IGP routing is recovered in time. The shortcoming of the large
retransmission timeout in TCP is thus avoided. Moreover, because tr(i
∗) is controlled to
be Th, BGP session failure probability can be calculated using Equation 3.18. Therefore,
we achieve the performance of the aggressive packet retransmission, without extra message
overhead. We will show the improvement on BGP session reliability by simulations in Section
3.6.
3.5.3 Extension for UPDATE Messages
Our previous analysis only considers KEEPALIVE messages. In this section, we extend the
model to include UPDATE messages. We assume that arrivals of the UPDATE messages from u
to v and from v to u are both Poisson processes with rate λ.
By combining the KEEPALIVE and UPDATE messages, we get the cumulative distribution
35
function of the inter arrival time Ta of BGP messages from u to v.
FTa(t) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 : if t ≥ Tk
1− e−λt : if 0 ≤ t < Tk
(3.19)
By applying renewal theory, the density function of failure time tf is as follows.
ftf (t) = (1− FTa(t)) /E[Ta]
=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 : if t ≥ Tk
λe−λt
1−e−λTk : if 0 ≤ t < Tk
(3.20)
Our previous TCP modiﬁcation also works in the scenario where UPDATE messages are
considered. That is, tr(i
∗) = Th and the BGP session failure probability can reach its lower
bound by enforcing one retransmission right before Hold Timer expires. Similar to Theorem
3.1, we can derive the theorem for pse based on the distribution of tf .
Theorem 3.2 If the arrival of UPDATE messages related to BGP session e is Poisson process
and the rate is λ, the BGP session failure probability in the modiﬁed TCP implementation
(in Section 3.5.2) is as follows.
pse =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 : if Tc ≤ Th − Tk
1 : if Tc ≥ Th
1−
[
1−e−λ(Th−Tc)
1−e−λTk
]2
: else
(3.21)
Proof: Because our augmentation on TCP (in Section 3.5.2), tr(i
∗) = Th. The ﬁrst two
cases in Equation 3.21 are trivial. In the third scenario, the probability that Hold Timer
expires is
qsv =
∫ Tk
Th−Tc
ftf (t) dt =
e−λ(Th−Tc) − e−λTk
1− e−λTk .
By Equation 3.17, we have the BGP session failure probability shown in this Theorem.
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Fig. 3.5 shows the BGP session failure probability as a function of the rates of UPDATE
messages. When λ = 0, it is equivalent to the previous case without taking UPDATE messages
into consideration. When λ increases, the session becomes more robust. When λ is large
enough, pse is either 0 or 1. Note that the rate of UPDATE messages does not inﬂuence the
repairing window.
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3.6 Validation of BGP Session Reliability Models
In this section, we validate the previous reliability models by simulations. The simulator,
SSFNET [39] with BGP4 implementation of version 1.4.15, is used in our experiments. Four
nodes in an AS, u, r1, r2 and v, are connected in sequence and each physical link has 20
millisecond propagation delay. BGP session e is set up between u and v. We use default
BGP timer parameters: Tk = 30 seconds and Th = 90 seconds. In order to test the failure
probability of session e, we inject network failures by bringing down the link between r1 and
r2 at a random time in simulations. The link is recovered Tc seconds after the failure. Tc
ranges from 30 to 95 seconds. For each value of Tc, we iterate the fault injection process
1000 times. By counting the times of Hold Timer expirations and BGP session failures, we
can obtain the percentages of the timer expiration and session failures, which stand for the
simulated results of qsv and pse.
Fig. 3.6(a) compares the expiration probabilities of the Hold Timer from the simulation
results and from our analytical models. Because the most often used retransmission timeout
(corresponding to R0 in the analytical model) in SSFNET TCP is 1.5 seconds for a small
round trip time, we let R0 equal 1.5 in the analytical models. The ﬁgure shows that the
timer expiration probability given by the simulations is quite close to the results from the
analytical models (Equation 3.13). Also, the simpliﬁed model (Equation 3.14), which only
takes the case of Ar into calculation, generates almost the same results as the exact model
does, because the round trip time is very small compared to the timer parameters.
Fig. 3.6(b) validates the model of BGP session failure probability. pse is calculated using
Equation 3.16. The ‘Simulation Results I’ is obtained with normal TCP. Its value is a little
greater than that of the analytical model. This is because, in simulation, R0 alternates
between 1.5 and 2.0 seconds due to the estimations of RTT and its variance, but, in the
analytical model, R0 is ﬁxed at 1.5. Thus, some diﬀerence exists. In order to show that R0
is the reason which causes the diﬀerence, we ﬁx R0 in TCP implementation to be 1.5 and get
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‘Simulation Results II’ which conforms to the analytical model very well. This experiment
shows that R0 in the analytical model needs to be calibrated based on the speciﬁc TCP
implementations to make the analysis result more precise. Usually, minrto is 1 second and
RTT is small values in backbone network. Thus, we can choose R0 to be 1− 2 seconds.
The modiﬁed TCP, described in Section 3.5.2, is implemented in the SSFNet simulator.
We keep track of the last acknowledgment time tp and modify the packet retransmission code
in TCP. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 3.6(c), as well as the results from the ag-
gressive packet retransmission and the original TCP. Our modiﬁcation of TCP (by enforcing
a retransmission right before Hold Timer expires) signiﬁcantly increases the robustness of
BGP sessions. It achieves almost the same results as the aggressive packet retransmission,
but no extra message overhead is incurred. In original TCP, the repairing window is 30
seconds; while, in the modiﬁed version, it is improved to 60 seconds. The length of the
repairing window is doubled due to the modiﬁcation.
Furthermore, in Fig. 3.6(c), the curves are diﬀerent only in the interval [30, 90] of Tc.
This means that only if Tc falls into interval [tr(i
∗) − Tk, Th], our modiﬁcation of TCP or
aggressive retransmission can improve the reliability of BGP sessions; in other range of Tc,
the failure probabilities are uniformly 0 or 1, no matter if the extra retransmissions are used.
3.7 Summary
The robustness of BGP sessions is a crucial factor for the reliable Internet communication.
In this chapter, we investigate the reliability of BGP sessions in the scenarios of transient
network failures. A model is proposed for characterizing the impact from BGP timers and
TCP retransmission behaviors on the failure probability of BGP sessions. We also develop
a simple augmentation of the TCP retransmission. The simulation results show that it
can considerably improve the robustness of BGP sessions and the repairing window almost
doubles.
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Chapter 4
BGP Session Lifetime Modeling in
Congested Networks
In present Internet, due to the lack of diﬀerentiation mechanism in packet forwarding, BGP
sessions are sensitive to severe network congestion. It is thus important to understand the
reliability of BGP in congested networks, for the purposes of system reliability evaluation
and failure avoidance.
In this chapter, we investigate the lifetime of BGP sessions in two types of network con-
gestion scenarios: (1) the TCP bandwidth saturation caused by traﬃc engineering failures;
(2) the UDP bandwidth saturation caused by worm attacks. The major results are summa-
rized as follows. Using statistical analysis based on intensive simulation results, we ﬁnd that
in most cases the BGP session lifetime can be characterized using exponential distributions
and Weibull distributions. In the case of TCP bandwidth saturation, if all TCP connections
have the same round trip time, the tail of the BGP lifetime tends to be power-law. Fur-
thermore, we propose an approximate model for the expected lifetime of BGP sessions, and
show that by slightly changing the TCP retransmission parameters, the robustness of BGP
sessions can be improved signiﬁcantly.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 gives an overview on BGP session
lifetime and the severe network congestion to be studied in this chapter. In Section 4.2, we
deﬁne BGP session lifetime and describe our methodology for investigating the reliability of
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BGP sessions. Then, we discuss the distribution of BGP session lifetime in Section 4.4 and
Section 4.5. Moreover, we propose an approximate model to calculate the expected BGP
session lifetime in Section 4.6, and discuss the impact of TCP retransmission behaviors on
BGP session lifetime. Section 4.7 summarizes the chapter.
4.1 Overview of BGP Session Lifetime
Our purpose is to study the detailed models for BGP session lifetime in the scenarios of
severe network congestion, called bandwidth saturation. The bandwidth saturation results
from two reasons: traﬃc engineering failures and worm attacks.
In normal network conditions, the traﬃc loads on diﬀerent links are well balanced by the
application of traﬃc engineering. However, due to network mis-conﬁgurations or network
component failures, a large amount of traﬃc (mainly consists of TCP ﬂows) may saturate
some links with limited capacity, which may further lead to the BGP session failure because
of the successive BGP message drop, even if TCP transmits packets conservatively according
to the available bandwidth. In the case when the networks are subject to worm attacks, the
UDP ﬂows generated by the scanning worms also threaten the survivability of BGP sessions.
Wang, Lad et al. [11][40] report that the worm attacks coincide with a large amount of
BGP update messages, which implies that the BGP session reset may be triggered by worm
saturation attacks in the Internet.
Particularly, in the edge ASes of the Internet, such as enterprise or campus networks, the
interdomain links belonging to these ASes have much less capacity than the links in their
ISP backbone and their local backbone. Therefore, these interdomain links are more likely
to be saturated, when the networks encounter traﬃc engineering failures or are subject to
worm attacks.
The lifetime of BGP sessions is an important metric in evaluating the robustness and the
reliability of BGP in congested networks. We deﬁne the BGP session lifetime as the time
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interval from the occurrence of the network special event, such as worm breaks or traﬃc
engineering failure, till the BGP session reset.
There are several beneﬁts in understanding the statistical characteristics of BGP ses-
sion lifetime in bandwidth saturation. First, a relationship between the reliability of BGP
sessions and the network-congested circumstances can be established. Thus, equipped with
the observatory on the network-congested conditions, the network administrators are able
to predict the BGP session lifetime, and take necessary strategies to prevent the failures
of BGP sessions due to network congestion. Second, a new dimension in the metric space,
which evaluates the quality of the network routing infrastructure — the vulnerability of BGP
routing protocol to bandwidth saturation attack, is explored. For example, it is valuable to
know the survival probability of BGP sessions under certain congestion intensity and the
recovery time. This information is helpful for inferring the network communication quality in
the data planes, and supporting the decisions on some network service deployments. Third,
the important factors that inﬂuence the robustness of BGP sessions, especially the impact
of TCP retransmission behaviors on the BGP session reliability, can be captured. Moreover,
some conﬁgurable network parameters can be tuned to improve the BGP session reliability,
without changing the behaviors of network protocols in normal network conditions. For
example, the results can guide the design of packet retransmission of transport protocols, in
order to support BGP sessions at certain levels of robustness.
To facilitate the study of BGP session failures and the lifetime subject to the transport
layer congestion (TCP or UDP), we take a joint approach by using the approximate models
and empirical studies.
Shaikh [10] studies the Up-to-Down (U2D) cycle of BGP sessions subject to various net-
work traﬃc overload factors based on a Markov chain model. However, their study is mainly
limited to the expected value of the U2D time of BGP sessions, and some simpliﬁcations in
their model are not realistic as well. We focus on the distribution models of BGP session
lifetime, as well as its expected value. Speciﬁcally, we have the following three concerns:
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(1) The model in [10] does not characterize the entire process of BGP session failure detec-
tion, i.e., the U2D cycle is deﬁned as the time interval in which one router does not receive
KEEPALIVE message from its peer before the Hold Timer expires. However, in practice, two
BGP peers detect the session failure event mutually and independently. If any of the two
peers fails to receive the KEEPALIVE messages, the BGP session is declared to be failed. Thus,
by using the Markov chain in [10], the lifetime of BGP session would be signiﬁcantly overes-
timated. (2) We aim to study the BGP sessions in a more realistic network context. Packet
drop probability in bandwidth saturation is not a constant, because of the traﬃc dynamics
that are caused by TCP congestion control and worm propagation processes. Moreover, we
consider more realistic TCP retransmission behaviors in TCP Reno, which greatly inﬂuence
the BGP session lifetime. (3) The model in [10] assumes that BGP routers always have
messages ready to send to their peers. In reality, the message sending frequency depends
on the KeepAlive Timer and the route updating process. From Chapter 3, we know that
the message sending frequency between two peers can inﬂuence the reliability of the BGP
session.
In order to obtain the distribution of the BGP session lifetime, the pure model-based
approaches are diﬃcult. So, we tackle this problem in a hybrid way, namely, the combination
of the empirical study and the statistical modeling. More speciﬁcally, we simulate the realistic
network saturation scenarios intensively, and then, based on the empirical study results,
we propose statistical models to characterize the properties of the BGP session lifetime
approximately.
We ﬁnd that, in most cases, the distribution of BGP session lifetime can be approximated
by exponential or Weibull distributions. However, when the Round Trip Time (RTT) of the
background TCP ﬂows is homogeneous, the distribution of BGP session lifetime shows a
heavy-tailed property, and the variance of the lifetime tends to be inﬁnite. We thus propose
three models, which are derived from the exponential distribution and Weibull distribution,
to approximate the BGP session lifetime. Statistical tests show that these models achieve
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satisfactory precision in matching the BGP session lifetime under various network congestion
scenarios.
We also study the expected value of BGP session lifetime in a simpliﬁed context, where
the packet drop probability is ﬁxed. The model in [10] is reﬁned to improve the accuracy of
predicting the BGP U2D time, by considering more realistic behaviors of the most popular
TCP version (TCP Reno). Based on this result and our study on the BGP lifetime distri-
butions, we propose a model to approximate the expected session lifetime. Furthermore, we
investigate the inﬂuence of TCP retransmission behaviors on the robustness of BGP sessions.
Our models on BGP session lifetime provide fundamental understanding about the ro-
bustness of BGP and the inﬂuential factors, which is of great use in managing BGP and TCP
protocols with network resilience in mind. For example, it is shown that we can signiﬁcantly
increase the expected lifetime of BGP sessions in most of the scenarios, by tuning some TCP
parameters slightly, without incurring much overhead and inﬂuencing the TCP behaviors in
normal network conditions. We also get to know how to conﬁgure BGP timers to tolerate
network congestion of a given magnitude.
4.2 Study Methodology
In this chapter, the same notations are used as in Chapter 3. The period of Hold Timer is
Th and the period of KeepAlive Timer is Tk. The default values of Th and Tk are 90 seconds
and 30 seconds, respectively, in IETF RFC.
Fig. 4.1 demonstrates our system model. We focus on studying the reliability of a
single BGP session. From network’s point of view, BGP networks (e.g., route reﬂection
networks) are aﬀected if some of its sessions fail, which will be addressed in Chapter 5.
Recall that the bandwidth saturation can be caused by two major sources: scanning worms
cause UDP type of bandwidth saturation, and traﬃc engineering failures lead to TCP type
of bandwidth saturation. In practical scenarios, the congestion may be the combination of
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Figure 4.1: System model: BGP session passes a congested link with capacity c (bits/sec)
and queue size qlen (pkts).
UDP and TCP bandwidth saturation. In our experiment, we study BGP sessions in extreme
and representative cases, i.e., either UDP or TCP saturation exists, and analyze the lifetime
with respect to diﬀerent levels of bandwidth saturation magnitudes. The extreme study can
be easily controlled in experiments and it can also reﬂects the BGP robustness in the general
cases.
We deﬁne the events, e.g. worm breaks or incoming TCP ﬂows, as the impulses on the
BGP sessions. In our experiment, the starting time of an impulse is uniformly distributed
on the time line. The impulse is generated by n UDP or TCP hosts that are connected
to two BGP routers, r1 and r2. The link between these two routers can process c bits per
second in each direction. If the volume of the impulses imposed on the system exceeds
the capacity of the link, packets are buﬀered in a queue with size qlen. Two major queue
management schemes are used in Internet: drop-tail and Random Early Detection (RED).
Our extended simulation show that these two queue management schemes lead to similar
statistical properties of BGP session lifetime in our speciﬁc cases. This is because we are
interested in severe network congestion where the averaged queue length is almost full at
all time (i.e., averaged queue length exceeds the larger threshold in RED) and thus RED
behaves similar to drop-tail in these scenarios. Therefore, we focus on drop-tail queue for the
purpose of BGP reliability investigation. Once the number of packets in the queue exceeds
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qlen1, the newly arrivals are discarded, including the KEEPALIVE messages of BGP. The
properties of packet drop probability under the two bandwidth saturation scenarios will be
discussed in Section 4.3.
BGP session lifetime is deﬁned as the time interval starting from the beginning of the
impulse event to the expiration of the Hold Timers. After Hold Timer expires, the BGP
router falls into Idle state and routing function terminates. We do not consider the following
recovery process in BGP, such as BGP connection connection retry. Once Hold Timer
expires, the session is declared to be failed. Because the packet loss in the congestion
is a time-varying process, it is extremely hard to ﬁnd out the exact closed-form solution
of the BGP session lifetime. Therefore, we rely on simulations and statistical analysis to
investigate the statistical properties of BGP session lifetime, and then propose models to
approximate the lifetime distributions. Speciﬁcally, by setting up the traﬃc impulses in the
simulator, we collect a large number of samples of the BGP session lifetime, and the Kaplan-
Meier estimator [42] is used to extract the CCDF(Complementary Cumulative Distribution
Function, also called empirical survival function) of BGP sessions. Based on the observation
on the shape of the CCDF’s, we give three models for BGP session lifetime approximation,
and perform Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [43] to validate the accuracy of the models.
Our simulation is carried out on the network topology described in Fig. 4.1. The adopted
simulator is SSFNet (version 2.0.0) [39]. We modiﬁed the drop-tail queuing module such that
the queue size is controlled by the number of packets. The link capacity between hosts and
routers is 100Mbps, which is larger than the capacity between routers r1 and r2, so that the
link, which the BGP session passes, is the bottleneck. The propagation delay between the
two routers is 10ms. TCP Reno is used in our study, which is the most widely deployed
TCP version. The network parameters for diﬀerent simulation scenarios are summarized in
Table 4.1.
1The other option of controlling queue length is by using the number of bits instead of the number of
packets, which favors the packets with smaller size. In this thesis, we only consider the drop-tail queue
managed by the number of packets, which is widely adopted in the Internet routers [41].
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Table 4.1: Simulation parameters for studying BGP session lifetime.
router link capacity c T1 (1.5Mbps), 5Mbps, and 10Mbps
router queue size, qlen 75, 250, 500, and 1000 pkts
rtt of hosts 30ms and 120ms, uniform for all hosts, or
(propagation delay) randomly generated from [0, 60] and [0, 240]
TCP connections, conn 500, 1000, 1500, 2000, and 3000
UDP connections, conn 500
worm propagation rate2, β 0.0005, 0.001, 0.002 and 0.004
packet size, l TCP 500, 1000 bytes. UDP 256 Bytes.
4.3 Characterizing Packet Loss in TCP and UDP
Bandwidth Saturation
Recall that we mainly consider two typical scenarios of bandwidth saturation in this chapter.
The ﬁrst scenario is caused by traﬃc engineering failures, and a large number of TCP ﬂows
are dumped to a link which has relatively small capacity. The second scenario is caused by
the scanning worms, and the available bandwidth on the link is saturated by lots of UDP
ﬂows.
The percentage of discarded packets, i.e., the packet drop probability, is the parameter
we are interested in, which largely determines the property of BGP lifetime. In the follow-
ing section, we will show that the packet drop probability behaves diﬀerently in the two
bandwidth saturation scenarios.
4.3.1 Packet Loss in TCP Bandwidth Saturation
In order to obtain the packet drop probability under TCP bandwidth saturation, two facts
about TCP retransmission are important. First, in TCP implementations [38], packets are
retransmitted in an exponential backoﬀ manner, i.e., RTO = min(2kR0, Rm), where k is
the backoﬀ counter, R0 is the initial value of RTO, and Rm is the maximum retransmission
2The worm propagation rate β will be introduced in Section 4.4.
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timeout limit. The default value of Rm is 64 seconds. R0 is calculated from the RTT (Round
Trip Time). Second, the backoﬀ counter is increased by one on each packet timeout. Only
on a successful packet transmission, the backoﬀ counter is reset to zero3. The maximum
value of the backoﬀ counter ζ is 12. If the maximum value is exceeded, the TCP connection
is dropped.
Before delving into the detailed exploitation of the packet drop probability, pd, in TCP
bandwidth saturation, we notice that pd is time-variant, due to the fact that some of the TCP
connections terminate when their backoﬀ counters exceed the limit (12) and hence both the
number of ﬂows and the packet drop probability decrease gradually as time elapses. There-
fore, we investigate pd in two aspects. First, we calculate pd in transient period by leveraging
a ﬁxed point model derived from a Markov Chain. The transient period corresponds to the
time interval from the beginning of the congestion to the time when any TCP connection is
lost. Second, we use empirical study to characterize the long-term packet drop probability
and the survived number of TCP connections. In particular, pd is averaged over a large time
scale (hundreds of seconds) to support our further study on BGP session lifetime.
Packet Drop Probability in Transient Period
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Figure 4.2: Discrete time Markov chain for TCP state transition in severely congested net-
works.
3The backoﬀ counter should not be reset, until the acknowledgment for a non-retransmitted packet is
received. Especially, the successful retransmission does not reset the backoﬀ counter.
48
The TCP behavior subject to the heavy congestion can be approximately modeled as a
Markov Chain, as shown in Fig. 4.2. The number on (or beside) the arrows stands for the
transition probability. p is the probability that a packet is discarded at the drop-tail queue.
Each state i is identiﬁed by a two-tuple (wi, ki), where wi stands for the congestion window
size in terms of packet number, and ki is the backoﬀ counter. We are only interested in
the behavior of TCP under severe congestion. Because timeouts happen frequently in this
condition and TCP stays mainly in the slow-start phase, it is reasonable for us to assume
that the slow start threshold is two and we ignore the states whose windows are larger
than four, i.e., the congestion window can only increases up to four and then it shrinks to
one. On every packet transmission failure, the congestion window also shrinks to one, and
the retransmission is deferred after the timeout. If the retransmitted packet is dropped,
the congestion window remains the same, while the backoﬀ counter increases by one. On
the contrary, upon each successful packet retransmission, the congestion window increases
by one and the backoﬀ counter remains the same. For example, upon a successful packet
retransmission at state (1, 3), the state jumps to (2, 3). At states (2, k), two packets are sent
out. If both packets are successfully delivered, the congestion window increases by one, the
backoﬀ counter is cleared, and the state jumps to (3, 0); if the ﬁrst packet is successfully
transmitted and the second packet is lost, the state jumps to (1, 1), and the acknowledgment
of the ﬁrst packet also triggers a packet sending; in all other cases, no new acknowledgment is
received, and the state jumps to (1, k+1). The ’End’ state means that the TCP connection
is dropped due to too many backoﬀs.
In order to make the chain to be positive recurrent, we add an additional transition from
state ’End’ to state (1, 11) with probability 1. Thus, the equilibrium distribution the Markov
chain can be calculated. However, because of the additional state transition, the packet drop
probability will be overestimated, and our simulation results also conﬁrm this diﬀerence.
Suppose πi is the equilibrium distribution of state i, and L is the packet size, i.e., L =
(MSS +40) ∗ 8 bits, where MSS is the maximum segment size in TCP protocol. Then, the
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traﬃc rate generated by a single TCP source is approximated by
r(p) =
L
∑
∀i πiE(Pi)∑
∀i πiE(Ti)
,
where E(Pi) is the expected number of packets that are sent from state i,
E(Pi) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 : if wi = 1
wi +
∑wi−1
j=1 p(1− p)jj : else
and E(Ti) is the expected time of staying in state i,
E(Ti) = (1− p)wiRTT + (1− (1− p)wi)min(2kiR0, Rm) .
Since, r(p) is the average sending rate of a single TCP source, if there are n such connections,
the capacity of link is c, and there is no buﬀer in the queue, we can deﬁne the following
function:
Γ(p) =
[
nr(p)− c
nr(p)
]
+
Γ(p) stands for the percentage of packet loss on the congested link. Thus, the ﬁxed point
solution of Γ(p) is the average packet drop probability pd in the transient period of TCP
saturation. That is, pd satisﬁes the following equation:
Γ(pd) = pd. (4.1)
Because Γ(p) is a continuous monotonically decreasing function of p ∈ [0, 1], and Γ(p) ∈
[0, 1], it is guaranteed that Γ(p) has one and only one ﬁxed point. Through binary search,
we can solve Eq. (4.1) and obtain the approximate result of packet drop probability. This
approximation is derived based on the assumptions that every TCP ﬂow has the same RTT
and there is no queue at the router. When the queue exists, this value actually provides an
upper bound of the packet drop probability.
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By using SSFNet simulator, we compare the pd calculated from Eq. (4.1) with the results
obtained from the simulation. Three types of links and diﬀerent queue sizes are tested (based
on the topology in Fig. 4.1). Each TCP ﬂow has RTT = 30ms (not including the queuing
delay). The results are shown in Fig. 4.3. The packet drop probability pd from simulations is
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Figure 4.3: Packet drop probability pd wrt. the number of TCP ﬂows in transient stage.
averaged in the whole transient period (about 500 seconds). Our ﬁxed point model tracks pd
at the large timescale very well. The small amount of overestimation is caused by two factors:
the introduction of the queue and the special treatment of the ‘End’ state as mentioned at
the beginning of this section. In addition, Fig. 4.3(a) shows that a larger queue size incurs
less packet drop probability.
The packet size also matters (Fig. 4.3(b)). An interesting fact is observed: the packet
drop probability under the (10Mbps, L=1000B) case is the same as that of the (5Mbps,
L=500B) case. This can be explained by our ﬁxed point model: in both cases, the link has
the same forwarding capacity in terms of the number of packets, and thus results in the same
ﬁxed point solution. Due to this result, in what follows, we will focus only on the cases with
packet size 1000 bytes.
The ﬁxed point model gives us an estimation on pd in transient period. In addition, if
the number of the TCP connections is not very large, then no TCP connection is actually
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dropped. Under this circumstance, the transient period extends to the entire time axis and
thus the results obtained by this model provide an approximation for the whole time period.
In general, under severe congestion, the above model is incapable of generating satisfactory
results as time goes to inﬁnity, and we aim to explore the behavior of the packet drop
probability in long-term period by empirical study.
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Figure 4.4: TCP behaviors under bandwidth saturation in long-term period.
Long-term Behaviors of TCP
In the long run, as the bottleneck link gets saturated, some TCP connections are dropped
gradually, which leads to smaller number of TCP connections competing the bandwidth on
the bottleneck link. Usually, it is intractable to get a closed-form result of pd over time.
Therefore, we study the behavior of packet drop by simulations. The results are shown in
Fig. 4.4.
We only show the cases where RTT is 30ms (for the 120ms cases, we get similar results.).
The packet drop probability pd is obtained by averaging the instantaneous results over a
time granularity of 600 seconds. In the ﬁgures, both axes are in logarithmic scale, therefore
a straight line implies a power-low behavior. In other words, pd decreases approximately in
a power-low, which means that the decreasing rate of pd is much slower than an exponential
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decreasing way. To be more conservative, we refer to a milder notion: subexponential
distribution, which includes power-low ones.
After the time exceeds 104 seconds, pd levels oﬀ, which indicates that the network enters
the equilibrium state (in term of packet drop). There are two interesting observations on
pd in this state: (1) Given a ﬁxed queue size, pd is insensitive to the initial number of
TCP connections, though they have diﬀerent pd’s in the transient state. The reason is
that when the number of TCP connections is larger, the packet drop probability in the
transient state is higher, and thus the drop rates of TCP connections are also higher than
those in the cases of smaller connection numbers. In addition, because of TCP’s congestion
control scheme (mainly timeouts during extremely congested periods), the remaining TCP
connections enter a safety state4, and the packet drop probability remains stable around the
same pd. (2) Whether the RTT is uniformly or randomly distributed signiﬁcantly inﬂuences
the equilibrium state of pd. The random RTT leads to lower equilibrium pd than the uniform
RTT. Moreover, when the TCP hosts have uniform RTT, increasing queue size can eﬀectively
absorb the burstiness of TCP ﬂows and decrease pd (shown in Fig. 4.4(b)). On the other
hand, Fig. 4.4(c) demonstrates that the queue size does not has too much impact on the
equilibrium pd, when the RTT is randomly distributed
5. Due to this reason, in Section 4.4
we will see that the queue size has only minor impact on the BGP session lifetime.
4.3.2 Packet Loss in UDP Bandwidth Saturation
Diﬀerent types of worms may have speciﬁc scanning behaviors. In this chapter, we assume
the worms scan IP addresses randomly. Because UDP packets generated by worms are non-
elastic, the inﬂuence of the queue size can be ignored. Thus, we can calculate the packet drop
probability more easily than in the cases of TCP. Suppose we have m hosts in one domain,
which have been infected by worms. Every host sends out scanning packets to randomly
4That is, in the equilibrium state, the drop rate of TCP connections decreases to a very small value, and
no further TCP connection drop happens.
5However, large queue size can still substantially decrease pd in the transient state.
53
generated IP addresses. Let r denote the rate of the packets that are sent to the addresses
of other domains by each host, i.e., each infected host contributes r packets per second to
the link between routers r1 and r2 in Fig. 4.1. m and r can be obtained from the network
address allocation information and the routing tables. Thus, the packet drop probability can
be calculated as
pd =
[
1− c
mrL
]
+
, (4.2)
where L is the size of the UDP packet.
If the propagation process of worms needs to be addressed, the number of infected hosts
is an increasing function of time. We use the epidemic model to characterize the worm
propagation. Suppose β is the contact rate of two hosts, and n is the total number of
hosts in one domain. Initially, there is one host been infected. At the ith period, i.e.,
t ∈ ((i− 1)∆T, i∆T ), the number of infected hosts [44] is
m(t) =
n
1 + (n− 1)e−βni (4.3)
where ∆T is the length of each infection period. Thus, by plugging m(t) into Equation 4.2,
we get the packet drop probability
pd 
[
p∗d −
c
rL
e−βn
t
∆T

]
+
(4.4)
where, p∗d is the drop probability when the worm propagation is matured in the domain
(all the hosts in the domain are infected), and p∗d =
[
1− c
nrL
]
+
. Diﬀerent from the TCP
saturation, pd in worm scanning increases in an exponential way toward the matured value
p∗d.
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4.4 CCDF Test on Lifetime of BGP Sessions
In this section, we study the qualitative properties of BGP session lifetime under the band-
width saturation. We mainly focus on the shape of the distribution functions and classify
the distribution categories. In Section 4.5, we will give a quantitative description of the BGP
session lifetime distribution.
For convenience, the BGP session lifetime is denoted as Tb. The CCDF, or survival
function6, is denoted as S(t). That is, S(t) = P [Tb > t].
The network simulation parameters are shown in Table 4.1. For each combination of
the parameters, we obtained 200 samples of Tb. The size of the sample set is large enough
for estimating precisely the mean and the distribution of the BGP session lifetime. Each
sample is obtained by running the simulation for up to Ts seconds (in simulation time). If
the BGP session is still alive after Ts seconds, the sample is right censored with respect to
Ts. In our simulation, Ts is as large as 150000 seconds and the percentage of the censored
samples is very small. Totally, we collected over 20000 BGP session lifetime samples, which
cover a wide range of network conﬁgurations. Every CCDF S(t) is estimated by employing
the Kaplan-Meier estimator [42] from 200 samples. We study the distribution families that
S(t) belongs to and the impacts of the network conﬁguration parameters, including the
number of connections (conn), RTT (rtt), queue size (qlen), worm contact rate (β), etc. In
the following parts, we ﬁrst look at the TCP saturation case, and then discuss the UDP
case. Due to space limit, we only present a small portion of the results, which are most
representative.
4.4.1 BGP Lifetime under TCP Saturation
Whether or not the TCP connections possess the same RTT inﬂuences the packet drop
probability pd. Hence, we consider the BGP session lifetime distribution under two sub-cases
6In the following sections, we use survival function and CCDF interchangeably.
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Figure 4.5: CCDF of BGP session lifetime Tb (S(t)) in TCP saturation state.
separately: (1) the RTT’s are randomly distributed with mean rtt; (2) all TCP connections
have the same RTT (uniform RTT).
Random RTT
Fig. 4.5(a) shows the empirical CCDF when we change conn, while keeping other parameters
unchanged. Notice that the y-axis is in logarithmic scale, so a straight line indicates an
exponential distribution. Thus, a straightforward conclusion is that Tb has an exponential
distribution in TCP saturation with random RTT. In the ﬁgure, the dotted lines are the
ﬁtted CCDF’s of exponential distributions. λ is the rate of the exponential distribution.
However, if the congestion level is not high, for example, the link capacity is relatively
large or the number of TCP connections is relatively small, the lifetime distribution tends
to have a heavier tail than the exponential distribution. This fact is demonstrated in Fig.
4.5(b). Comparing the three curves in the ﬁgure, we notice that the CCDF shows concave
up pattern as the link capacity increases. This reminds us that other types of distributions,
such as Weibull distribution, should be applied (the details will be explained in Section 4.5).
From the ﬁgure, we also notice that the CCDF curves do not start from time zero (we will
see this more clearly in the following ﬁgures). Recall that Tb is deﬁned as the time interval
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from the beginning of the bandwidth saturation to the expiration of the Hold Timers. The
KeepAlive messages are sent to the peers every Tk seconds, and the Hold Timers, which
have period Th, are reset once the KeepAlive messages are received. Thus, the smallest
value that Tb can take is Th− Tk. Therefore, the CCDF curve does not start from time zero
and has a positive shift.
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Figure 4.6: Empirical mean and variance of BGP session lifetime (seconds) in TCP saturation
state (random RTT).
We show the empirical mean and variance of the BGP session lifetime under diﬀerent
network conﬁgurations in Fig. 4.6. There are several observations: (1) The mean of the life-
time is approximately the square root of the variance of the lifetime, which further conﬁrms
the exponential behavior of the BGP lifetime; (2) The queue size at the router has impact
on the BGP lifetime. On average, a larger queue size usually results in a longer lifetime,
especially when the number of TCP connections is small. However, if the number of TCP
connections is large, the impact of the queue size is minor (Fig. 4.6(a)); (3) The number
of TCP connections plays an important role in aﬀecting the BGP lifetime. Speciﬁcally, the
fewer the TCP connections, the larger the mean of the lifetime. We also notice that smaller
RTT of the background TCP traﬃc leads to a shorter BGP lifetime, because TCP tends to
send packets more promptly, if the RTT is small. Therefore, during the traﬃc engineering
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failures, the fate of the BGP session is mainly determined by the volume of the TCP traﬃc
dumped into the bottleneck link.
Uniform RTT
In the uniform RTT scenario, the BGP session lifetime has distinct diﬀerence in the statistic
distribution from the random RTT case. We show the result in Fig. 4.5(c). Note that in
a log-log plot, a straight line indicates a power-law behavior. We ﬁt the CCDF’s to Pareto
distributions (as shown in dotted lines in Fig. 4.5(c)) with the shape parameter α’s. In our
simulation results, the ﬁtted α ranges from 0.76 to 1.9, which indicates the heavy-tailedness
of the BGP session lifetime, i.e., Tb has inﬁnite variance. It also implies that under severe
TCP congestion of uniform RTT case, the majority of the BGP sessions have short lifetimes,
but there exists a minor portion of the BGP sessions whose lifetimes are extremely long and
cause the variance of the BGP session lifetime to approach inﬁnity.
4.4.2 BGP Lifetime under UDP Saturation
As we have mentioned, the UDP saturation is caused by the worm scanning. The worm
propagation consists of two phases: ﬁrst, the worms infect more computers and the worm-
generated traﬃc rate increases steadily; second, the worms infect all computers in a domain,
and the worm traﬃc resembles a constant bit-rate type of traﬃc. We consider the second
phase ﬁrst and then discuss the ﬁrst phase.
Constant Bit-rate Traﬃc
For the constant bit-rate traﬃc, the packet drop probability pd does not vary over time. In our
simulations, in order to set up the environment to have probability pd, it is straightforward
to see that the sending rate of each ﬂow satisﬁes r = c
nl(1−pd) (pkts/sec), where c is the link
capacity, l is the UDP packet size, n is the total number of UDP ﬂows and n equals 500 in
our simulation.
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When the packet drop probability, pd, is not very high, the constant bit-rate UDP satura-
tion leads to exponentially distributed BGP lifetimes. An example of the simulation results is
shown in Fig. 4.7(a), where the CCDF curves are linear in the logarithmic scale coordinate.
However, when pd is large, the tail of the lifetime tends to decrease faster than an expo-
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Figure 4.7: CCDF of BGP session lifetime in UDP saturation state.
nential way. This is because, with large pd, the majority of the BGP packets are dropped,
and the BGP session tends to terminate promptly7. The simulation results are shown in
Fig. 4.7(b), where the two groups of curves correspond to pd = 0.8 and pd = 0.95. The
reason why the supexponential pattern does not appear in TCP case is that for TCP ﬂows,
pd is usually small. Even if pd is large, TCP connections shrink the congestion window mul-
tiplicatively, the retransmission timers increase to large values, and some TCP connections
are even dropped. All these factors make pd decrease from the large value promptly.
Worm propagation Traﬃc
We consider the worms of random scanning type. Its behavior is characterized by Equation
4.3. In order to simulate the increase of the worm traﬃc during the worm propagation
7When pd is very close to 1, no packet is actually delivered successfully. Tb depends only on the starting
time of the bandwidth saturation, and follows uniform distribution in [Th−Tk, Th]. We skip this trivial case
in the following sections.
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process, the start time of each UDP source is scheduled according to Equation 4.3, that is,
the jth source starts at time ∆T
nβ
ln (n−1)j
n−j . In simulations, the worm contact period ∆T is set
to be 30 seconds, and n equals 500.
Fig. 4.7(c) shows two of the CCDF curves of BGP session lifetime when the worm
propagation processes are considered. Again, the distribution of Td can be approximated
by exponential distributions, i.e., S(t) = e−λ(t−b). From the simulation results, we observe
that the rate parameter λ of the lifetime distribution is mainly inﬂuenced by p∗d only. The
transient stage during the worm propagation and the worm contact rate β do not have much
impact on the shape of the distribution and λ. The shift parameter b is inﬂuenced by β
largely. If β goes to ∞, the worms infect all hosts instantly, and this case degenerates to the
constant bit-rate UDP saturation scenario.
4.5 Fitting the Distribution of BGP Session Lifetime
To reﬁne our empirical study of the BGP session lifetimes, we provide a quantitative analysis
in this section. Speciﬁcally, based on our previous observations in Section 4.4, we present
three models to ﬁt the distributions of the BGP session lifetime. The adopted procedures
include: (1) use Most Likelihood Estimation (MLE) to estimate the parameters of the pro-
posed models; (2) apply the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test [43] on the empirical CCDF and
the proposed ﬁtting models to check whether or not the models are appropriate. Although
the scenario of TCP saturation with uniform RTT provides us more insight into the lifetime
distribution, it is unlikely to happen in practice. Thus, in what follows, we mainly focus on
the UDP saturation and the TCP saturation with random RTT’s.
Suppose Sˆ(t) is the estimated survival function from one of the three models, and S(t)
is the empirical survival function from the sample data. Hypothesis H = 0 means that Sˆ(t)
is accepted to be the estimation of the survival function for the samples; otherwise, H = 1.
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The K-S test statistic is
kss = maxi
∣∣∣S(ti)− Sˆ(ti)∣∣∣ .
Sˆ(t) is accepted, i.e., H = 0, only if kss is smaller than a critical value. In our test, the
critical value is 1.36/
√
n, which oﬀers the signiﬁcance level of 0.058 [43]. Besides kss, we
also deﬁne the average error ξ between the estimated function and the empirical function as
follows:
ξ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣S(ti)− Sˆ(ti)∣∣∣ .
4.5.1 Distribution Models for BGP Session Lifetime
Three ﬁtting models are proposed for BGP session lifetime distributions. The ﬁrst model is
the shifted exponential distribution; the second one is the hybrid model combing a uniform
distribution and an exponential one; the third one is the Weibull distribution.
Shifted Exponential Model (SEM)
The results in Section 4.4 show that in many cases the CCDF of the BGP session lifetime
Tb follows an exponential way. We also notice that the CCDF of the lifetime has a positive
shift from the zero, i.e., the minimal value of Tb is greater than zero. Therefore, the most
straightforward way to ﬁt the BGP session lifetime distribution is a Shifted Exponential
Model (SEM):
S(t) = e−λ(t−b), (4.5)
where b is the shift parameter, and λ is the rate.
The rate parameter λ and shift parameter b can be estimated based on n lifetime samples
{ti} from the simulations using MLE. Without loss of generality, we assume ti is sorted in an
increasing order (ti ≤ ti+1, 1 ≤ i < n). The ﬁrst r elements in {ti} are the lifetime samples
8A signiﬁcance level of 0.05 means that the probability of deciding H = 1 while the actual value holds 0
is 0.05.
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of BGP sessions that break during the simulation. The remaining elements stand for the
truncation time Ts, which means that n − r BGP session lifetime samples exceed the total
simulation time, and thus the real lifetime samples are not available. Thus, the likelihood
function reads:
L(λ, b) =
r∏
i=1
λe−λ(ti−b)
n∏
i=r+1
e−λ(Ts−b)
It is easy to see that there is no nontrivial b to maximize the above function, and we choose
b∗ = mini ti. Given b, L is a concave function of λ. By solving ∂L∂λ = 0, we obtain λ
∗ that
maximizes the likelihood function L.
λ∗ =
(∑r
i=1 ti
r
− b + (Ts − b)(n− r)
r
)−1
(4.6)
The detailed results of ﬁtting SEM and K-S test are shown in Table 4.2 and 4.3. We
only present the results when qlen equals 75. The other cases have similar results and lead
to the same conclusions.
Table 4.2: Fitting the BGP lifetime distributions in UDP traﬃc saturation. 10Mbps link.
qlen = 75. K-S signiﬁcance level is 0.05.
Models pd λ ×10−4 α b/b1 kss ξ H
0.2 0.6000 - 135.7 0.06104 0.02521 0
0.4 21.79 - 101.8 0.06523 0.02608 0SEM
0.6 48.09 - 62.35 0.1706 0.06227 1
0.8 155.6 - 61.69 0.1772 0.08726 1
0.2 0.5986 - 135.7 0.06114 0.02463 0
0.4 23.32 - 202.3 0.07352 0.02438 0RSEM
0.6 64.83 - 173.4 0.08019 0.02737 0
0.8 303.0 - 128.9 0.06125 0.02842 0
0.2 1.931 0.8854 135.7 0.04904 0.02282 0
0.4 14.05 1.067 101.6 0.08098 0.02891 0WM
0.6 9.117 1.291 61.57 0.09808 0.04213 0
0.8 7.219 1.676 59.02 0.03639 0.01092 0
We observe that SEM performs well (smaller kss and ξ) in UDP saturation when the
packet drop probability pd is not very large. In the ﬁrst two cases, pd = 0.2 or 0.4, the ﬁtted
SEM model is accepted by the K-S test. However, when pd is larger than 0.6, the errors
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Table 4.3: Fitting the BGP lifetime distributions in TCP traﬃc saturation. T1 link.
qlen = 75. K-S signiﬁcance level is 0.05.
rtt Models conn λ ×10−4 α b/b1 kss ξ H
500 7.513 - 98.54 0.03986 0.01499 0
SEM 1000 14.80 - 68.46 0.04774 0.01421 0
2000 23.19 - 63.92 0.09567 0.03185 1
500 7.817 - 241.4 0.04568 0.01863 0
0.03 RSEM 1000 15.45 - 134.0 0.04222 0.01010 0
2000 25.32 - 141.1 0.06223 0.01562 0
500 9.223 0.9731 98.53 0.04409 0.01540 0
WM 1000 10.26 1.053 68.09 0.04545 0.01339 0
2000 7.924 1.1660 63.33 0.05666 0.01801 0
500 1.523 - 107.8 0.1118 0.04877 1
SEM 1000 4.360 - 99.69 0.1050 0.05369 1
2000 8.643 - 62.01 0.08531 0.03848 0
500 1.524 - 161.7 0.1121 0.04894 1
0.12 RSEM 1000 4.428 - 210.2 0.1096 0.05785 1
2000 9.197 - 204.6 0.09296 0.03601 0
500 8.306 0.8172 107.8 0.03857 0.01090 0
WM 1000 18.67 0.8249 99.68 0.06090 0.02170 0
2000 9.808 0.9832 62.00 0.08088 0.03775 0
increase considerably. While, for the TCP saturation, SEM does not provide satisfactory
performance, especially when the congestion level is either too high (small rtt and large
conn) or too low (large rtt and small conn).
In order to demonstrate the cases where SEM does not perform well, we show an example
of the empirical CCDF with 95% conﬁdence interval and the ﬁtted curves in UDP saturation
in Fig. 4.8. Due to the heavy bandwidth saturation (pd = 0.8), the empirical CCDF (the
staircase curve in the ﬁgure) is a concave down curve, deviating from the linear pattern, and
thus SEM fails to match it.
Since the empirical CCDF shows a concave down pattern in severe UDP saturation,
which resembles the behavior of uniform distribution, we envision the shift parameter b in
the lifetime distribution to be a uniformly distributed random variable, instead of treating
it to be deterministic. Thus, we have the following model.
63
50 100 150 200 250 300 350
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
BGP lifetime: Tb
CC
DF
Empirical CCDF (CI=95%)
SEM
RSEM
WM
Figure 4.8: CCDF test of UDP satu-
ration. 10mbps link, pd = 0.8, and
qlen = 75. The empirical CCDF
shows a concave down pattern.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
x 104
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
BGP lifetime:  Tb
CC
DF
Empirical CCDF (CI=95%)
SEM
RSEM
WM
Figure 4.9: CCDF test of TCP satu-
ration. 10mbps link, conn = 5000,
rtt = 0.03 and qlen = 75. The
empirical CCDF shows a concave up
pattern.
Randomly Shifted Exponential Model (RSEM)
We model the BGP session lifetime by summing a uniformly distributed random variable b
and an exponential random variable κ:
Tˆb = κ + b, (4.7)
where κ and b are independent, κ follows exponential distribution with rate λ, and b is
uniformly distributed in [b0, b1]. b0 equals Th − Tk, which is the minimum value of the BGP
session lifetime. b1 and λ are the parameters to be estimated from the lifetime samples.
We can derive the BGP session survival function from Equation 4.7 as follows:
S(t) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1
λ(b1−b0)(e
λb1 − eλb0)e−λt : if t ≥ b1
1
λ(b1−b0) [1− λ(t− b1)− e−λ(t−b0)] : if b0 ≤ t < b1,
(4.8)
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and the density function of the session lifetime is
f(t) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1
b1−b0 (e
λb1 − eλb0)e−λt : if t ≥ b1
1
b1−b0 [1− e−λ(t−b0)] : if b0 ≤ t < b1.
(4.9)
In order to estimate λ and b1, the likelihood function is deﬁned as follows:
L(λ, b1) =
r∏
i=1
f(ti)
n∏
i=r+1
S(Ts).
In general, we rely on numerical methods to ﬁnd λ∗ and b∗1, such that L is maximized.
However, in a special case, where b1 is known and b1 ≤ ti ≤ Ts for all i, λ∗ can be calculated
analytically:
λ∗ =
1
b1 − b0 ln
∑
i ti/n− b0∑
i ti/n− b1
.
The ﬁtted results of RSEM model are shown in Table 4.2 and 4.3. We can say that,
compared with SEM, RSEM ﬁts all cases of UDP bandwidth saturation well, and the model
is accepted by the K-S test. Fig. 4.8 also demonstrates that RSEM ﬁts the survival function
nicely even when the packet drop probability is large.
In TCP saturation, from Table 4.3, we observe that RSEM performs well when the
congestion level is high (large conn and small rtt). However, when the congestion level is
low (small conn and large rtt), the ﬁtting errors increase. We can also see this in Fig. 4.9,
where 5000 TCP connections are simulated in a link of 10Mbps. The empirical CCDF with
95% conﬁdence interval is shown in the ﬁgure. Due to the large link capacity, the congestion
level is low, and the empirical CCDF has a concave up pattern, and both RSEM and SEM
fail to track this pattern. This motivates us to look for more ﬂexible models.
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Weibull Model (WM)
So far, we ﬁnd that SEM and RSEM perform well in some cases, where the real survival
functions are either linear or concave down. On the other hand, they are not good candidates
for ﬁtting real survival functions with a concave up pattern. Thus, we turn to a third model
for BGP session lifetime — Weibull distribution, which is more ﬂexible than the previous
two models. The Weibull model is deﬁned as follows:
S(t) = e−λ(t−b)
α
, (4.10)
where α is the parameter to control the shape of the survival function. The MLE function is
L(λ, α, b) = λrαre−λ
∑n
i=1(ti−b)α
r∏
i=1
(ti − b)α−1.
Similar to RSEM, in the Weibull model, we have to take numerical methods to ﬁnd the
values of λ∗, α∗, and b∗, such that L is maximized.
The results of Weibull model are shown in Table 4.2 and 4.3. WM can approximate the
BGP session lifetime well in all scenarios, and the errors are acceptable in K-S test. In Fig.
4.8 and 4.9, WM ﬁts the distribution with satisfactory precision when the survival function
is either concave up or concave down.
Furthermore, we compare the ﬁtting errors of the three models in Fig. 4.10. We treat
SEM as the base case, and show the ratio of the ﬁtting errors of RSEM and WM to the error
of SEM. In general, RSEM and WM outperform SEM. Speciﬁcally, (1) in UDP saturation
(Fig. 4.10(a) and 4.10(b)), SEM is comparable to the other models when the pd is relatively
small; for all pd’s, RSEM and WM perform roughly the same, but RSEM is a little better.
(2) In TCP saturation (Fig. 4.10(c) and 4.10(d)), when the TCP connection number is not
too small, the normalized ﬁtting errors of WM and RSEM are close to each other; when the
number of connections is around 1000, SEM has similar performance as RSEM and WM.
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Figure 4.10: Normalized ﬁtting errors of RSEM and WM averaged on qlen = 75, 250, 500,
and 1000.
Weibull distribution can also model the scenario of worm propagation precisely. The shift
parameter b is mainly determined by the worm propagation rate β. In the next section, we
discuss the underlying reasons that cause these performance diﬀerences for the three models.
4.5.2 Distribution Shape of BGP Session Lifetime
From the previous discussion, we know that WM can precisely ﬁt the distribution of BGP
session lifetime in almost all scenarios, while the exponential distribution based models, SEM
and RSEM, are acceptable only in some of the cases. We seek to explain the reasons why
this happens by discussing the shape parameter in the lifetime distribution under diﬀerent
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bandwidth saturation scenarios.
In Section 4.4, we show that the tail of the lifetime distribution deviates from the expo-
nential function in some scenarios. In WM, when α > 1, d
2 ln(S(t))
dt2
is smaller than zero, and
S(t) is concave down in the CCDF test; otherwise, it is concave up. Thus, the presence of the
shape parameter α in WM is the essential reason why WM can ﬁt the lifetime distribution
better than the other two.
From Equation 4.5 and 4.10, we can see that SEM is a special case of WM, with α = 1.
SREM is also an exponential model when t > b1, as shown in Equation 4.8. However, when
t ∈ [b0, b1), the uniform component makes the distribution to be concave down. Speciﬁcally,
we have
d2 ln (S(t))
dt2
= A
[
λ2
(
e−λ(t−b0) − 1
)
− λ3 (b1 − t) e−λ(t−b0)
]
< 0,
where A =
[
1 + λ(b1 − t)− eλ(t−b0)
]−2
> 0. Thus, S(t) in RSEM is concave down in the
CCDF test, and it corresponds to the shape parameter α greater than or equal to 1.0. We
thus conclude that the limitations of SEM and RSEM come from their linear or concave
down shape in CCDF, while WM is much more ﬂexible and its shape parameter can be
tuned to ﬁt linear, concave up or concave down distribution functions.
By ﬁtting WM to the empirical CCDF’s of all simulation scenarios, we can study how
the shape parameter changes under various network conﬁgurations. The results are shown
in Fig. 4.11.
In UDP saturation (Fig. 4.11(a)), α varies between 0.9 and 1.0, when the packet drop
probability is small. Since α is close to 1.0, SEM and RSEM ﬁt the lifetime distribution
precisely. On the other hand, when the congestion level is higher, α increases noticeably,
because high congestion level leads to smaller lifetimes and lighter tails. Since SEM can
only represent distributions with shape parameter 1.0, it can not provide satisfactory ﬁtting
results when pd is too large. However, RSEM still performs well in this scenario, because
68
the uniformly distributed component enables it to accommodate larger shape parameters
(α > 1).
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Figure 4.11: Shape change of lifetime distribution.
The behavior of BGP sessions in TCP saturation is more complex. Because of the
conservative packet transmission and the connection drops of the TCP sessions, the packet
drop probability in TCP saturation seldom reaches a large value. Thus, the shape parameter
in TCP saturation is smaller than that of UDP saturation. This fact is observed in Fig.
4.11(b). When the congestion level is high (for example qlen is small, rtt is small, conn is
large, or link capacity is low.), the shape parameter is close to or greater than 1.0, and thus
RSEM can provide satisfactory ﬁtting for the lifetime distribution. Due to its simplicity in
characterizing the shape parameter of the lifetime distribution, SEM can only perform well
in some cases.
Summary: Our ﬁndings on the models for the BGP session lifetime are summarized in
Fig. 4.12. WM is the most eﬀective model among the three, and it can ﬁt the lifetime
distribution in almost all cases we considered. The only exception is the TCP saturation
with uniform RTT. In this scenario, we have shown in Section 4.4 that the tail of the lifetime
tends to be power-law (can be ﬁtted by Pareto distributions). RSEM can be used for severe
TCP saturation, which is caused by a large number of TCP connections, small link capacity,
69
small queue size or small RTT. In UDP saturation, without considering worm propagation
process, RSEM provides satisfactory performance. The usage of SEM is limited to the cases
where the UDP bandwidth saturation is not severe.
TCP Saturation UDP Saturation
Random RTT Uniform RTT
Heavy Saturation
Worm Large  pd Small  pd
WM WM,
RSEM
WM,
RSEM,
SEM
Power-law
tail
WM,
RSEM
WM
Figure 4.12: Models of BGP session lifetime in diﬀerent scenarios.
4.6 Expected BGP Session Lifetime with Constant pd
In previous sections, we focus on studying the lifetime distribution of BGP sessions. In
practice, it is also very important to understand the characteristics of the average value of
the lifetime and its relationship with network conﬁgurations, especially TCP retransmission
behaviors.
As has been discussed in Section 4.1, it is diﬃcult to model Tb and its expected value pre-
cisely. In this section, two assumptions make the analysis of the expected lifetime tractable:
(1) the packet drop probability is ﬁxed; (2) there are always BGP messages ready for trans-
mission. These assumptions are also made in [10], but we consider more realistic TCP
retransmission behavior and extend the U2D time to the lifetime by leveraging the empirical
study results introduced in previous sections. The simulation results, which will be pre-
sented later, show that our model can predict the U2D time more precisely than that in [10].
Furthermore, based on the model, we will show that we can improve the robustness of BGP
sessions by tuning TCP parameters appropriately.
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4.6.1 Modeling the U2D Time
The U2D time Tu2d is deﬁned based on a single Hold Timer and it denotes the time interval
from the beginning of the network congestion to the happening of the Hold Timer expiration
event. Tu2d is diﬀerent from the BGP lifetime Tb deﬁned here. Tb is based on two Holder
Timers related to one session, and upon either expiration of the two timers, the session fails.
In TCP Reno implementations [38], upon timeouts, packets are retransmitted in an ex-
ponential backoﬀ manner, i.e., retransmission timeout RTO equals min(2kR0, Rm), where k
is the backoﬀ counter, R0 is the initial value of RTO, and Rm is the maximum retransmission
timeout limit. The default value of Rm is 64 seconds. R0 is calculated from the RTT (Round
Trip Time). The backoﬀ counter increases by one on each timeout. Only upon a successful
packet transmission, the backoﬀ counter is reset to zero9. We denote the maximum value of
the backoﬀ counter as ζ whose default value is 12. If the maximum value is exceeded, the
TCP connection is terminated.
(0, 0)
END
(0, 1) (0, 2) (0, t0)
(1, 1) (1, 2) (1, t1)
(2, 2) (2, t2)
(]-1,
t]−1)
(]-1,
]-1)
(], t])
(t0,t0)
(t1,t1)
(t2,t2)
Figure 4.13: Discrete time Markov chain for BGP U2D time. The dotted arrows stand
for packet loss transitions, which happen with probability pd; the solid arrows stand for
transitions of successful packet deliveries, which happen with probability 1− pd.
Our proposed Markov chain is described in Fig. 4.13. Except for the ‘End’ state, each
9The backoﬀ counter is not reset on the successful packet retransmission. In [10], this fact is not
considered.
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state is a two-tuple (s0, s). s0 is the initial value of the TCP backoﬀ counter, when a BGP
message is initially transmitted. s is the current TCP backoﬀ counter, when the BGP
message is transmitted or thereafter retransmitted. Thus, s0 ranges from 0 to ζ. Given R0,
Rm and Hold Timer period Th, the range of s has to satisfy the following two constraints:
1. s0 ≤ s ≤ ζ,
2.
∑s
i=s0
min(Rm, 2
iR0) < Th.
These two constraints guarantee that a BGP session fails upon either TCP connection drop
or BGP Hold Timer expiration. Obviously, the maximum value of s depends on s0. We
thus denote the maximum value of s, given s0, as ts0 , which is also shown in Fig. 4.13 and
can be obtained from the above two constraints. On each packet loss, s increases by one.
When the maximum value ts0 is exceeded, the state transits to ‘End’, i.e., the BGP session
fails. On the other hand, if the packet is transmitted for the ﬁrst time and it is successfully
delivered, the Hold Timer and backoﬀ counter are reset, and the state transits from (i, i) to
(0, 0). Upon a successful retransmission, the Hold Timer is cleared, but the backoﬀ counter
is unchanged, and the state transits from (i, j) to (j, j) (i = j).
Let us denote T (i,j) as the transition time from the state (i, j) to the state ‘END’ in the
Markov model. Based on this Markov model, the BGP U2D time Tu2d is the duration of an
excursion from the state (0, 0) to ‘End’, i.e., T (0,0). The distribution of Tu2d can be calculated
recursively by using the following equation:
P [Tu2d > t] = P [T
(0,0) > t] = (1− pd)P [T (0,0) > t−RTT ] + pdP [T (0,1) > t−R0]. (4.11)
Similarly, we have recursive equations for P [T (i,j) > t] of all other states in the Markov
model, and they can be solved recursively to get the CCDF of Tu2d.
Based on the distribution of Tu2d, the expected value E[Tu2d] can be derived. Moreover,
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E[Tu2d] may be directly calculated by solving a set of linear equations. For example,
E[T (0,0)] = (1− pd)(E[T (0,0)] + RTT ) + pd(E[T (0,1)] + R0),
and we have similar equations for the other states in the Markov model. With the knowledge
of Tu2d, we next discuss how to calculate the expected BGP session lifetime E[Tb].
4.6.2 Modeling the Expected BGP Session Lifetime E[Tb]
The BGP U2D time only characterizes the time when the single Hold Timer expires. In
reality, a BGP session fails when the Hold Timer of either routers expires. Let Tu2d and
T ′u2d stand for the BGP U2D time of the two routers. According to our deﬁnition, the BGP
lifetime is the minimum of the two U2D times, i.e., Tb = min(Tu2d, T
′
u2d).
We assume that Tu2d and T
′
u2d are two independent random variables. The assumption
is supported the fact that the packet sending processes of the two routers are independent
of each other in BGP. In our system model (Fig. 4.1), Tu2d and T
′
u2d may be correlated
due to TCP, if the TCP ACK is piggybacked with the data packet in the reverse direction.
However, this case does not frequently happen in the bandwidth saturation scenarios we are
studying. This is because in severely congested networks, the size of the sending window of
TCP is usually one. TCP has no more data packet to send, until the outstanding packet has
been acknowledged. Thus, when a data packet is received in TCP, it is very likely that a
pure ACK is sent back immediately (or after 200ms if delayed ACK is enabled) and the ACK
is rarely piggybacked. Thus, the correlation between Tu2d and T
′
u2d is not prominent. The
precision of our model shown in the following simulation section also demonstrates that this
assumption is reasonable. Thus, the distribution of Tb can be calculated as follows:P [Tb >
t] = P [Tu2d > t]P [T
′
u2d > t] = (P [Tu2d > t])
2. The expected value E[Tb] can also be obtained
accordingly.
Furthermore, from the results in Section 4.4 and Section 4.5, we know that the BGP
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session lifetime can be characterized by Weibull distribution, which provides a relatively
easier way to relate the U2D time with the lifetime.
Lemma 4.1 (Empirical Model) If the BGP U2D time Tu2d follows a Weibull distribution
with shape parameter α and shift parameter b, the relationship between the expected lifetime
and the expected U2D time is
E [Tb] = 2
− 1
α (E [Tu2d]− b) + b. (4.12)
Proof: Suppose the distribution of the U2D time is FTu2d(t) = 1 − e−λ(t−b)α. The
distribution of the BGP lifetime is FTb(t), and we have
FTb(t) = Pr [min(Tu2d, T
′
u2d) < t]
= 1− Pr [Tu2d > t]Pr [T ′u2d > t]
= 1− e−2λ(t−b)α
Therefore, the expected lifetime Tb is
E [Tb] = b +
∫ ∞
0
e−2λt
α
dt = b + 2−
1
α
∫ ∞
0
e−λx
α
dx
= b + 2−
1
α (E [Tu2d]− b) .
According to the study in previous sections, the shift parameter b is Th − Tk, i.e., the
minimum value of Tb; the shape parameter α is 1.0 or a little bit larger than 1.0. As an
approximation for the expected lifetime, we take α = 1.0, and thus
E[Tb]  E[Tu2d] + Th − Tk
2
. (4.13)
Therefore, we can calculate the expected BGP session lifetime by using Equation 4.13. The
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expected U2D time E[Tu2d] is obtained from the Markov model in the previous section.
4.6.3 Model Validation
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Figure 4.14: Expected lifetime of BGP sessions and U2D time. Th = 90 sec and Tk = 30 sec.
We implement a queuing module in SSFNet simulator, which drops any incoming packet
with a speciﬁed probability pd. Thus, we can obtain many lifetime samples of a BGP session
subject to constant packet drop probability. The results are summarized in Fig. 4.14. The
error bar represents the measured expected lifetime and its 99% conﬁdence interval from the
simulations. The analytical result is derived from Equation 4.12, and α is obtained by the
MLE based on the simulated samples. The ﬁgure shows that the analytical results ﬁt the
simulation results very well. Moreover, we calculate the BGP session lifetime by using the
simpliﬁed Equation 4.13, and the results are quite close to those calculated using Equation
4.1210.
In order to compare the model in [10] with ours, we calculate the U2D time by using
the model in [10] and the session lifetime by Equation 4.12. The results are plotted with
the legend ‘simple model’ in Fig. 4.14. It is shown that the simple model overestimates the
expected lifetime and U2D time considerably, especially when the packet drop probability
10We do not show this curve in the ﬁgure to make the picture clearer.
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is small. The overestimation is due to the ignorance of the realistic control scheme in TCP
retransmission backoﬀ counter.
One issue worth mentioning is that the expected BGP lifetime with constant packet drop
probability is not exactly the same as the expected BGP lifetime with the UDP induced
bandwidth saturation. This is because, in UDP saturation, the packet drop probability is
modulated by the instantaneous network conditions. Therefore, although the average drop
probability is ﬁxed, each speciﬁc BGP packet experiences diﬀerent dropping procedures.
This fact may lead to diﬀerences between the real UDP saturation and the ﬁxed packet drop
probability adopted in this model. Despite the existence of these diﬀerences, the proposed
model still provides us valuable hints in understanding the BGP session lifetimes.
We further calculate the distribution of BGP session lifetime by using Equation 4.11
and P [Tb > t] = (P [Tu2d > t)
2. In order to decrease the computation overhead, we assume
RTT is zero in the Markov model, since it is a small value compared with RTO and can be
ignored. The results are shown in Fig. 4.15. When the packet drop probability pd is not
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Figure 4.15: The CCDFs of BGP session lifetime derived from the Markov model.
very large (Fig. 4.15(a) and Fig. 4.15(b)), the computed CCDFs clearly have linear tails,
which leads to the approximation of the BGP session lifetime by the exponential distribution.
When pd is as large as 0.9, the CCDF shows staircase pattern but the trend is still linear.
The reason is that our Markov model is basically a discrete time model. When pd is large,
the discrete property of Tb obtained from the model is more noticeable. Moreover, in Fig.
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4.16, the expected values of Tb from the pure Markov model (i.e., using the above CCDFs )
and the empirical model (Lemma 4.1) are compared with the simulated result. The ﬁgure
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Figure 4.16: Expected lifetime of BGP sessions derived from the empirical model (Lemma
4.1) and the pure Markov model (Th = 90 sec and Tk = 30 sec).
shows that both two approaches to approximate E[Tb] have satisfying precision. However,
the result from Lemma 4.1 and Equation 4.13 has smaller computation complexity.
4.6.4 Increasing BGP Session Robustness
The lifetime of BGP sessions is essentially determined by the maximum number of packet
retransmissions that can be carried out before the Hold Timer expires. After a KeepAlive
message is delivered, the probability that the Hold Timer expires in the next Th seconds
decreases as the number of TCP retransmissions increases. In theory, the failure probabil-
ity of BGP sessions approaches zero asymptotically, as the number of TCP retransmissions
tends to inﬁnity. Thus, by making TCP retransmit packets more aggressively, we can im-
prove the robustness of BGP sessions. Although TCP can not achieve inﬁnite number of
retransmissions in a ﬁnite time period, we can tune TCP’s retransmission behavior slightly,
by changing the maximum backoﬀ counter ζ and the maximum RTO Rm, so as to obtain
signiﬁcant improvement for the BGP session lifetime.
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Figure 4.17: Expected BGP session lifetime E[Tb]. Th = 90 sec and Tk = 30 sec.
Fig. 4.17(a) shows the impacts of Rm and ζ on the expected BGP session lifetime E[Tb]
when packet drop probability is 0.4. A larger ζ leads to more TCP retransmissions and
thus increases E[Tb]. However, when Rm is large, ζ’s impact on the expected BGP session
lifetime is not signiﬁcant. For example, if Rm is set to be the default value, 64 seconds, the
ﬁgure shows that E[Tb] changes little as ζ increases. The reason is that due to the large
Rm, a few number of retransmission attempts take longer time than Th, and the Hold Timer
expires. Thus, the BGP session is dropped far ahead of the time instance when the TCP
retransmission counter reaches its limit ζ. Therefore, ζ’s impact is little. Similarly, when ζ
is small (e.g., the default ζ of TCP is 12), the impact of Rm is not signiﬁcant either. This is
because, whatever Rm is, before the Hold Timer expires, ζ has been reached, and thus only
ζ matters here. The default working point of BGP and TCP is also shown in Fig. 4.17(a).
Obviously, there is a large room of improvement for the expected BGP session lifetime.
Based on the above observations, we can increase the expected BGP session lifetime by
jointly adjusting the two TCP parameters, ξ and Rm. Fig. 4.17(b) compares E[Tb] of the
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default TCP settings with E[Tb] when Rm takes diﬀerent values and ζ = 30. Speciﬁcally, by
decreasing Rm from its default value 64 seconds to 8 seconds, the robustness of BGP sessions
is improved by multiple orders of magnitude. In most of cases (pd ≤ 0.7), the improvement
of the BGP session lifetime is signiﬁcant, as shown in Fig. 4.17(b). Our studies can thus
serve as the directions on how how to adjust the parameters and how much reliability gain
can be achieved.
Setting Rm and ζ in TCP module is a trivial job. Thus, the induced implementation
overhead in making this improvement is minor. Furthermore, the behavior of TCP is not
aﬀected if the congestion does not happen. We also argue that the incurred message overhead
due to the decrease of Rm and the increase of ζ is negligible. The reason is that only the
TCP modules on BGP routers are modiﬁed, and they generate a very small amount of extra
traﬃc in Internet. For example, if Rm = 8 seconds and ζ = 30, at most 60 packets are sent
out by a pair of BGP peers in 233 seconds of time. This is very small amount of traﬃc,
especially in bandwidth saturation scenario, but the BGP session lifetime is increased from
hundreds of seconds to about 105 seconds if pd equals 0.4. Thus, the additional message
overhead is quite worthwhile.
Besides by tuning the parameters of TCP, we can also increase BGP session lifetime
by diﬀerentiating BGP packets from the other packets. That is, give the IP packets which
contain BGP messages higher priority in packet forwarding. If this diﬀerentiated packet
processing is widely deployed, BGP messages will not be dropped due to queue overﬂow,
and BGP sessions will not be aﬀected by network congestion. However, this forwarding
service incurs extra overhead in packet classiﬁcation and it is not always available at BGP
routers in Internet. Our models on BGP session lifetime and techniques on TCP tuning can
improve BGP session robustness even if the diﬀerentiated forwarding service is not available.
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4.7 Summary
The reliability of BGP sessions is an important metric in evaluating the resilience of Internet
routing infrastructure. In this chapter, by using simulations and statistical methods, we
systematically study the BGP session lifetime under severe network congestion, which can
be caused by traﬃc engineering failure or worm attacks. By employing CCDF test and
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we argue that in most cases the BGP lifetime approximately
follows exponential distribution or Weibull distribution. However, in the TCP bandwidth
saturation case with uniform RTT, the lifetime distribution has a power-law tail. We also
reﬁne a previously proposed model [10] on the expected BGP session U2D time by considering
more realistic TCP retransmission behaviors, which improves the accuracy in predicting the
U2D time. Moreover, we propose a method to calculate the expected BGP lifetime based on
the results in the lifetime distribution study and investigate the impact of TCP parameters
on BGP session robustness. We show that by changing TCP parameters appropriately, the
expected BGP session lifetime can be dramatically increased.
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Chapter 5
Reliability of Internal BGP Networks
A reliable routing control plane in Internal Border Gateway Protocol (IBGP) is very im-
portant for achieving dependable Internet data communication. However, the reliability
modeling of IBGP and the design of reliable IBGP route reﬂection networks, which are of
great importance to increase the robustness of IBGP operations, have not been well investi-
gated.
In previous two chapters, we have studied the reliability of BGP sessions. In this chapter,
we focus on BGP networks. The reliability analysis of IBGP networks, which are overlaid
on top of IP networks, is challenging, because failures of IBGP sessions may be correlated
through the shared IGP routes. We ﬁrst present a model for the reliability analysis in IBGP
networks to characterize the correlated failures, followed by three metrics to measure the re-
liability of IBGP. Then, we investigate the optimization problems of ﬁnding the most reliable
IBGP route reﬂection topologies. We show that the problems in general are NP-hard and an
optimization bound is thus provided. Moreover, we develop eﬃcient algorithms for search-
ing satisfactory near-optimal topologies in general scenarios, as well as the optimal solutions
in some special networks. Our study shows that route reﬂection topologies considerably
inﬂuence the reliability of IBGP operations. By applying our models and optimization tech-
niques, a route reﬂection topology can be appropriately conﬁgured and the IBGP robustness
can be improved signiﬁcantly.
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5.1 Backgournd and Motivations
5.1.1 Internal BGP Networks
In a traditional IBGP network, IBGP sessions form a full mesh over all BGP routers in a
domain. A hierarchical IBGP structure, called route reﬂection [1], was proposed to solve
the scalability limitation in the full mesh design. Fig. 5.1 shows an example of two-level
IBGP route reﬂection network. BGP routers are divided into three clusters. In each cluster,
at least one router is chosen as a route reﬂector (e.g., A, B, E and I in Fig. 5.1), and
other routers are route-reﬂector clients. In cluster I, redundant reﬂectors are used for higher
reliability. All reﬂectors establish a full mesh via IBGP sessions. A client is only required
to share IBGP sessions with the reﬂectors in its cluster. The sessions between clients of the
same cluster are optional. For example, an optional session may be established between K
and J . A client is the traditional BGP router and it only needs to communicate with its
reﬂectors. A reﬂector is responsible for: (1) reﬂecting routes (routing information) from its
client to the peer reﬂectors and the other clients; (2) reﬂecting routes from its peer reﬂectors
to its clients. The CLUSTER LIST loop detection mechanism prevents routes from being
reﬂected back to the clusters where the routes originate.
C
G
H
J
K
E I
B
D
I
II
IIIF
A
Figure 5.1: An example of IBGP route reﬂection network. Routers are grouped into three
clusters. Solid lines stand for IP links; dotted lines stand for IBGP sessions. Shaded nodes
represent route reﬂectors.
Route reﬂection network and full mesh IBGP network are both overlay networks on top
of the underlying IP networks. Each IBGP session is an overlay edge supported by a TCP/IP
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connection. Some IBGP peers are not adjacent physically. They depend on IGP (Interior
Gateway Protocol) to communicate across multiple hops. For example, in Fig. 5.1, the
IBGP session between router A and D is routed along an IGP path through router B.
5.1.2 Reliability of IBGP Networks
A reliable IBGP control plane is very important to the quality of Internet routing. When an
IBGP session is lost, all related routes in the BGP routing tables have to be withdrawn and
thus some IP addresses become unreachable. The route withdrawal messages trigger huge
amount of route re-computations and also result in route ﬂaps. It usually takes a long time
and lots of network resource to re-establish this lost session.
On the other hand, the reliability and stability of IBGP operations depend on the quality
of underlying TCP and IGP routing. It is reported that BGP sessions are sensitive to
transport layer stability and routing layer reliability [11][10], especially for the IBGP sessions
which cross multiple IP hops. Therefore, understanding the inﬂuential factors on IBGP
reliability and furthermore ﬁnding proper methods to improve IBGP robustness are very
crucial for delivering highly available and stable services in Internet routing.
However, so far, issues, such as how to model the reliability of IBGP, which is inﬂuenced
by IGP routing and transport layer protocols, and how to improve the IBGP reliability within
the existing Internet framework, have not been well studied yet. In Chapter 3 and Chapter
4, we have shown that TCP provides only a limited support of reliable communication for
IBGP sessions and failures in IP networks may make the IBGP sessions fail. In this chapter,
we focus on analyzing the reliability of the whole IBGP networks given the fact that IBGP
sessions are unreliable due to the inﬂuence from the underlying IP networks.
The reliability analysis in IBGP networks is complex due to the correlations between
diﬀerent IBGP sessions. For example, in Fig. 5.1, the IBGP session between H and E
is not statistically independent of the session between G and E, because they share one
IP link. Cui [45] gives an approximate calculation on the probability that two overlay
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links fail simultaneously. We perform a much more extensive study on the reliability of
the overlay networks in IBGP. By using the dependent network failure analysis model [46]
(based on independent failure-causing events), we investigate the reliability of IBGP networks
and propose three novel metrics for network resilience: IBGP Failure Probability (IFP),
Expected Session Loss (ESL), Expected Connectivity Loss (ECL). In a nutshell, IFP deﬁnes
the probability of IBGP failures taking into account conditional failures of IBGP sessions;
ESL reﬂects the average percentage of the failed IBGP sessions; ECL stands for the average
percentage of IBGP router pairs that are isolated in the IBGP control plane.
With the reliability model for IBGP, we can answer many meaningful questions on IBGP
reliability and have a quantitative guide in designing reliable IBGP networks. Previously,
when we migrated a full mesh IBGP network to a route reﬂection network, we did not have
a precise understanding on the impact of this transition in terms of network reliability. For
example, does the network become less reliable because the transition reduces the number
of IBGP sessions? How much reliability can we gain by introducing one redundant reﬂector
and how many reﬂectors are actually needed? How are routers clustered? And, moreover,
is it possible to design a route reﬂection network that is even more reliable than the full
mesh IBGP? At present, the only guideline for setting up reﬂection topology is to follow the
physical topology [3]: in large networks, route reﬂection topology is usually overlaid with
IGP hierarchy; routers are clustered according to IGP areas; in each cluster, the core routers
are selected as the reﬂectors, and the others are clients of their core router. But, in general,
the reliable IBGP network design problem has not been studied in the literature. In this
chapter, the IBGP reliability optimization problems are formulated and studied based on
the reliability models and metrics we propose.
We aim to increase BGP routing reliability by conﬁguring IBGP route reﬂection networks
appropriately without changing the standard of protocols, so that the rate and impact of
IBGP failures are minimized. The goal of design is to minimize IFP, ESL or ECL. Speciﬁ-
cally, we formally prove that this optimization problem is NP-hard, even in some simpliﬁed
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cases; we develop several eﬃcient algorithms to search for satisfactory near-optimal solu-
tions; an optimization lower bound is also given to show the room for improvement. Our
extensive computational experiments demonstrate that based on the realistic Internet net-
work topologies, we can ﬁnd both reliable and eﬃcient solutions for IBGP networks, i.e.,
the solutions are very close to the global optima and have small number of IBGP sessions
involved. In addition, we investigate the optimization problem in a special case – fully mesh
IP networks, which has strong application background and has simpliﬁed solutions.
Besides the models and the optimization algorithms, we have the following key insights
into the design of reliable IBGP route reﬂection networks. (1) Reliable IBGP network design
highly depends on the topology of IP networks, as well as the speciﬁc reliability of each IP
network component. Even in IP networks where all routers and links have the same reliability,
some appropriately designed IBGP networks are much more reliable than other options. (2)
It is not always true that the IBGP network with more redundant IBGP reﬂectors or more
IBGP sessions is more reliable. The redundant elements in IBGP should be used properly.
(3) Full mesh IBGP is often not the best topology in terms of reliability, even though it
has maximum number of IBGP sessions and is traditionally used in small networks. In
some cases, we can design a more reliable IBGP network by clustering routers and placing
reﬂectors appropriately.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we deﬁne the network
models. In Section 5.3, we present a reliability analysis framework for IBGP and deﬁne three
reliability metrics. In Section 5.4, the methods for calculating the metrics are discussed, fol-
lowed by case studies to demonstrate the inﬂuential factors on IBGP network reliability.
Furthermore, we formulate the reliability optimization problems for IBGP networks in Sec-
tion 5.5 and discuss the techniques for solving these problems. The performance of these
optimization techniques is evaluated in Section 5.6. In Section 5.7, we present some sup-
plementary discussions on the hardness of the reliability optimization for IBGP networks.
Section 5.8 concludes the chapter.
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5.2 Network Models
We represent an IP network as graph G(V,E), where V and E are the sets of routers and
IP links, respectively. (u, v) represents the IP link from router u to router v. IGP path from
u to v is denoted as Puv, which is the set of routers and links on the path.
IBGP Route reﬂection network Gr(Vr, Er) is overlaid on top of the IP network, where Vr
is the set of IBGP routers and Er is the set of IBGP sessions. We consider transitive domains
where every router runs BGP, and thus Vr = V . IBGP session between u and v is denoted by
〈u, v〉. IGP paths Puv and Pvu are used to support this session. We also use Pe to denote the
IGP path used by session e, where e ∈ Er. In a two-level route reﬂection network, the nodes
are grouped into several clusters. Each cluster contains one or multiple route reﬂectors. Er
includes the full mesh of IBGP sessions among all reﬂectors and the sessions between clients
and their reﬂectors. IBGP sessions between the clients in one cluster are optional, which can
be used to improve the reliability of IBGP networks. In general, route reﬂection hierarchy
can have an arbitrary number of reﬂection levels, i.e., some reﬂectors are the clients of some
higher level reﬂectors, which are in turn the clients of others, and so on. In this thesis, we
only discuss two-level reﬂection networks.
5.3 Reliability Analysis for IBGP Networks
In IBGP networks, both BGP routers and IBGP sessions could fail due to the component
failures1 in the supporting IP networks. In this section, we present an analysis framework
to model the impact from IP networks to IBGP networks.
1In this chapter, the failure means fail-stop, i.e., the failed components stop functioning. We do not
consider Byzantine failures, such as misbehaving or adversaries in routing.
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5.3.1 Analysis Framework
In route reﬂection network Gr(Vr, Er), the failures of diﬀerent edges, i.e., IBGP sessions,
are not necessarily independent. Two overlaid sessions may share the same IP routers or
links in their IGP paths. There are several approaches to studying the network reliability
with dependent component failures. We make use of the cause-based reliability analysis
model [46] in IBGP networks.
We identify all major failure scenarios in IP networks. For example, a failure scenario can
be the case in which a single router or a single IP link fails. These failure scenarios happen
independently. Let S denote the set of all failure scenarios we are interested in plus one
special scenario, s0, where no failure exists. The probability that a scenario happens can be
derived from the historical network operation information, and let rs denote the probability
that scenario s happens. If S includes all network states, ∑s∈S rs = 1. Moreover, we use Fs
to denote the set of components in IP networks that fail in scenario s (s ∈ S), and Fs is a
subset of V ∪ E. Other components in IP networks, which are not in Fs, work properly.
In scenario s, the IBGP sessions that belong to the routers in Fs fail. If Fs partitions the
network, the IBGP sessions crossing two partitioned sub-networks also fail. For example, in
Fig. 5.1, the failure of router G causes sessions 〈G,E〉 and 〈H,E〉 to fail. On the other hand,
if the IP network is not partitioned, the aﬀected IBGP sessions may or may not be broken,
depending on the IGP routing recovery time. We thus model the impact of IP network on
IBGP sessions as a probability variable. For example, in Fig. 5.1, if IP link (A,B) fails, the
IBGP sessions 〈A,D〉 and 〈A,B〉 fail with a certain probability. In general, we denote qs as
the conditional failure probability of the IBGP sessions that are aﬀected by the IP network
failures in scenario s, i.e.,
qs = Pr [session e fails | Fs fails and other components are up] , (5.1)
where e ∈ Er, s ∈ S, and Pe∩Fs = ∅. qs is related to the IGP routing recovery time and the
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conﬁguration parameters in BGP and TCP retransmissions. In Chapter 3, we showed that
qs is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the round trip time between the two BGP routers of an
IBGP session. Thus, to simplify the following discussion on IBGP route reﬂection topology
optimization problem, we assume that qs is the same for all inﬂuenced IBGP sessions in
scenario s. Moreover, in a given failure scenario, all components in IP network G(V,E)
are in deterministic states. Each BGP router detects the session failure independently. The
BGP timers at diﬀerent routers are set and shifted independently, too. Thus, the conditional
failures of the aﬀected IBGP sessions (with probability qs) are independent, and we can apply
reliability analysis techniques in networks with independent failures.
Generally speaking, the size of S can be very large if we want to cover all failure scenarios.
However, in practice, we can get a satisfying statistical coverage (i.e.,
∑
s∈S rs is very close to
1) by only analyzing the failure scenarios that could most likely happen. According to [47],
the possibility that multiple physical components fail simultaneously in one administrative
domain is extremely small. It is also shown that, in IP networks, most of the failures only
involve single IP links or routers [48]. Therefore, we assume that at most one IP component
fails at any time in one domain of IP networks. Under this assumption, the number of
network failure states is |V | + |E|, and this gives us enough precision for the purpose of
designing route reﬂection topology.
Note that several IP links may share one segment of ﬁber, and thus they may fail coinci-
dentally when the ﬁber is cut. In this scenario, we can include the event of single ﬁber-cut as
a failure scenario in S, and analyze the simultaneous failures of the related IP links. Similar
analytic models can thus be applied.
Table 5.1 summaries the major notations used in this chapter.
5.3.2 Reliability Metrics
In order to characterize the reliability of IBGP route reﬂection networks, we propose three
metrics in this section: IBGP Failure Probability (IFP), Expected Session Loss (ESL) and
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Table 5.1: Table of notations for Chapter 5.
(u, v) IP link from router u to router v
〈u, v〉 IBGP session between router u and router v
G(V,E) IP network with router set V and link set E
Gr(Vr, Er) IBGP network with router set Vr and IBGP session set Er
Puv IGP path from router u to router v
S Set of all network failure scenarios
Fs Set of failed components in state s, Fs ⊆ V ∪ E
rs Probability that network failure scenario s occurs
qs Conditional session failure probability in scenario s
n Number of IBGP routers in a domain
m Number of IBGP sessions in a domain
θs Number of IBGP sessions owned by the routers in Fs
φs Number of IBGP sessions passing Fs but not owned by Fs
P IBGP failure probability (IFP)
Ls Expected session loss (ESL)
Lc Expected connectivity loss (ECL)
Expected Connectivity Loss (ECL). Though our methods focus on route reﬂection IBGP
networks (and the full mesh IBGP), they can also be applied to the confederation IBGP
networks with very few modiﬁcations.
We deﬁne the IBGP failure as the termination of one or several non-optional IBGP
sessions, which is caused by router failures or IP link failures2. Moreover, we deﬁne θs as the
number of IBGP sessions that are possessed by Fs; let φs denote the the number of IBGP
sessions that pass Fs, but are not owned by Fs. θs and φs are determined by the route
reﬂection topology and its relation to the IP network topology. For example, θs0 = 0 and
φs0 = 0. If B fails in Fig. 5.1, sessions 〈A,B〉, 〈B,C〉 and 〈B,D〉 fail, because they are
owned by B. However, session 〈A,D〉 only passes B, and thus it fails with probability qs.
2We will show later that any non-optional IBGP session failure leads to function loss of IBGP routing in
the existing BGP protocol, no matter whether redundant reﬂectors or sessions are employed (Lemma 5.4).
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Thus, θs = 3 and φs = 1.
IBGP Failure Probability (IFP) P
IFP means the probability that IBGP failure happens. Given a route reﬂection network
and the failure scenario set S, the probability of IBGP failure P can be calculated from the
probability of each scenario and the topologies of IBGP networks:
P = 1−
∏
s∈S
[
1− rs + rs(1− qs)φs1{θs=0}
]
. (5.2)
At the right hand side of Equation 5.2, we calculate the probability of no IBGP failure for
each scenario, which contains two part: either the scenario does not happen or no sessions
actually fail.
In practice, if we only consider failures of single IP links or routers, i.e., S = V ∪ E, P
in Equation 5.2 can be simpliﬁed as
P = 1−
∏
s∈V
(1− rs)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P¯V
∏
s∈E
[
1− rs + rs(1− qs)φs
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P¯E
. (5.3)
P¯V is the same for any IBGP route reﬂection topology, because every router failure deﬁnitely
breaks all the IBGP sessions possessed by it and causes IBGP failure. P¯E is contributed by
IP link failures. If no IBGP sessions are deployed on a link (i.e., φs = 0), its failure does not
inﬂuence IBGP; otherwise, the sessions passing it are inﬂuenced and fail with probability qs.
Thus, the probability of no IBGP failure is (1− qs)φs .
Because P¯V is not related to IBGP route reﬂection topologies, the optimization prob-
lem with respect to IFP only needs to consider P¯E. Then, minimizing P is equivalent to
maximizing P¯E.
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Expected Session Loss (ESL) Ls
IFP reﬂects how likely an IBGP failure will happen. However, it does not characterize how
severe the IBGP failure is. Another dimension in the design space is the amount of losses
in IBGP failures. We deﬁne the session loss as the ratio of the number of failed IBGP
sessions to the total number of IBGP sessions in the route reﬂection network. Because any
BGP routing updates are propagated via one or several IBGP sessions in a domain, a higher
session loss means a larger damage to IBGP routing.
In a given route reﬂection network, suppose m is the total number of IBGP sessions. We
have the Expected Session Loss (ESL) deﬁned as follows:
Ls =
∑
s∈S
rs
θs + qsφs
m
. (5.4)
The optimization objective is thus to ﬁnd a route reﬂection topology to minimize Ls.
Expected Connectivity Loss (ECL) Lc
ESL counts the function loss of IBGP networks by the number of failed IBGP sessions.
However, diﬀerent IBGP sessions may have diﬀerent levels of importance. For example,
some session connects two clusters together and some session only connects a client to a
reﬂector. Therefore, we propose a more elaborate metric, the Expected Connectivity Loss
(also called Expected Resilience Loss), to characterize the detailed function loss of IBGP
networks, and denote it as Lc.
The function of an IBGP network is to distribute external routing information, which
is learned from outside of the AS, to all other IBGP routers in this domain after necessary
processing. In a healthy network, there is a valid IBGP signaling path between any two IBGP
routers. BGP update information originated from one router can be advertised to all other
IBGP routers in the domain by these IBGP signaling paths. Some of these signaling paths
are just direct IBGP sessions in the IBGP networks; some of the paths involve multiple IBGP
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sessions and reﬂectors. In network failure scenarios, if some IBGP sessions fail, the IBGP
signaling paths between some routers become unavailable, and thus the function of IBGP
network is partially defunct. Therefore, we can use the number of failed IBGP signaling
paths to measure the function loss of IBGP networks.
In network failure scenario s, if router i can not exchange routing information with router
j directly or indirectly due to IBGP session failures, i and j are isolated from each other and
we denote this relation as i
s
 j. Likewise, if i and j are reachable to each other in failure
state s, it is denoted as i
s↔ j. Please note that two routers may be isolated even if they
are connected in a route reﬂection graph. For example, if session 〈A,D〉 fails in Fig. 5.1,
A and D are isolated. Though A and D both share an IBGP session with B, B does not
reﬂect routes between A and D, because B is in the same cluster as A. CLUSTER LIST
loop detection policy [1] prevents this type of route reﬂection. In Section 5.4, we will discuss
the calculation of the isolation probability by considering valid route reﬂection.
In a full mesh IBGP network, any two routers communicate directly using a dedicated
IBGP session. If session 〈i, j〉 fails, only i and j are isolated from each other. In a route
reﬂection network, the routers are organized hierarchically. One IBGP session may on the
signaling paths of multiple router pairs. Thus, the termination of one IBGP session may
invalidate several signaling paths. For example, in Fig. 5.1, the external routing information
learned by router H has to be reﬂected by E, by I, and then it can be received by J . If IBGP
session 〈H,E〉 fails, H is isolated from the other BGP routers in the domain. In addition,
failures of diﬀerent IBGP sessions or routers have diﬀerent impacts on IBGP operations. For
instance, the termination of session 〈A,B〉 only makes A and B isolated from each other.
However, if session 〈E, I〉 breaks, the routers in cluster II and III are isolated.
In a general IBGP network, based on the above descriptions about IBGP function loss,
the connectivity loss in scenario s, denoted as Lc(s), is
Lc(s) =
2
∑
i,j∈Vr,i=j Pr[i
s
 j]
n2 − n , (5.5)
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where n is the number of IBGP routers. On the other hand, the IBGP network connectivity
L¯s is
L¯c(s) = 1− Lc(s) =
2
∑
i,j∈Vr,i=j Pr[i
s↔ j]
n2 − n . (5.6)
Therefore, the ECL over the entire state space is Lc =
∑
s∈S rsLc(s) and L¯c =
∑
s∈S rsL¯c(s),
where rs is the probability that the network is in state s. It is easy to verify the following
facts: 0 ≤ Lc, L¯c ≤ 1 and Lc + L¯c = 1.
5.4 Reliability Calculation of IBGP Networks
In previous discussions, we have presented the reliability analysis framework for IBGP net-
works. In this section, we discuss how to calculate the reliability metrics based on the
topology of IBGP networks. According to Equation 5.2 and 5.4, we ﬁrst need to calculate
{θs} and {φs} based on the relation between IP network topology and IBGP network topol-
ogy, and then compute IFP and ESL. The challenging part is to calculate Lc, which can
be reduced to computing network connectedness [49] in IBGP signaling graphs. We will
discuss this in detail next, followed by a case study to show the intuitions behind the metric
deﬁnitions and the reliable IBGP network design.
5.4.1 Calculation of IBGP Network Connectivity Loss Lc
In order to calculate the connectivity loss Lc, we need to obtain the isolation probability
Pr[i
s
 j] for any pair of nodes, i and j, in any failure scenario s. Because not all paths in
IBGP route reﬂection graph are valid signaling paths, the reﬂection graph can not be used
directly to calculate the isolation probability, and we will deﬁne auxiliary graphs for this
purpose instead.
Let us ﬁrst explain what is the valid IBGP signaling path. In a route reﬂection network, if
routing information is sent from a client to its reﬂector, we deﬁne this advertising relationship
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as C-R; similarly, R-C and R-R stand for sending routing information from a reﬂector to
its client and from a reﬂector to its peer reﬂector in diﬀerent clusters, respectively. Thus,
according to IETF RFC [1], the valid route advertising path is the subsequence or the whole
of the following sequence: C-R ⇒ . . . C-R ⇒ R-R ⇒ R-C. . . ⇒ R-C3.
The calculation of isolation probability can be reduced to the (s, t)-connectedness prob-
lem4 [49] in the directed acyclic graph Gsij in which the edges may fail independently. The
auxiliary graph Gsij is generated based on the route reﬂection graph Gr(Vr, Er) with the
following three modiﬁcations: (1) The IBGP routers that fail in network failure scenario s
and the IBGP sessions they own are removed from Vr and Er. (2) In G
s
ij, the edges, which
pass Fs, have failure probability qs; other edges have zero failure probability. (3) The nodes
and edges that are not on the valid IBGP signaling paths between i and j in Gr(Vr, Er) are
removed. In the resulted graph after the above operations, the directions of the edges are
determined, such that the edge direction conforms to the shortest path from i to j in terms
of hop-count in graph Gr.
Lemma 5.1 A signaling path is valid, if and only if it is a path in graph Gsij from i to j.
Proof Sketch: First, it is easy to see that the direction of every edge in Gsij can be uniquely
determined In reﬂection graph Gr, according to the rule of IBGP route reﬂection, the set of
all valid signaling paths from i to j is equivalent to the set of shortest paths between i and
j in terms of hop-count. Because only the edges in Gr that are not used by signaling paths
from i to j are removed in Gsij and the edge directions in G
s
ij are determined to conform to
shortest paths from i to j, Gr and G
s
ij share the same set of shortest paths from i to j. Thus,
the set of signaling paths is equivalent to the set of the shortest paths in Gsij. Moreover, we
can show that all paths from i to j in Gsij have the same distance. Therefore, we conclude
that signaling path set is equivalent to the path set in Gsij. 
3If optional IBGP sessions between clients in the same cluster are used, the signaling paths can also be
C-C. Because signaling paths of this type are independent of others and the related isolation probability can
be simply calculated, we ignore the optional sessions in this section for clarity.
4The (s, t)-connectedness problem aims to compute the probability that at least one path from i to j
does not fail in the directed probabilistic graph.
94
Based on the above lemma, the problem of computing the isolation probability Pr[i
s
 j]
is equivalent to calculate the probability that all paths from i to j fail in graph Gsij. Next,
we will focus on the two-level route reﬂection topology to discuss the detailed calculation.
i
j
C
(a) Two
clients
in same
cluster.
i
j
C
(b) Client vs. reﬂec-
tor in other cluster.
C
i
C
j
i j
(c) Two clients in diﬀerent
clusters.
Figure 5.2: Gsij for calculating Pr[i
s
 j] in two-level route reﬂection networks.
In a two-level route reﬂection network, the routing information can be reﬂected at most
twice. We thus divide the calculations into the following three cases based on the relation-
ship between router i and router j. For convenience of explanation, we denote the failure
probability of IBGP session 〈u, v〉 in failure scenario s simply as puv.
First, if both i and j are reﬂectors or i is a client of the reﬂector j, because of route
reﬂection rules and CLUSTER LIST loop detection, the routes from i can not be reﬂected
to j by any other reﬂectors and vice versa. Thus, only one IBGP signaling path exists and
Pr[i
s
 j] = pij.
Second, if i and j are clients in the same cluster or i is a client and j is a reﬂector in
other cluster, the graphs Gsij of these two scenarios are shown in Fig. 5.2(a) and Fig. 5.2(b),
respectively. There are |C| independent paths from i to j, where C is the set of reﬂectors in
the cluster of i. Thus,
Pr[i
s
 j] =
∏
c∈C
(pic + pcj − picpcj) (5.7)
Third, if i and j are clients in diﬀerent clusters, the graph Gsij of this scenario is shown in
Fig. 5.2(c). Ci and Cj are the sets of reﬂectors in the cluster of i and j, respectively. There
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are |Ci||Cj| diﬀerent paths from i to j. Thus, Pr[i s j] is the probability that all these
paths fail. However, because these paths are not independent, the probability calculation
could be a diﬃcult problem. In general, the following lemma shows that it is unlikely to ﬁnd
eﬃcient solutions to calculate the isolation probability in this scenario if |Ci| and |Cj| are
large.
Lemma 5.2 If i and j are clients in diﬀerent clusters, the problem of computing Pr[i
s
 j]
is #P-complete.
Proof Sketch: The problem of computing Pr[i
s
 j] is equivalent to ﬁnd the probability
that all paths from i to j fail in graph Gsij (shown in Fig. 5.2(c)). Though Ci and Cj form
a complete bipartite, it is a more general case than a general bipartite, because if one edge
does not exist, the corresponding edge in Gsij can have 1 as the failure probability. Thus, the
reduced result of Corollary 3.4 in chapter 3.2 of [49] by using the proof technique of Theorem
3.2 is a special case of Gsij. Bipartite Independent Set problem, which is #P-complete, can
be reduced to the problem of computing Pr[i
s
 j], and therefore the result in the lemma
follows. 
In practice, if the sessions with zero failure probabilities cover a path from i to j in
Gsij, then Pr[i
s
 j] = 0; otherwise, the isolation probability can be computed fast enough
by some existing network reliability analysis methods. The reasons are that the number of
IBGP sessions that have nonzero failure probabilities in a failure scenario is small and the
number of redundant reﬂectors (|Ci| and |Cj|) is also quite limited. In this chapter, we use
the factoring algorithms [50] to calculate the isolation probability.
5.4.2 Case Studies - functional reliability analysis
We perform a functional reliability analysis on eight IBGP networks which are overlaid on top
of the same IP network. The functional reliability analysis means to analyze the reliability
of the IBGP network in which the failure probabilities of all components (including IBGP
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sessions) are the same. Let us denote r as the happening probability of each failure scenario
and denote q as the conditional failure probability of the inﬂuenced IBGP sessions in all
network failure scenarios. We only consider failures of single IP link or single router in the
following analysis.
Table 5.2 shows eight IBGP reﬂection networks and their reliability metrics P, Ls and
Lc. Solid lines represent IP links, dotted lines represent IBGP sessions, and the shaded nodes
represent reﬂectors. We deﬁne a notation βk = 1−r+r(1−q)k to simplify the representation
of IFP P .
G, Gr
(a)
B
E
C D
A (b)
B
E
C D
A (c)
B
E
C D
A (d)
B
E
C D
A
IFP : P 1− (1− r)5β33β22β1 1− (1− r)5β41 1− (1− r)5β2β31 1− (1− r)5β32β31
ESL : Ls 10+9q5 r (2 + q)r 4+3q2 r 14+11q7 r
ECL : Lc r10(20 + 18q) r10(28 + 18q) r10(26 + 23q − q2) r10(20 + 11q + q2)
G, Gr
(e)
B
E
C D
A (f)
B
E
C D
A (g)
B
E
C D
A (h)
B
E
C D
A
IFP : P 1− (1− r)5β23β22β21 1− (1− r)5β2β41 1− (1− r)5β33β22β1 1− (1− r)5β33β22β1
ESL : Ls 18+15q9 r 10+7q5 r 10+9q5 r 10+9q5 r
ECL : Lc r10(20 + 15q) r10(25 + 19q − q2) r10(20 + 7q + 3q2) r10(20 + 11q + q3)
Table 5.2: IFP, ESL and ECL comparisons of IBGP route reﬂection networks. Only single
router or single link failures are considered. r = rs, the probability of a failure scenario.
q = qs, the failure probability of IBGP sessions in failure scenarios (Equation 5.1). βk =
1− r + r(1− q)k.
Using Lc as an example, we show the computation of reliability metrics as follows. In
Case (c), if E fails, Lc(s) = 1010 , because all routers are deﬁnitely isolated; if A fails, A
is isolated and B loses contact with others with probability q, so Lc(s) = 4+3q10 ; etc. By
combining Lc(s) of all network failure scenarios, we obtain the connectivity loss of Case (c):
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Figure 5.3: The comparison of expected connectivity loss for the case studies in 5.4.2.
Lc = r10(26 + 23q − q2). The calculations of P and Ls follow Equation 5.2 and 5.4.
Let us compare these eight IBGP reﬂection topologies in terms of three reliability metrics.
It is straightforward to see that 1 − r ≤ βk ≤ 1 and βk ≥ βk+1. Thus we can establish the
order of the P’s for the eight cases as follows.
IFP P : (b) ≤ (c) ≤ (f) ≤ (d) ≤ (e) ≤ (a) = (g) = (h)
Similarly, we can obtain the order for Ls’s.
ESL Ls : (b) ≤ (f) ≤ (c) ≤ (d) ≤ (e) ≤ (a) = (g) = (h)
The above orders of P and Ls hold for any q. However, the order of Lc is slightly inﬂuenced
by the speciﬁc value of q and the order is shown in Fig. 5.3.
With respect to IBGP failure probability, Case (b) is the best network, because it has
the minimum number of IBGP sessions and covers the minimum number of IP links. By
introducing as few as possible unreliable components into the IBGP networks, Case (b)
achieves the optimum IFP. Thus, optimizing IFP requires using the smallest number of
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IBGP sessions and IP links, and redundant reﬂectors and sessions are thus not favored.
However, in practice, this design strategy does not give us reliable IBGP networks in terms
of IBGP function loss. The reason is that the impact of IBGP failures may be signiﬁcant.
ESL and ECL take into account the impact of IBGP failures. In this case study, it
shows that ESL sometimes can not measure the loss of IBGP function appropriately. ESL
order is roughly the same as IFP order, except for the sequence of Case (c) and Case (f)
swapped, which is due to the redundant session in Case (f). Intuitively, the cases with
more redundant elements lead to more robust IBGP networks, but ESL does not reﬂect this
observation. On the other hand, ECL, which models the IBGP function loss more elaborately
gives us satisfactory characterization, i.e., cases (b), (c) and (f) with small number of IBGP
sessions and reﬂectors are less robust than other cases (shown in Fig. 5.3). The disadvantage
of ECL is that it requires higher computing complexity than ESL. We analyze the reliability
of these eight IBGP networks as follows by using ECL.
Case (a) is a traditional full mesh IBGP network with 10 sessions and no route reﬂector
is deployed. Case (b) and (c) are route reﬂection networks, which have two and one cluster,
respectively. Both of them suﬀer from the single point of failure problem. For example, if
E fails in (c), all routers are isolated. Thus, cases (b) and (c) are less reliable than Case
(a). There are two ways to increase IBGP network reliability: using redundant reﬂectors
and adding redundant IBGP sessions between clients.
Case (d) uses two reﬂectors in one cluster. It is much more resilient than Case (c), due to
the redundant reﬂectors and 3 additional sessions. For a small network, where the number
of BGP sessions is not a big concern, this design is quite preferable. It is even more reliable
than Case (a) which has the maximum number of sessions. The reason is that there is only
one signaling path between any two routers in fully meshed IBGP networks, while multiple
IBGP signaling paths may exist in Case (d). Thus, the route reﬂections by the redundant
reﬂectors can avoid some cases of router isolation. For example, if link (C,D) fails, in Case
(a), Pr[B
s
 D] = q, because other routers do not reﬂect routes between B and D. But,
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in Case (d), the redundant reﬂectors, C and E, both reﬂect routes between B and D, i.e.,
there are two independent paths from B to D in graph GsBD. Therefore, the communication
between B and D is not aﬀected by the failure of (C,D).
However, using more redundant reﬂectors does not necessarily guarantee higher reliability.
Case (e) uses one more reﬂector and two more sessions than Case (d), but it still performs
worse. This is because a reﬂector can not reﬂect routes between its redundant reﬂectors and
their clients (due to CLUSTER LIST loop detection), i.e., too many reﬂectors may make
the IBGP signaling paths to be less redundant. In Case (e), there is only one path in graph
GsAD from A to D. If link (D,E) fails, Pr[A
s
 D] = q. But, in Case (d), two independent
paths exist, because both A and D are clients and they can exchange routes via reﬂector C
and E. Therefore, if link (D,E) fails, Pr[A
s
 D] = 0.
Using redundant sessions between clients of the same cluster can also improve reliability.
Based on Case (c), we introduce one more session between node B and node C in Case (f).
This improves ECL slightly, because the number of independent signaling paths between
B and C increases. Case (g) even constructs a full mesh among all clients, and it is most
reliable among all these IBGP networks. In addition, in some scenario, using many redun-
dant sessions among clients can not improve ECL signiﬁcantly. For example, Case (h) only
obtains very slightly smaller ECL than Case (d), thus these three additional sessions are not
worthwhile.
Summary: This case study shows the pros and cons of the three proposed metrics in terms
of characterizing the reliability of IBGP network. Furthermore, it gives some intuitions about
optimizing IBGP networks for reliability: (1) The traditional full mesh IBGP network is not
the most reliable solution, and we can make IBGP networks more reliable by introducing
redundant reﬂectors and sessions appropriately, without incurring much additional overhead;
(2) Redundant reﬂectors can improve BGP network reliability, but they have to be used
appropriately, because too many redundant reﬂectors may decrease IBGP robustness.
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5.4.3 Applicability of ECL Metric to End Users
In this section, we brieﬂy comment on the relation between ECL metric and the network
performance experienced by end users. From users’ point of view, network reliability stands
for the reachability of network addresses, which can further be formulated as the number of
reachable IP preﬁxes. Thus, we deﬁne Expected Preﬁx Loss for this purpose and denote it
as Lp. If the set of IP preﬁxes is P and the egress routers of preﬁx  is EG()5, we have the
following deﬁnition for Lp:
Lp =
∑
s∈S
rs
∑
v∈V,∈P Pr[v
s
 EG()]
n|P | , (5.8)
where Pr[v
s
 EG()] is the probability that v is isolated from any router in EG() in
scenario s. The reason is that if all egress routers are isolated from a router, the IP preﬁx is
unreachable to it.
In order to calculate Lp, we can follow roughly the same procedure as calculating Lc. The
only diﬀerence is that the isolation probability between one router and multiple egress routers
needs to be computed. This can be carried out in the directed graph deﬁned previously by
merging the multiple egress routers into one node.
ECL is the same as EPL, if every IP preﬁx has only one egress router. ECL over-estimates
EPL, if some IP preﬁxes have multiple egress routers. However, we ﬁnd that the route
reﬂection networks with small ECL’s have relatively small EPL’s too. This relationship
between ECL and EPL is shown in Fig. 5.4. In this ﬁgure, we enumerate the reliability
metrics of all route reﬂection networks for ten routers and sort the networks by ECL metric.
The failure probability of IBGP sessions is randomly generated from [0, 0.8]. The egress
routers of IP preﬁxes cover all combination of two and three routers. This ﬁgure shows
that by minimizing ECL in the design of route reﬂection networks, we also minimize EPL
5EG() means the set of egress routers that can forward data packets to IP preﬁx . That is, the routers
in EG() have received BGP advertisements for  from other domains.
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Figure 5.4: The comparison of ECL and EPL by enumerating all possible RR networks in
an IP network of ten nodes.
approximately, under the assumption that the egress routers of an IP preﬁx are uniformly
distributed in all routers. Because EPL is based on the IP preﬁx set, which is dynamic,
and has higher computing overhead than ECL, we minimize ECL in route reﬂection network
design problem. The optimization result should have acceptably small EPL and moreover,
it is robust to IP preﬁx changes.
5.5 Reliability Optimization for IBGP Networks
In previous sections, we deﬁned reliability metrics for IBGP networks and showed that the
route reﬂection topology aﬀects the reliability of an IBGP network. We observed that the
traditional IBGP network with the fully meshed IBGP sessions is not the most reliable IBGP
conﬁguration, which motivates us to optimize route reﬂection topologies to increase the IBGP
robustness. In this section, we discuss several categories of optimization problems and their
solutions. In next section, we will present the experimental studies on these problems.
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5.5.1 Optimization Problem Description and Complexity
The optimization objective is to minimize one of the three metrics: IFP, ESL and ELT.
We use M to denote any of the metrics, and describe the general form of the optimization
problem as follows:
Problem 5.1 (Reliable RR Network Design) In IP network G(V,E), given (1) the prob-
abilities of failure scenarios {rs|s ∈ S}, where S = V ∪E, (2) IBGP session failure probability
{qs|s ∈ S}, and (3) all IGP paths, ﬁnd the route reﬂection network G∗r based on G, such that
M(G∗r) ≤M(Gr), for any route reﬂection network Gr based on G.
The design problem is called RR-IFP, RR-ESL and RR-ECL, when the metric to be
minimized is IFP, ESL and ECL, respectively. Because ECL is a more realistic metric
than ESL in characterizing IBGP function loss, we mainly focus on RR-IFP and RR-ECL
problems in the following discussions.
The lemma below shows the complexity of ﬁnding the optimum solution for the general
reliable IBGP route reﬂection design problem.
Lemma 5.3 The reliable route reﬂection design problems, RR-IFP and RR-ECL, are NP-
hard.
Proof: We will show (in Lemma 5.7) that a special case of the problems, where the
IP network is a complete graph, is NP-hard. Thus, RR-IFP and RR-ECL in general are
NP-hard.
Since the general optimization problem is NP-hard, we need heuristic algorithms to ﬁnd
satisfying near-optimal solutions in practice. In order to have more insights into the design
problem, we separate the optimization problem into two categories according to the structure
of IP networks, that is, optimization in fully meshed IP networks and in general IP networks.
There are two reasons for this separation: (1) In the fully meshed IP networks, the reliability
metric computation and IBGP topology optimization can be substantially simpliﬁed, from
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which we can obtain helpful intuitions on designing the reliable IBGP network; (2) Investi-
gating the fully meshed IP networks is also useful in real applications. Small AS’s may have
the fully meshed IP links deployed to increase the communication robustness. In large AS’s,
the backbone routers in one PoP usually are fully connected by IP links. Thus, the design of
IBGP route reﬂection inside fully meshed IP networks has strong application background.
5.5.2 IBGP Reﬂection over Fully Meshed IP Networks
In a fully meshed IP network, all IGP routes are independent of each other, except for the
shared source nodes or destination nodes. Therefore, any two IBGP sessions are independent
of each other unless they are owned by the same router. Due to this property, the design
problem of IBGP route reﬂection topology can be signiﬁcantly simpliﬁed.
In RR-IFP problem, because every IP link has at most one IBGP session deployed,
θij = 1, if router i and router j are IBGP peers; otherwise, θij = 0. Based on Equation 5.3,
we can simplify the optimization objective as follows:
argmin
Gr
P = argmax
Gr
P¯E
= argmax
Gr
∏
〈i,j〉∈Er
(1− rijqij)
= argmin
Gr
∑
〈i,j〉∈Er
log
1
1− rijqij (5.9)
In RR-ECL problem, the optimization can also be simpliﬁed. In general, if a cluster
has only one reﬂector, the reﬂector becomes a bottleneck and the IBGP network will be
severally isolated when this critical router fails. (1) In IBGP networks having only one
cluster, optional sessions between clients can solve this single point of failure problem, such
as Case (g) in Table 5.2. However, a large number of optional IBGP sessions have to be
used, which is not scalable to large networks. (2) In IBGP networks with multiple clusters,
the failure of the single reﬂector can isolate the cluster that the single reﬂector resides in. In
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this case, the use of optional sessions does not help6 and signiﬁcant amount of connectivity
loss is thus caused. Therefore, we set up more than one reﬂector in each cluster as a general
rule to provide a clear explanation and we will brieﬂy discuss the single reﬂector case after
this general case.
We ﬁrst present a lemma to show the direct impact of a BGP session failure on IBGP
network connectivity.
Lemma 5.4 If IBGP session 〈u, v〉 fails and it is a non-optional session in IBGP route
reﬂection networks, router u and router v are isolated from each other.
Proof: Since u and v share a required IBGP session, there are three possible relationship
between them: (reﬂector, reﬂector), (client, single reﬂector), and (client, one of the multiple
reﬂectors). We use Fig. 5.1 as an example. If both u and v are reﬂectors, such as A and
E, because other reﬂectors can not reﬂect routing information between two other reﬂectors,
u and v are isolated. If u is the only reﬂector of client v, v loses the single connection
with the other IBGP routers. If v has multiple reﬂectors, for example, C uses A and B as
its reﬂectors, because the CLUSTER LIST loop detection is enforced, A (or B) does not
reﬂect information from C to B (or A). Therefore, by summarizing all scenarios, u and v
are isolated from each other. 
Please recall that n denotes the number of routers. Due to the multiple reﬂectors in
the fully meshed IP networks, we have the following lemma concerning the connectivity loss
caused by network failures.
Lemma 5.5 If each cluster has more than one reﬂector in the fully meshed IP network
G(V,E), then the optional IBGP sessions between clients in the same cluster do not inﬂuence
ECL, and moreover,
a) ECL caused by the failure of routers, written Lc(V ), is irrelevant to reﬂection topology
design, and Lc(V ) = 2n
∑
i∈V ri, where ri is the probability that router i fails.
6Optional IBGP sessions are only used between clients in the same cluster.
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b) ECL caused by the failure of link (i, j), written Rc(i, j), is nonzero only if router i and
j share an IBGP session 〈i, j〉, and Lc(i, j) = 2n2−nrijqij.
Proof: Because all IGP routes are one-hop in the fully meshed IP networks and the
number of reﬂectors are more than one in each cluster, there are at least two independent
IBGP signaling routes between any two clients in the same cluster through the reﬂectors.
Since, we only consider the single IP component failure, the use of optional IBGP sessions,
adding another signaling path, does not inﬂuence ECL.
Single router failure only resets the IBGP sessions it possessed, and it does not inﬂuence
the IBGP sessions between other BGP routers, because all IBGP sessions cross only one IP
hop. To be more speciﬁcally, if the failed router is a client, obviously the reﬂection structure
is not changed; if it is a reﬂector, the other redundant reﬂectors in the cluster ensure the
connectivity between the clients and other part of the IBGP network. Thus, the failed router
is the only isolated IBGP router. No matter what reﬂection topology is used, ECL is the
same, and Lc(V ) =
∑
i∈V
2(n−1)
n2−n ri =
2
n
∑
i∈V ri.
In fully meshed IP network, session 〈i, j〉 only crosses link (i, j) and link (i, j) can only
be used by session 〈i, j〉. Thus, route reﬂection network is inﬂuenced by link (i, j) if and only
if i and j share an IBGP session. We further argue that if session 〈i, j〉 breaks, i and j is
the only isolated pair as follows. By lemma 5.4, we know that i and j are isolated from each
other, if 〈i, j〉 fails. Moreover, due to the redundant reﬂectors in each cluster, the failure
of 〈i, j〉 does not inﬂuence signaling paths between routers except i and j. Therefore, the
calculation of ECL due to link (i, j) failure can be simpliﬁed as Lc(i, j) = 2n2−nqijrij.
From the lemma above, the solution to RR-ECL problem in the fully meshed IP network
is
argmin
Gr
Lc = argmin
Gr
Lc(E) = argmin
Gr
∑
〈i,j〉∈Er
rijqij, (5.10)
and the optional sessions between clients in the same cluster are not necessary.
By combining the results from Equations 5.9 and 5.10 together, we note that the problems
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of reliable IBGP route reﬂection network are equivalent to minimizing the weight summation
of the whole route reﬂection graph. In a formal manner, let W(Gr) denote the weight
summation of all links in route reﬂection graph Gr, i.e., W(Gr) =
∑
〈i,j〉∈Er wij. We have
the following problem formulation.
Problem 5.2 (Simpliﬁed Reliable RR Network Design) In the complete graph G(V,E),
given the link weight {wij|i, j ∈ V }, ﬁnd a subgraph of G to be the route reﬂection network
G∗r, such that W(G∗r) ≤ W(Gr), for any route reﬂection network Gr based on G.
Speciﬁcally, in RR-IFP problem, wij = − log (1− rijqij); in RR-ECL problem wij = rijqij.
It is interesting to note that these two weight deﬁnitions are approximately the same when
rijqij is small, because log(1+x)  x for small x. In the existing Internet, the network failure
probabilities are indeed very small, and therefore, RR-IFP and RR-ECL have approximately
the same optimization objective in fully meshed IP networks, i.e., if we ﬁnd the optimum
solution for one, we get an approximate solution for the other.
Intuitively, in order to minimize W(Gr), we would like to make use of reliable IP links
and have a small number of IP links involved in route reﬂection networks. The traditional
full mesh IBGP network has every IP link involved, and thus it has worse reliability than
other properly designed IBGP networks. Quantitatively, in the fully meshed IP networks
G(V,E), if the traditional full mesh IBGP is used, P = 1 −∏i∈V (1 − qi)∏e∈E(1 − qere),
and Lc = 2n
∑
i∈V ri +
∑
e∈E
2
n2−nreqe. In later sections, we will see how much reliability
improvement can be made by route reﬂection network optimization.
Single-cluster Case
We impose one more constraint on the optimization problem: only one cluster is allowed.
This restriction is reasonable in small IP networks. Two important questions need to be
answered: how many redundant reﬂectors are needed, and where to place reﬂectors. The
following lemma gives the optimum number of reﬂectors.
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Lemma 5.6 In fully meshed IP networks, if a single cluster is used in the overlaid IBGP
route reﬂection network, the optimum number of reﬂectors is 2.
Proof: Because there are at least two reﬂectors in the cluster, we only need to show that
any reﬂection network with k + 1 reﬂectors (k ≥ 2), written Gk+1r , has larger W(Gr) than
a reﬂection network with k reﬂectors, written Gkr . In network G
k+1
r , we choose arbitrarily
one reﬂector i and change it into client to obtain a new reﬂection network Gkr . The sessions
between i and other reﬂectors in Gk+1r remain in G
k
r , but they change from R-R relationship
to R-C relationship. The sessions between i and the clients in Gk+1r are missing in G
k
r ,
because sessions between clients are not required. Other sessions are the same in the two
networks. Thus, Gkr .Er ⊂ Gk+1r .Er. It follows naturally that W(Gkr) <W(Gk+1r ). Therefore,
the optimum number of reﬂectors is 2.
Lemma 5.6 shows that the route reﬂection network is most reliable if two reﬂectors are
used. Using more reﬂectors actually decreases the reliability of the IBGP network, even
though more resources are consumed. The intuitive reason is that more redundant reﬂectors
lead to less number of IBGP signaling paths in route reﬂection networks. As an extreme
example, in the traditional full mesh IBGP network where every router can be viewed as a
reﬂector, only one signaling path exists between any two routers and it is less reliable than
the IBGP networks with fewer route reﬂectors.
We can thus directly obtain an algorithm, from Lemma 5.6, to ﬁnd the optimum route
reﬂection network by enumerating all possible reﬂector pairs. The optimum placement of
reﬂectors is:
arg min
i,j∈V
Mi + Mj − wij, (5.11)
where Mi =
∑
k =i,k∈V wik, ∀i ∈ V . In the resulted IBGP network, 2n− 3 IBGP sessions are
used.
Discussions:
• BGP protocol can be slightly modiﬁed to increase IBGP reliability. In IBGP, CLUS-
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TER LIST aims to prevent a BGP UPDATE message from re-entering a cluster, and it
prohibits route reﬂection between two routers in the same cluster. For example, in
Fig. 5.1, if session 〈A,D〉 fails, B does not reﬂect routes between them. However, if
we only perform CLUSTER LIST check on BGP messages from other clusters, i.e., we
allow the route reﬂection from the clients to peer reﬂectors in the same cluster, IBGP
reliability can be improved. Due to this modiﬁcation, the single link failure between
a reﬂector and a client does not contribute to the connectivity loss, because the other
reﬂector in the same cluster can reﬂect BGP messages between them.
• Besides the IBGP design with redundant reﬂectors, it is also possible to create the
redundancy by using optional IBGP sessions between clients. That is, we choose one
router to be the single reﬂector, the remaining routers are clients, and the clients
form a full mesh of IBGP sessions. In this design, between any two clients there are
two independent IBGP signaling paths; however, between the reﬂector and a client
there is still only one signaling path. Thus, the optimum reﬂector is determined by
argmini∈V Mi. The optimized ECL is smaller than the previous redundant reﬂector
design shown in Equation 5.11, but the number of IBGP sessions is
(
n
2
)
, which is much
larger than the redundant reﬂector design (2n− 3).
Multi-cluster Case
In this section, we consider the case of multiple clusters and the problems of both router
clustering and reﬂector placement in fully meshed IP networks. Because using only one
reﬂector in a cluster may isolate the whole cluster in the multi-cluster case, we focus on the
design with redundant reﬂectors in a cluster. We have the following lemma concerning the
complexity of the problem.
Lemma 5.7 In fully meshed IP networks, the simpliﬁed reliable RR network design problem,
RR-IFP and RR-ECL, is NP-hard.
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Proof: The proof is in Section 5.7.
Router clustering makes the problem much harder than the single-cluster case. In order
to solve the design problem, we need heuristic algorithms, which will be discussed in next
section. Moreover, we introduce an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) model for solving this
problem, especially for fully meshed IP networks. The ILP model can be used to ﬁnd the
optimum solution when the network size is not large by using some powerful mathematical
programming solvers, such as CPLEX [51].
Let us consider the problem in which the number of clusters is ﬁxed to be nc. We deﬁne
the following binary variables:
gij =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 : i is a reﬂector in cluster j.
0 : else.
(5.12)
hij =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 : i is a client in cluster j.
0 : else.
(5.13)
sij =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 : i and j share an IBGP session.
0 : else.
(5.14)
Below is the ILP formulation.
∑
i∈V
gij = nr 1 ≤ j ≤ nc (5.15)∑
1≤j≤nc
gij + hij = 1 ∀i ∈ V (5.16)
sij ≥
∑
1≤k≤nc
(gik + gjk)− 1 ∀i, j ∈ V, i < j (5.17)
sij ≥ gik + hjk − 1 ∀i, j ∈ V, i < j, 1 ≤ k ≤ nc (5.18)
sij ≥ gjk + hik − 1 ∀i, j ∈ V, i < j, 1 ≤ k ≤ nc (5.19)
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The optimization objective is as follows.
min
∑
i,j∈V,i<j
wijsij (5.20)
Formula 5.15 ensures that the number of reﬂectors in one cluster is nr (nr = 2 in our
discussion). Formula 5.16 guarantees that any router can be either a reﬂector or a client in
just one cluster. Formula 5.17 ensures that two reﬂectors share one IBGP session. Formulas
5.18 and 5.19 guarantee that a reﬂector and any of its clients share one IBGP session.
Moreover, we can avoid the unnecessary searching in clustering the routers by the following
constraints, which are not required for deﬁning a valid route reﬂection network but can
improve the speed of solving the optimization problem.
∑
i∈V
(hi j + gi j) ≤
∑
i∈V
(hi j+1 + gi j+1) ∀i ∈ V, i ≤ n− 1 (5.21)
Because at least two reﬂectors are required in one cluster, the range of nc is from 1 to
n
2
,
we can use CPLEX to solve the optimization problem by enumerating all possible values of
nc, and choose the optimal nc and the reﬂection topology.
Furthermore, as a special case, if all links and routers are uniform in terms of reliability,
the following lemma shows that the single-cluster design is the solution.
Lemma 5.8 In a fully meshed IP network, if each failure scenario probability (rs) and each
conditional IBGP session failure probability (qs) are the same, the single-cluster design is
the optimum solution for the simpliﬁed reliable RR network design problem.
Proof: Because all links and routers are uniform, wij is the same for any i-j pair. Thus,
W(Gr) is proportional to the number of IBGP sessions used in the reﬂection network. Given
that there are two reﬂectors in one cluster, the number of sessions is
(
2nc
2
)
+ 2(n − 2nc) =
2n + 2n2c − 5nc. Therefore, if nc = 1, W(Gr) is minimized.
Therefore, in this special case, this problem is reduced to the problem in Section 5.5.2.
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5.5.3 IBGP Reﬂection over General IP Networks
If the IP network topology is a general graph, the optimization problems are much more
diﬃcult to solve than in the fully meshed IP network. Moreover, optimizing RR-IFP and
RR-ECL may lead to diﬀerent results, even if the network failure probabilities are small, as
has been demonstrated in Section 5.4.2.
The mathematical programming model for RR-IFP problem includes the Formulas 5.15-
5.19, and the following formula:
ul =
∑
i=j,i,j∈V
sijfijl, ∀l ∈ E, (5.22)
where binary variable fijl is one if IGP path Pij passes IP link l; otherwise fijl is zero. Thus,
ul stands for the number of IBGP sessions passing link l. fijl can be calculated from IGP
routing results. The optimization objective is to maximize P¯E in Equation 5.3, i.e.,
max
∑
l∈E
log (1− rl + rl (1− ql)ul) . (5.23)
This model contains a nonlinear component. In a special case, where qs = 1 for any failure
scenario s, the above model becomes linear, and can be solved using tools such as CPLEX.
In RR-ECL problem, there even does not exist a closed-form model to formulate the prob-
lem because of the diﬃculty in calculating the ECL metric. Therefore, in order to solve the
general form of RR-ECL and RR-IFP problems, we apply iterative search techniques. The
basic ideas are: probing and calculating various conﬁgurations of IBGP networks, choosing
the next searching target according to some rules, and optimizing the reliability iteratively.
In the following text, we focus on RR-ECL problem to explain the optimization techniques.
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Greedy Select (GS)
Greedy Select (GS) is an intuitive way to design reliable reﬂection topologies. We ﬁrst
randomly pick up several routers to be reﬂectors from a candidate reﬂector set, each reﬂector
is designated to be in an independent cluster, and each of the remaining routers (clients)
is connected to a reﬂector which has the most reliable IGP path to it. In each cluster, the
most reliable router other than the existing reﬂector is chosen as the second reﬂector. GS
repeats this iteration for many times and returns the best topology it ﬁnds. For a network
with n BGP routers, GS iterates for 2n2 times. In each iteration, the candidate reﬂector set
consists of the top 60% of the most reliable routers.
Tabu Search (TS)
Tabu Search (TS) is an eﬃcient meta-heuristic algorithm which can ﬁnd satisfactory near-
optimal solutions in large combinatorial optimization problems. We skip the details on tabu
search itself, but brieﬂy describe the speciﬁc settings we use for solving RR-ECL problem.
Interested readers are referred to [52] on the basics of tabu search.
TS optimization is performed based on a ﬁxed number of clusters. We search through
all possible values of cluster numbers (from 1 to n) by TS to ﬁnd the smallest value of
ECL. In each TS optimization, we take a two-level approach to optimize RR topologies as
follows7. At the higher level, the placement of reﬂectors is optimized; at the lower lever, with
the ﬁxed reﬂectors structure, we optimize the assignment of the clients to reﬂectors. The
neighborhood structure of the reﬂector placement is deﬁned by the following procedures:
swapping two reﬂectors in diﬀerent clusters, swapping a reﬂector with a client, changing a
reﬂector to be a client, and changing a client to be a reﬂector. The neighborhood structure
of client assignment is deﬁned by moving a client from one cluster to another cluster. The
7The purpose of decomposing the optimization into two levels is to decrease the size of the neighborhood
structure. This two-level approach does not prevent us from reaching the global optimal solution. There
is always a searching trace leading to the global optimum from an initial topology, even if the topology
searching is decomposed into two levels.
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tabu list contains the new clients, the new reﬂectors, and the clients just being moved to
avoid loops in the searching process. However, if a neighboring solution is better than the
best result found so far, the tabu condition is disabled. The initial RR topology is generated
by using the GS algorithm.
Previously, we has shown that the robustness of IBGP can be increased by using optional
IBGP sessions between clients in the same cluster. However, using a large number of op-
tional sessions increases the overhead of BGP routers, especially in large networks. Thus, in
practice, we have to make a tradeoﬀ between the scalability and robustness. This tradeoﬀ
can also be implemented in our heuristic searching algorithms. In addition, our experimental
results, which are based on the realistic Internet network topologies and will be presented
later, show that by using optional IBGP sessions, the robustness of IBGP is increased only
slightly, compared with the appropriately designed IBGP route reﬂection networks with no
optional sessions, which means that we can obtain both reliable and eﬃcient IBGP networks
without using many IBGP sessions.
Using TS, we can ﬁnd the optimum RR topology for the IP network in the case study
previously discussed in Section 5.4.2. The best RR topology without using optional BGP
sessions is: forming one cluster and router B and E being reﬂectors. The ECL is 20+11q
10
r. The
result is better than Case (h) which uses the maximum number of sessions. This example
demonstrates the beneﬁts of designing the RR topology properly. When the optional session
is allowed, the Case (g) is the best design.
Lower Bound of ECL optimization
We develop a lower bound for the minimum ECL in RR-ECL problem to evaluate the
performance of our optimization algorithms. For convenience, we rank all links in IP network
G(V,E) based on the product of the scenario occurrence probability and the corresponding
conditional session failure probability, i.e., {rsqs|s ∈ E}; let r˜(i) denote the ith smallest value.
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Lemma 5.9 In IP network G(V,E), the lower bound for the solution of RR-ECL problem
is L
( |V |2 )
, where
L =
∑
i∈V
(|V | − 1)ri +max
⎛
⎝(2|V | − 3)r˜(1), |V |−1∑
i=1
r˜(i)
⎞
⎠ . (5.24)
Proof: We analyze the bound by considering router failures and IP link failures sepa-
rately as follows. (1) On each router failure, we underestimate the ECL by only considering
the router isolation related to the failed router. Thus, at least |V | − 1 pairs of routers are
isolated due to the single router failure, which contributes to the ﬁrst term in Equation 5.24.
(2) Because the minimum number of the non-optional sessions is 2|V | − 3 (see the proof
of Lemma 5.8) and each session is inﬂuenced by at least one IP link, the minimum amount
contributed by these links is (2|V |−3)r˜(1) 8. On the other hand, at least |V |−1 IP links are
used by IBGP sessions; otherwise, the IBGP network is not connected at the routing layer.
These links contribute at least
∑|V |−1
i=1 r˜(i) to ECL. Moreover, by ﬁnding the maximum of
the above two values, we get the second term in Equation 5.24.
In IP networks that are not strongly connected, the failures of the critical links or nodes
can partition the network. For example, in Fig. 5.1 node G is a critical node. The above
lemma can be extended to give a tighter lower bound in this case. We denote N(i) to be
the number of node pairs (including the failed nodes) that are partitioned due to the failure
of i, where i ∈ V ∪ E. r˜(i) is determined only based on the non-critical links (i.e., the links
that can not partition the network). Then, similar to the reasoning in Lemma 5.9, the lower
bound of ECL is L
( |V |2 )
, where
L =
∑
i∈V ∪E
N(i)ri +
|V |−1−β∑
i=1
r˜(i), (5.25)
8Please note that if a non-optional IBGP session fails, the related two IBGP routers are isolated (see
Lemma 5.4).
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where β is the number of the critical IP links which can partition the network.
5.5.4 Summary of the Problems and the Solutions
Based on the above discussions on optimizing IBGP route reﬂection networks, we summarize
the problem categories and the time complexities of the solutions in Fig. 5.5. In some special
cases, we can ﬁnd the optimum design by polynomial algorithms. In general cases, we have
to use heuristics based on iterative searching to obtain the near-optimal solutions.
O(n2)
General RR Design
Fully meshed IP
network
Single Cluster
Design
Multiple Cluster
Design
Uniform routers
and links
Heterogeneous
routers and links
constant NP
Genearl IP
network
ILP
NP LocalSearch
Figure 5.5: Summary of reliable IBGP RR network design problems.
5.6 Experimental Studies of IBGP Network
Optimization
5.6.1 Fully meshed IP Networks
In fully meshed IP networks, the RR network design is irrelevant to the reliability of BGP
routers. Thus, in this subsection, we assume that all BGP routers are perfect. The failure
probabilities of IP links pf is generated randomly from the interval [0.02− δ, 0.02+ δ], where
δ equals 0.005, 0.01, and 0.02, respectively, in the three cases to be studied. The failure
scenario occurrence probability is re and re = pf (e)
∏
l =e[1 − pf (l)]. The IBGP session
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conditional failure probability, qe, is 0.31, which corresponds to 36 seconds failure recovery
time under the default setting of BGP and TCP timers (see Chapter 3). In addition, because
reqe is small, the results of the RR-IFP problem are approximately the same as the RR-ECL
problem, and thus we only describe the results of RR-ECL as follows.
In the single-cluster design problem in a network of 20 nodes, we enumerate all possible
route reﬂection networks with two and three reﬂectors, calculate the ECL for each conﬁgu-
ration, sort by ECL, and draw the results in Fig. 5.6. In the ﬁgure, each point stands for
a feasible solution to the RR network design problem. The optimum solutions for the three
cases are marked in the ﬁgure. The IBGP networks with three reﬂectors are worse than the
IBGP networks with two reﬂectors, which conﬁrms the statement in lemma 5.6. We also
notice that the range of ECL is larger when the range of the link failure probability is higher,
which means that we can take advantage of more reliable links and avoid using unreliable
links to make RR network more robust.
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Figure 5.6: ECLs of all RR networks with two or three reﬂectors in a single cluster in a fully
meshed IP network. pf is the link failure probability.
In the case of multi-cluster design, we use CPLEX to solve the ILP model discussed in
Section 5.5.2. In a fully meshed IP network with 14 nodes, the link failure probabilities are
generated randomly with δ set to 0, 0.01 or 0.02. Fig. 5.7 shows the optimization results
of when the number of clusters nc are 1 through 7. If the link failure probabilities are the
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Figure 5.7: The optimum ECLs wrt. diﬀerent number of clusters in a fully meshed IP
network.
same for all IP links, ECL increases monotonically as nc, and the single-cluster design has the
smallest ECL, which conﬁrms Lemma 5.8. On the other hand, if the link failure probabilities
are not the same, as shown in the ﬁgure, the optimal cluster number is two in these two
cases. The reason is that IBGP sessions can be arranged to avoid passing unreliable links
by grouping routers into multiple clusters appropriately.
5.6.2 General IP Networks
The general network topologies we used in our experiment are summarized in Table 5.3.
The ﬁrst two topologies are generated by Brite topology generator [53] at the router level
with Waxman model. The other two are PoP level topologies taken from the rocketfuel
project [54], which stands for building a third level route reﬂection on top of the PoP graphs.
The failure probability of each router is randomly generated from interval [0.02−a, 0.02+
a] and the link failure probability is generated from [0.04−b, 0.04+b]. In our experiment, we
test two settings of a and b: one is (a, b) = (0.02, 0.04); the other is (a, b) = (0.005, 0.005).
We call them I and II, which stand for large and small variances of network component
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Table 5.3: IP networks used in the experiments of Chapter 5.
Name Router Number Link Number Description
WM20 20 40 Waxman Model, Brite
WM40 40 80 Waxman Model, Brite
AS6461 19 34 RocketFuel
AS3251 41 87 RocketFuel
failure probabilities, respectively. Thus, we denote the experiment conﬁguration with net-
work WM20 and the ﬁrst failure setting as ‘WM20-I’ and other conﬁgurations are similarly
denoted.
We develop and implement an eﬃcient TS algorithm to solve the RR-ECL problem. Fig.
5.8 demonstrates the optimization results of TS with respect to diﬀerent numbers of clusters.
In this network (WM20), the optimal cluster number is 2. It is interesting to note that, in
the scenario of larger variance of network component failure probability, we can ﬁnd RR
topology with smaller ECL by deploying reﬂectors and IBGP sessions on the more reliable
router and links.
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Figure 5.8: The optimum ECLs wrt. diﬀerent number of clusters in WM20 by tabu search.
In Fig. 5.9, we compare the optimization results of GS and TS with the traditional fully
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meshed IBGP and the lower bound of ECL in all eight scenarios. It is obvious to observe
that by performing RR topology optimization, we can ﬁnd much more reliable IBGP RR
network than the traditional fully meshed IBGP. Even the simple GS algorithm can achieve
signiﬁcant improvement in terms of reliability. By using TS, ECL can be further minimized.
Comparing the results with the lower bound of ECL, we conclude that the TS algorithm can
ﬁnd satisfying results which are close to the global optimum solution.
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Figure 5.9: Performance of ECL optimization in general IP networks.
Previously, we have discussed that the reliability of IBGP networks can be improved by
using optional sessions between clients of the same cluster. In Fig. 5.10, we compare the
results if the optional sessions are allowed with the results when no optional sessions are used
in the algorithm of TS. The ﬁgures show that in the four network topologies we studied, the
use of optional sessions only improves IBGP reliability very slightly. The reason is that, in
these networks, the impact of single component failures on IBGP is already minimized to a
small level by appropriately placing redundant reﬂectors and clustering routers. Thus, the
optional sessions are not necessary in these cases and the additional cost in managing the
optional sessions in saved. Therefore, we can design both reliable and eﬃcient IBGP route
reﬂection networks.
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Figure 5.10: Performance comparison of RR design with/without optional BGP sessions.
Finally, we test the robustness of ECL optimization when the topologies of IP networks
change. We focus on the scenario where new IP links are introduced into the IP networks.
In the original network WM20-I, which contains 40 IP links, we ﬁnd out the optimized route
reﬂection network. We further randomly generate new links in WM20-I, from one extra link
to 40 extra links. For each generated new IP network, route reﬂection network is optimized
again by using Tabu search and let Lnewc denote the new ECL result. The ECL of old
reﬂection network in the new IP network is also computed and the result is Loric . Thus, the
ratio L
ori
c
Lnewc stands for the performance degradation of the original route reﬂection network
from the updated reﬂection design considering the IP network change. We use this ratio as
the measure of the robustness of ECL optimization. The results are shown in Fig. 5.11. For
each number of additional IP links, we test 100 randomly generated IP networks. The 50%
and 90% percentile of the results are drawn in the ﬁgure. From the 50% percentile curve,
we observe that in about half of the new IP networks, the original route reﬂection network
performs only 5% worse than the newly optimized ones, even if as many as 40 links are added
into the original IP network that has 20 links. Moreover, in 90% of the new IP networks,
the original route reﬂection network is at most 10% worse. Therefore, we conclude that the
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Figure 5.11: ECL comparison between the original and updated RR networks when IP
network changes.
optimization results of RR-ECL is robust to IP network changes in terms of introducing new
IP links.
5.7 Complexity Analysis
In this section, we show that the simpliﬁed route reﬂection network design described in
Problem 5.2 is NP-hard. We investigate a special case of Problem 5.2 in which the number
of reﬂectors in one cluster is one, and we call this special problem sRRD. This simpliﬁcation
is only for the purpose of the following hardness proof. It is not assumed in designing reliable
route reﬂection networks.
Next, we will reduce sRRD from Uncapacitated Facility Location Problem (UFL) that is
proved to be NP-hard in [55]. In UFL, F is a set of nf potential facilities, and D is a set of
nd clients. For any i ∈ F , a ﬁxed nonnegative cost fi is given as the opening cost of facility
i. For every client i ∈ D and facility j ∈ F , there is a connection cost cij between client i
and facility j. The problem is to open a subset of the facilities of F , and assign every client
to an open facility such that the total cost, including the opening cost and the connection
cost, is minimized. That is min
F ′⊆F
[∑
i∈F ′
fi +
∑
i∈D
min
j∈F ′
cij
]
.
122
If we require that IBGP routers are grouped into exactly k clusters in the sRRD problem,
we get the k-sRRD problem, where 0 < k ≤ n. Similarly, if the number of opened facilities
is required to be k, we have the k-UFL problem, where 0 < k ≤ nf .
Lemma 5.10 k-UFL problem is NP-hard.
Proof: By contradiction. Let us assume that there is an algorithm that can solve k-UFL in
polynomial time. Because the number of facilities nf is ﬁnite, we can also ﬁnd the optimal
solution for UFL in polynomial time by solving k-UFL with k = 1, 2, . . . , nf , respectively.
While, it is unable to ﬁnd a solution for UFL in polynomial time, unless P=NP. Therefore,
k-UFL has to be NP-hard. 
Lemma 5.11 sRRD problem is NP-hard.
Proof: Because k-sRRD is a special case of sRRD. We only need to show that k-sRRD
is NP-hard, and we prove this by reducing k-UFL problem to k-sRRD problem. From the
k-UFL problem, we construct a graph, as shown in Fig. 5.12, to form the k-sRRD problem.
We deﬁne sets F = {Fi | 1 ≤ i ≤ nf} and D = {Di | 1 ≤ i ≤ nd} to be set of facilities and
set of clients, respectively. An auxiliary node T is also introduced. The link weights of the
graph are set as follows: (1) For any Fi ∈ F, the weight between T and Fi is fiM , where M is
a very large positive number; (2) The weight between T and any Di ∈ D is inﬁnity; (3) For
any link between Fi, Fj ∈ F, the weight is fi+fjk−1 ; (4) The weight of a link between any two
nodes in D is inﬁnity; (5) For any Fj ∈ F and Di ∈ D, the weight is cji.
Based on the construction in Fig. 5.12, we can easily map the k-UFL problem into the
(k+1)-sELT problem. The following veriﬁes that this mapping is valid. Because the weight
between any two nodes in {T}∪D is inﬁnity, at most one node from {T}∪D can be chosen
as the reﬂector. The other k or k+1 reﬂectors are from F. We choose M large enough, i.e.,
M  max
(
max
i,j,l
fl
cij
, max
i,j,l
(k−1)fl
fi+fj
)
, such that T is guaranteed to be a reﬂector. The other k
reﬂectors are chosen from F.
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Figure 5.12: Reduction from k-UFL to k-sRRD.
Because the weight between T and any node in D is inﬁnity, the nodes in D can only be
assigned to the reﬂectors in F. Likewise, due to the large M , the nodes in F that are not
reﬂectors are assigned to the reﬂector T . Therefore, the total weight of the reﬂection graph,
γ, is
γ = weight of reﬂector mesh + weight of client connections
=
∑
i,j∈R
wij +
∑
i∈C
min
j∈R
cij
= min
F ′⊆F
|F ′|=k
(∑
i∈F
fi/M +
∑
i∈F ′
fi +
∑
i∈D
min
j∈F ′
cij
)
= min
F ′⊆F
|F ′|=k
(∑
i∈F ′
fi +
∑
i∈D
min
j∈F ′
cij
)
+ C (5.26)
where C =
∑
i∈F
fi/M and C is a constant. From equation 5.26, the (k + 1)-sRRD problem
has the same optimization function as the k-UFL problem. Therefore, we have reduced the
k-UFL problem to the k-sRRD problem. By lemma 5.10, we know that the k-sRRD problem
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is indeed NP-hard. Moreover, we prove that sRRD is NP hard.
Finally, since the sRRD problem is a special case of Problem 5.2, we know that Problem
5.2 is NP-hard.
5.8 Summary
The reliability of IBGP networks has a remarkable impact on the dependability of Internet
routing. Based on the existing Internet framework, how to model and how to improve the
resilience of IBGP networks are of signiﬁcant importance. In this chapter, we propose a reli-
ability model and three novel reliability metrics for IBGP networks, which take into account
the dependent failures of IBGP sessions and quantify the resilience of IBGP networks in
various network failure scenarios. Then, we formulate the optimization problems for ﬁnding
the most reliable route reﬂection networks and analyze their properties in the fully meshed
IP networks and general networks. Moreover, several eﬃcient algorithms are developed to
solve the problems eﬃciently. Through extensive experiments, we show that our model is
eﬀective in characterizing the resilience of IBGP networks and we can ﬁnd satisfying designs
which are close to the global optimum solutions.
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Chapter 6
Advertising Interdomain QoS Routing
Information
Based on the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), interdomain QoS information advertising
and routing are important for balancing Internet traﬃc and improving packet forwarding
eﬃciency. However, two major challenges, scalability and heterogeneity, make the QoS
extension to BGP diﬃcult. In the existing routing schemes, static and instantaneous QoS
metrics, such as link capacity and available bandwidth, are used to represent QoS routing
information. But neither of them can solve the two challenges well.
In this chapter, BGP is extended to advertise available bandwidth and delay information
of packet forwarding routes. But, instead of using the traditional deterministic metrics, a
series of statistical metrics, Available Bandwidth Index (ABI), Delay Index (DI), Available
Bandwidth Histogram (ABH) and Delay Histogram (DH), are deﬁned and applied to QoS
information advertising and routing. Two major contributions of the proposed statistical
metrics are: (1) QoS information is abstracted into one or several probability intervals, and
thus the heterogeneous and dynamic QoS information can be represented more ﬂexibly and
precisely; (2) By capturing the statistical property of the detailed distribution of QoS infor-
mation, these new metrics are eﬃcient and they can highly decrease the message overhead in
routing, thereby making the QoS advertising and routing scalable. Our extensive simulations
conﬁrm both contributions of the QoS extension to BGP very well.
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6.1 Motivations
There are mainly three advantages in bringing QoS information into BGP. First, it will op-
timize the interdomain packet forwarding performance. By properly using the QoS routing
information in BGP messages, we can identify routes with higher available bandwidth or
lower traﬃc load to forward data packets. Second, it will make interdomain traﬃc engi-
neering [56] more eﬀective. Local IP traﬃc can be better controlled if the global Internet
traﬃc condition is known. Third, it can provide necessary information for other interdomain
related protocols which need QoS support from the routing layer. For example, in the in-
terdomain resource reservation protocol BGRP [57], the block rate will be decreased if the
signal messages are distributed according to appropriate QoS metrics.
However, there are two major diﬃculties when QoS information advertising is introduced
into BGP. First, the extension has to be scalable. BGP is originally designed to exchange
pure reachability information. If QoS metrics are added, the scalability of Internet routing
should not be compromised by the dynamic nature of the QoS information. Second, the QoS
representation should be able to handle the heterogeneity of links or routes in the interdomain
routing. The connections between BGP routers may be of diﬀerent types. For example, some
connections may use direct physical links, while some may use the paths provided by the
intradomain routing, i.e. IGP routes. Moreover, the route refreshing periods may vary in
diﬀerent domains. Thus, the QoS information obtained from diﬀerent ASes has diﬀerent
degrees of precision.
In order to cope with the two diﬃculties described above, QoS metrics have to be appro-
priately selected. As we know, there exist two types of QoS metrics: the static QoS metrics
and the dynamic ones. The static metrics are deterministic all the time, such as the link
capacity and AS hop count. The dynamic metrics vary according to diﬀerent traﬃc loads,
such as the available bandwidth of a link or a path.
Routing using static metrics has low message overhead. After the routing table is set up,
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QoS information of routes will not be further exchanged, because the values of the static QoS
metrics are constant. However, static QoS metrics usually can not reﬂect the instantaneous
network status. For example, even if the link capacity is high, the real available bandwidth
could be low due to high traﬃc load. On the other hand, dynamic QoS metrics can represent
the instantaneous network status, but high routing message overhead is incurred due to the
ﬂuctuation of dynamic QoS metrics over time. Routing based on the instantaneous QoS
metrics without any control is not scalable in the global Internet. Some simple statistics
based on the instantaneous values, such as average available bandwidth, can reduce the
message overhead, but they are too coarse-grained to model the instantaneous information
well.
We propose four novel statistical QoS metrics, which make the QoS extension of interdo-
main routing scalable and achieve satisfactory routing optimality1. Based on the samples of
available bandwidth and delay, we deﬁne Available Bandwidth Index (ABI) and Delay Index
(DI) to model the instantaneous values of the available bandwidth and delay. Basically, ABI
or DI is a compound metric which consists of an interval  = [l, u] and a probability ρ,
meaning that the instantaneous value belongs to the interval  with probability ρ. In order
to increase the precision of QoS information advertising, we further extend the concept of
ABI and DI to Available Bandwidth Histogram (ABH) and Delay Histogram (DH) by making
use of multiple probability intervals.
The instantaneous values of the available bandwidth and delay ﬂuctuate from time to
time. However, in the Internet backbone, since a large number of ﬂows are aggregated on
each link, the statistical distributions of bandwidth and delay are far more stable than the
instantaneous values. Thus, by using the statistical QoS metrics in BGP advertising and
routing, the routing message overhead can be reduced to a level which is close to the cost of
routing using static QoS metrics. Thus, this approach makes QoS information advertising
1Routing optimality means the ability to ﬁnd the path with the best QoS. We will give a rigorous deﬁnition
for routing optimality in section 6.6.
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scalable to large networks. On the other hand, although the instantaneous information is
not advertised, using simulations, we show that the statistical metrics lead to much higher
routing optimality than the static metrics, because distribution information of bandwidth
or delay is exploited to ﬁnd better routes.
Our new metrics are also ﬂexible to cope with the heterogeneity in the interdomain
routing, which neither the static nor the dynamic metric could achieve. The distributions of
QoS information of a direct physical link are diﬀerent from those of a group of IGP routes.
Also, diﬀerent precision levels of QoS information can be represented by the statistical metrics
properly. For example, a less precise QoS parameter may have a larger interval  or a
smaller probability ρ. This is helpful to represent the QoS routing information of a path
which contains some legacy routers that do not support the BGP QoS extension.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, the network model is
deﬁned. In Section 6.3, we present two new metrics, ABI and DI, and their join operations.
In Section 6.4, we present BGP QoS extension based on ABI and DI. In Section 6.5, we
extend ABI and DI to histogram information, ABH and DH, respectively. Section 6.6 shows
the simulation results. Section 6.7 concludes this chapter.
6.2 Network Model
We consider a typical network with BGP routers and ASes, where BGP routers can be either
QoS-aware or without any QoS extension, as shown in Fig. 6.1(a). In Fig. 6.1(a), the BGP
routers in AS1, AS2, AS3 and AS5 are QoS-aware, while routers in AS4 are not. We call
those BGP routers without QoS extension the legacy BGP routers. Our network model,
representing the BGP routers and ASes, is then deﬁned as a graph G = (V,E), where V is
the set of QoS-aware BGP routers and E is the set of logical links that connect QoS-aware
BGP routers. Fig. 6.1(b) shows an example which is abstracted directly from the network
in Fig. 6.1(a). With respect to diﬀerent abstraction origins in the real network, there are
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three diﬀerent types of logical links in E:
1. TYPE-1: A TYPE-1 logical link in E represents a real physical link which connects
two BGP routers directly. Typically, this type of links exists between two neighboring
ASes (e.g., the link between r4 and r6 in Fig. 6.1(b)).
2. TYPE-2: A TYPE-2 logical link stands for an IGP route inside an AS, connecting
two BGP routers within the same AS (e.g., the link between r2 and r4 in Fig. 6.1(b)).
3. TYPE-3: A TYPE-3 logical link encapsulates a physical route across multiple ASes,
along which all the intermediate routers are legacy BGP routers. For example, the link
between r1 and r6 shown in Fig. 6.1(b) is a TYPE-3 logical link. This type of links
corresponds to the scenario where QoS-aware BGP routers are only incrementally or
partially deployed.
AS1
AS2
AS3AS5 r1r5
r2
r3
r4
r6
AS4r8 r7
p1
p2
(a) Network of BGP routers.
r1
r5
r4
r6
r2
r3
(b) Network
model for BGP
QoS extension.
Figure 6.1: Network model for BGP QoS extension.
Each link e ∈ E can be associated with some QoS parameters. In this proposal, we con-
centrate on two types of QoS parameters: bandwidth and delay. In traditional QoS routing,
link capacity and instantaneous available bandwidth are used to characterize the bandwidth
information of links or routes. The instantaneous available bandwidth is a dynamic param-
eter and represents the instantaneous available data transferring rate on a link at a certain
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time. On the other hand, the link capacity, focusing on the static aspect, describes the
maximum data transferring rate of a link, which is usually much larger than the available
bandwidth due to existing traﬃc or bandwidth reservations. The delay metric is the aggre-
gated information of processing delay, propagation delay and queuing delay. Likewise, the
instantaneous delay changes frequently over time.
Now, assuming the bandwidth or delay information is available for each logical link in
E, our focus is to bring QoS extensions to the original BGP so that interdomain routing,
traﬃc engineering and other related protocols can be optimized based on appropriate QoS
parameters.
In order to obtain available bandwidth for diﬀerent types of links in E (TYPE-1, 2, or
3), three diﬀerent ways are applied accordingly. If e ∈ E is a TYPE-1 link, its available
bandwidth can be simply obtained by monitoring its traﬃc directly. If e is of TYPE-2, then
we can get the available bandwidth information of e from the IGP running in that AS (we
assume the IGP to be QoS-enabled, such as the OSPF with QoS extensions [58]). If e is a
TYPE-3 link, since e actually represents a route that consists of legacy BGP routers, we have
to initiate an end-to-end bandwidth measuring process to obtain the available bandwidth
information of e. Notice that: (1) For a TYPE-1 link, changes of its available bandwidth
are caused by traﬃc ﬂuctuations on the physical link. On the other hand, for a TYPE-2 or
TYPE-3 link, since it may represent an entire path rather than a single physical link in the
real network, the variation of the available bandwidth may be caused by traﬃc ﬂuctuations
and also by route changes. For example, in Fig. 6.1(a) the IGP routing in AS2 may change
from path p1 to path p2. This will result in the change of link metrics between r2 and r4 in
Fig. 6.1(b), if the QoS properties of p1 and p2 are diﬀerent. (2) The technique of end-to-end
bandwidth measuring is used to obtain the available bandwidth for TYPE-3 links. However,
we do not rely on this technique to obtain bandwidth information for TYPE-1 and TYPE-2
links. It is because end-to-end measurements may be very imprecise. Moreover, there are
large communication and computing overheads involved.
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6.3 New QoS Metrics: ABI and DI
In order to characterize the instantaneous bandwidth and delay information, we introduce
two novel QoS metrics – Available Bandwidth Index (ABI) and Delay Index (DI), which are
scalable and can handle heterogeneity while providing good routing optimality.
6.3.1 Deﬁnitions of ABI and DI
In our new QoS metrics, ABI and DI, we bring in statistical properties of the dynamic QoS
parameters. Let us assume that the available bandwidth on a link or a route is a random
variable that follows a certain distribution. The instantaneous values (samples) fall into an
interval  = [l, u] with probability ρ. The interval  and its corresponding probability ρ
can be used as a new compound statistic for these instantaneous values. Following this idea,
we deﬁne the ABI metric as follows.
Deﬁnition 6.1 (Available Bandwidth Index (ABI)) The Available Bandwidth Index bˆ
is deﬁned as bˆ = {bl, bu, ρ}, meaning that the probability for the instantaneous available
bandwidth b belonging to the interval  = [bl, bu] is no less than ρ, i.e., Pr [b ∈  = [bl, bu]] ≥
ρ.
Similarly, we have the deﬁnition of Delay Index.
Deﬁnition 6.2 (Delay Index (DI)) The Delay Index dˆ is deﬁned as dˆ = {dl, du, ρ}, mean-
ing that the probability for the instantaneous delay d belonging to the interval  = [dl, du] is
no less than ρ, i.e., Pr [d ∈  = [dl, du]] ≥ ρ.
In the deﬁnitions of ABI and DI,  represents the dynamic range of the instantaneous
values. ρ is related to the statistical coverage of  and the precision of the measurement.
There are several advantages of using ABI and DI as routing metrics.
First, ABI and DI can represent the ﬁne-grained statistical property of the available
bandwidth and delay eﬃciently. With ABI and DI, the major statistical property of the
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instantaneous values can be captured with acceptable processing overhead. ABI and DI
avoid the processing overhead that is incurred by using probability density functions, which
theoretically can model QoS parameters distributions completely. On the other hand, ABI
and DI are much more ﬁne-grained than the low cost static QoS parameters and some simple
statistics, such as link capacity and average available bandwidth.
Second, ABI and DI make BGP QoS extension scalable. The instantaneous bandwidth
or delay of a link may vary frequently over time, but its statistical distribution changes
much less frequently. If the instantaneous values are directly used as the routing metric in
BGP, a large number of route update messages could ﬂood over the whole network, and the
routing message overhead is unacceptable. On the contrary, since the ABI and DI reﬂect the
major statistical properties of QoS, it is far more stable than the instantaneous values. For
instance, if we look for better routes in terms of ABI2, most of the instantaneously changes
are ﬁltered out to avoid unnecessary route updates. Therefore, employing ABI and DI as
routing metrics makes the BGP with QoS extension more scalable.
Third, ABI and DI can accommodate the link heterogeneity which is caused by diﬀerent
link types and diﬀerent measuring precisions. For example, if the bandwidth information
of a TYPE-3 logical link is imprecise due to some legacy BGP routers, this imprecision is
reﬂected by a large interval length || or a small probability ρ in ABI.
6.3.2 Calculations of ABI and DI
ABI and DI calculations of a link depend on the link types. In this section, we mainly discuss
the calculation of ABI. The technique for calculating DI is the same.
For TYPE-1 links and TYPE-2 links, the calculation of ABI is based on a list of
sample values of the available bandwidth in the history. Assume that n samples,
−→
b =
{b(t1), b(t2), . . . , b(tn−1), b(tn)}, can be kept for each link, which represent the available band-
width samples at time t1, t2, . . . , tn, respectively. The values of the samples can be obtained
2We will address the comparison of ABIs and DIs later in Section 6.4.2.
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from direct physical link monitoring or IGP QoS routing. The samples are updated as new
bandwidth information is available, and the old records are overwritten.
We want to ﬁnd a certain interval [bl, bu] and a corresponding ρ for the available band-
width of a link. Based on the bandwidth vector
−→
b , the ABI with conﬁdence interval 1− α
is calculated as follows: Suppose bm is the median element in
−→
b . Then, bl = bm − δ and
bu = bm+δ, where 2δ is the length of interval [bl, bu]. We adjust δ so that k elements out of n
samples in
−→
b fall into interval [bm− δ, bm + δ]. k is thus constrained by α, ρ, and n, in order
to guarantee that the instantaneous bandwidth belongs to [bm − δ, bm + δ] with probability
ρ and the conﬁdence interval is 1− α. Therefore, we can ﬁrst compute k for given α, ρ and
n, then calculate δ, and lastly obtain [bl, bu].
Intuitively, it is necessary that k ≥ nρ. If we consider the conﬁdence interval 1−α which
reﬂects the accuracy of ABI calculation, we have the following theorem for an arbitrary
bandwidth distribution. Let us assume zα to be the value of the standard normal curve
above which we can ﬁnd an area of α.
Theorem 6.1 Given the available bandwidth vector
−→
b , the number of samples n, probability
ρ, and the conﬁdence interval 1− α, if
k =
nz2α + 2n
2ρ + nzα
√
4nρ− 4nρ2 + z2α
2 (n + z2α)
= g(n, ρ, zα) (6.1)
and interval  = [bl, bu] contains k elements of
−→
b , then the probability, that the instantaneous
bandwidth belongs to the interval , is no less than ρ with conﬁdence interval 1− α.
Proof: Let us assume that the instantaneous available bandwidth b is a random variable.
Denote p as the probability for b belonging to  = [bl, bu], i.e. p = Pr [bl ≤ b ≤ bu]. If k
elements from all the samples in
−→
b belong into interval , by the proportion estimation
theory [59], for any bandwidth distribution, we have, Pr
[
p ≥ k
n
− zα
√
k/n(1−k/n)
n
]
 1− α,
where 1−α is the conﬁdence interval and zα is the value of the standard normal curve above
which we can ﬁnd an area of α. According to the deﬁnition of ABI, p is required to be
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greater than ρ with conﬁdence 1 − α, i.e., Pr [p ≥ ρ] = 1 − α, we get the requirement on
k: k
n
− zα
√
k/n(1−k/n)
n
= ρ. By solving this equation, we obtain Equation 6.1. Therefore, if
k satisﬁes Equation 6.1, the probability for the instantaneous bandwidth b falling into  is
greater than ρ with conﬁdence 1− α.
Theorem 6.1 yields several observations: (1) ρ is a tunable parameter for each link, and
its value can be chosen according to the speciﬁc link properties. In order to capture the
major portion of the samples, usually ρ should be close to 1, such as 90%. (2) α is set to be
a small value, such as 0.05, to get a good conﬁdence interval. (3) n should be a large number
to make the ABI calculation more precise. A rule often used is nρ ≥ 5 and n(1−ρ) ≥ 5 [59].
Since ρ is close to 1, the number of bandwidth samples n is required to be larger than 5
1−ρ .
For example, if ρ = 90%, n ≥ 50.
Based on the assumptions that n is a large number, ρ is close to 1, and zα is usually in
[0, 2] (because α is a small number), g(n, ρ, zα) in Equation 6.1 can be simpliﬁed as
g(n, ρ, zα)  nρ + zα
2
+ zα
√
nρ(1− ρ) (6.2)
The delay index (DI) for TYPE-1 and TYPE-2 links can be similarly calculated based on
the samples of link delay or IGP routing delay. For TYPE-3 links, we assume the end-to-end
bandwidth or delay measurement techniques, such as [60], can provide approximate ranges
for available bandwidth and delay, as well as the precision rate of the measurement. We use
the range and precision rate as the interval  and probability ρ of ABI and DI.
A route is formed when the links are connected together in sequence. In the next two
sections, we discuss how to compute the ABI and DI of a route by joining the ABIs and DIs
of the links on the route together.
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6.3.3 ABI Join Operations
Because bandwidth is a concave metric, the available bandwidth of a route is the minimum
available bandwidth of all links on that route. To obtain ABI of a route, a straightforward
way is to ﬁnd the available bandwidth of that route, and then calculate the ABI according to
the deﬁnition. However, this method is not practical in BGP protocol. Instead, we calculate
the ABI of a route by joining the ABIs of individual links or sub-routes directly.
Given two ABIs bˆ1 and bˆ2, we deﬁne the ABI join operation as bˆ = bˆ1 ⊕ bˆ2. Thus, the
ABI of route v1v2 . . . vn is bˆv1v2 ⊕ . . .⊕ bˆvn−1vn , where bˆvivj is the ABI of link vivj.
We make two assumptions in the join operation of ABI. First, ABIs of diﬀerent links
are independent. Similar assumption is made by Lorenz and Guerin in [19][20]. Two facts
support this assumption. (a) A large number of ﬂows are aggregated on each link. The Intra-
domain traﬃc contributes a large portion of the total network traﬃc. Thus, the correlation
between two diﬀerent links in interdomain level is small. (b) The bandwidth distribution
outside  = [bl, bu] is approximately symmetric around , i.e. Pr[b < bl]  Pr[b > bu] 
(1−ρ)/2. This assumption holds well for the links of TYPE 1 and TYPE 2, because 1−ρ is
very close to 0 according to the calculation of ABI, and the bandwidth distribution outside
 has small value. For TYPE 3 links, ρ could also be close to 1, if || is large enough. If ρ
is small due to the imprecision in bandwidth measurement, the symmetric assumption may
not hold well. We will discuss this special case in the last part of this section.
In order to compute the interval and probability for bˆ = bˆ1 ⊕ bˆ2, we can set the bˆ.
by the combinations of bˆ1. and bˆ2., and then compute bˆ.ρ based on bˆ.. Obviously,
there are multiple options of setting bˆ.. A smaller interval length corresponds to a smaller
bˆ.ρ, which means that bˆ. models the instantaneous available bandwidth less precisely. On
the contrary, a large interval gives a high precision, but it may over estimate the dynamic
range. We will present two ABI join operation methods, which can be used in diﬀerent
circumstances. For convenience, let l1 = bˆ1.bl, u1 = bˆ1.bu, l2 = bˆ2.bl, and u2 = bˆ2.bu in the
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following discussions.
The two join operation methods for computing bˆ1 ⊕ bˆ2 are illustrated in Fig. 6.2. Small
rectangle boxes with cross-line patterns represent bˆ1. and bˆ2.. The shaded area stands
for the interval of the resulting ABI bˆ.. For each join operation method, there are three
subcases shown in the ﬁgure based on the value of u1.
     Link 1 Link 2 Link Joiningl1 l1 l1 u1u1u1
l2
l2 l2
u2 u2
u2
Bandwidth
(a) Join operation method 1.
     
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l2
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(b) Join operation method 2.
Figure 6.2: ABI join operation methods.
ABI Join Operation Method 1: Given that bˆ1, bˆ2 are two ABIs for link 1 and link 2, and
bˆ = bˆ1 ⊕ bˆ2, then bˆ. = [min(bˆ1.bl, bˆ2.bl),min(bˆ1.bu, bˆ2.bu)].
The ABI join method 1, which is shown in Fig. 6.2(a), applies the minimum operations
on the intervals of the two links. The following lemma gives the value of bˆ.ρ.
Lemma 6.1 Under the condition of ABI join operation method 1, if bˆ1.bu < bˆ2.bu, then
bˆ.ρ = bˆ1.ρ(1 + bˆ2.ρ)/2; otherwise, bˆ.ρ = bˆ2.ρ(1 + bˆ1.ρ)/2.
Proof: Denote b1, b2 and b as instantaneous available bandwidth values on link 1, link
2, and the joined links, respectively. ρ1 = bˆ1.ρ, and ρ2 = bˆ2.ρ. Without loss of generality,
assume l1 ≤ l2. There are two cases based on the relation between u1 and u2.
(1) If u1 ≤ u2:
Pr[b ∈ bˆ.] = Pr[l1 ≤ b1 ≤ u1]Pr[b2 ≥ l1] + Pr[b1 > u1]Pr[l1 ≤ b2 ≤ u1] ≥ ρ1Pr[b2 ≥ l2] =
ρ1(1 + ρ2)/2
(2) If u1 ≥ u2
Pr[b ∈ bˆ.] = Pr[l1 ≤ b2 ≤ u2]Pr[b1 ≥ l1] + Pr[b2 > u2]Pr[l1 ≤ b1 ≤ u2] ≥ ρ2Pr[b1 ≥ l1] =
ρ2(1 + ρ1)/2
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From the two cases above, ρ2(1 + ρ1)/2 or ρ1(1 + ρ2)/2 is the lower bound of Pr[b ∈ bˆ.].
Thus, we prove the lemma.
In the ABI join operation method 1, the length of bˆ. is never larger than the lengths of
bˆ1. and bˆ2. simultaneously. When more links are joined to the route, the length of the
resulting bandwidth interval will not increase substantially. However, the probability ρ of
the resulting ABI may be smaller than bˆ1.ρ and bˆ2.ρ. In the following join operation method
2, we enlarge the length of the interval bˆ. so as to increase bˆ.ρ.
ABI Join Operation Method 2: Given that bˆ1 and bˆ2 are two ABIs for link 1 and link 2,
and bˆ = bˆ1 ⊕ bˆ2, then bˆ. = [min(bˆ1.bl, bˆ2.bl),max(bˆ1.bu, bˆ2.bu)].
The ABI join method 2 (in Fig. 6.2(b)) covers the whole range including both bˆ1. and
bˆ2.. The following lemma gives the value of bˆ.ρ.
Lemma 6.2 Under the condition of ABI join operation method 2, bˆ.ρ = (bˆ1.ρ + bˆ2.ρ)/2
Proof: Denote b1, b2 and b as instantaneous available bandwidth on link 1, link 2, and
the joined links, respectively. ρ1 = bˆ1.ρ, and ρ2 = bˆ2.ρ. Without loss of generality, assume
l1 ≤ l2.
(1) If u1 ≤ u2:
Pr[b ∈ bˆ.] = Pr[l1 ≤ b1 ≤ u2]Pr[b2 ≥ l1] + Pr[b1 > u2]Pr[l1 ≤ b2 ≤ u2]
≥ ρ1Pr[b2 ≥ l1]+ρ2(Pr[u1 < b1 ≤ u2]+Pr[b1 > u2]) ≥ ρ1(1+ρ2)/2+ρ2(1−ρ1)/2 = (ρ1+ρ2)/2
(2) If u1 ≥ u2:
Pr[b ∈ bˆ.] = Pr[l1 ≤ b1 ≤ u1]Pr[b2 ≥ l1] + Pr[b1 > u1]Pr[l1 ≤ b2 ≤ u1]
≥ ρ1Pr[b2 ≥ l2] + Pr[b1 > u1]ρ2 = ρ1(1 + ρ2)/2 + ρ2(1− ρ1)/2 = (ρ1 + ρ2)/2
From these two cases, we conclude that (ρ1 + ρ2)/2 is the lower bound of probability of b
belonging to . Therefore, bˆ.ρ = (bˆ1.ρ + bˆ2.ρ)/2.
The advantage of join operation method 2 over the previous one is that ρ of the joined
ABI bˆ is never less than ρ1 and ρ2 simultaneously. If more links are joined to the route, ρ
of the resulting ABI will not decrease substantially. However, the length of the interval 
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may become larger and larger. Thus, method 2 is acceptable, only if the ranges of bˆ1. and
bˆ2. are close to each other. It is not appropriate, when those two intervals are disjoint and
separated with large distance.
These two join operation methods discussed above are used by BGP routers to calculate
the ABI of a route. Notice that: (1) ABI join operation methods 1 and 2 can be used
alternatively depending on the relationship of bˆ1 and bˆ2. In general, method 1 is preferred,
especially when the two intervals bˆ1. and bˆ2. are disjointed; however, if bˆ1. and bˆ2. are
largely overlapped, method 2 is preferred. (2) These two join operations are both based on the
symmetric distribution assumption. If this assumption does not hold well, the probability
that instantaneous available bandwidth belongs to the interval deﬁned by join operation
method 1 is at least bˆ1.ρ · bˆ2.ρ. Therefore, we can use method 1 to calculate bˆ., and let
bˆ.ρ=bˆ1.ρ · bˆ2.ρ. In most cases, especially when the link type is TYPE 1 or TYPE 2, ρ is close
to 1, and the distribution outside  is approximately symmetric. These two join operations
can give satisfying precision in calculating the ABI of the joined links.
6.3.4 DI Join Operations
Delay is an additive metric, i.e., the delay of a route is the summation of delays of all links
on the route. Similarly, calculating a route’s DI by using the instantaneous values directly
is not practical in BGP. Instead, we calculate DI of a route by joining the DI of each link on
the route.
The DI join operation is deﬁned as dˆ = dˆ1 ⊕ dˆ2, where dˆ1 and dˆ2 are two given DIs.
The DI of route v1v2 . . . vn is thus dˆv1v2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ dˆvn−1vn , where dˆvivj is the DI of link vivj.
Following the same idea in ABI join operation, we can ﬁrst set dˆ. by diﬀerent combinations
of dˆ1. and dˆ2., and then compute dˆ.ρ. We also assume, the delays of diﬀerent links are
independent.
DI Join Operation Method 1: Given that dˆ1, dˆ2 are two DIs of link 1 and link 2, and
dˆ = dˆ1 ⊕ dˆ2, then dˆ. = [dˆ1.dl + dˆ2.dl, dˆ1.du + dˆ2.du)].
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The following lemma gives dˆ.ρ.
Lemma 6.3 Under the condition of DI join operation method 1, dˆ.ρ = dˆ1.ρ · dˆ2.ρ.
Proof: Denote d1, d2 and d as the instantaneous values of delay on link 1, link 2, and
the joined links, respectively. Then, Pr[d ∈ dˆ.] ≥ Pr[dˆ1.dl ≤ d1 ≤ dˆ1.du]Pr[dˆ2.dl ≤ d2 ≤
dˆ2.du] = dˆ1.ρ · dˆ2.ρ. Thus, dˆ1.ρ · dˆ2.ρ is the lower bound of the probability that the route
delay belongs to dˆ..
We can also increase dˆ.ρ by enlarging the length of the joined interval. The following join
operation method assumes that the delay is symmetrically distributed around the interval
deﬁned by DI.
DI Join Operation Method 2: Given that dˆ1, dˆ2 are two DIs of link 1 and link 2, and
dˆ = dˆ1 ⊕ dˆ2, then dˆ. = [max(dˆ1.dl, dˆ2.dl), dˆ1.du + dˆ2.du)].
dˆ.ρ is calculated by using the following lemma.
Lemma 6.4 Under the condition of DI join operation method 2, if dˆ1.dl < dˆ2.dl, dˆ.ρ =
dˆ2.ρ(1 + dˆ1.ρ)/2; otherwise, dˆ.ρ = dˆ1.ρ(1 + dˆ2.ρ)/2.
Proof: Denote d1, d2 and d as instantaneous delay values on link 1, link 2, and the joined
links, respectively. ρ1 = dˆ1.ρ, and ρ2 = dˆ2.ρ. Without loss of generality, assume dˆ1.dl < dˆ2.dl.
Then, dˆ. = [dˆ2.dl, dˆ1.du + dˆ2.du]. Pr[d ∈ dˆ.] ≥ Pr[dˆ1.dl ≤ d1 ≤ dˆ1.du]Pr[dˆ2.dl ≤ d2 ≤
dˆ2.du] + Pr[d1 < dˆ1.dl]Pr[dˆ2.dl ≤ d2 ≤ dˆ2.du]
= ρ1ρ2 + ρ2(1− ρ1)/2 = ρ2(1 + ρ1)/2. The lemma is proved.
In the above two DI join operation methods, method 1 is used in general. When dˆ1.dl is
much smaller than dˆ2.dl or vice versa, method 2 is preferred, because it generates a larger
dˆ.ρ than method 1 does, and the resulted intervals from both methods are approximately
comparable in this scenario.
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6.4 Protocol Extensions of BGP
In order to enable the interdomain QoS routing, we make three modiﬁcations to BGP: (1)
extend BGP UPDATE messages to record QoS information; (2) select paths based on the QoS
information stored in the extended BGP UPDATE messages; (3) monitor and update the QoS
state of the advertised routes.
6.4.1 BGP UPDATE Message Extension
QoS information has to be recorded in the UPDATE message, which represents the ability of a
domain to provide the route with such QoS. In [16] a new attribute QoS NLRI is proposed
for this purpose. Similar attempt can be taken here. We require QoS information to be put
into the Path Attribute ﬁeld. Accordingly, the BGP routing table is extended to keep the
QoS information. Extended BGP routers use the ABI and DI calculation methods and the
join operations, which is presented in Section 6.3, to obtain the ABI and DI for links and
paths.
In order to cope with legacy BGP routers, the QoS attribute should be optional and
transitive, which means QoS attribute may not be recognized by some legacy BGP routers
and this attribute should be passed on even if it is not recognized.
The QoS-aware BGP router needs to know whether or not a BGP message is directly
from a QoS-aware router, and where the last QoS-aware router is. For this purpose, in an
UPDATE message, a new optional and transitive attribute is created to record the IP address
of the last QoS-aware BGP router. Each QoS-aware BGP router records its IP address in
this attribute when the UPDATE message passes by. Thus, QoS-aware routers can decide if a
TYPE-3 link is needed for exchanging QoS information.
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6.4.2 QoS Path Selection
In the BGP path selection process, QoS-based path selection policy is involved. Because
there are multiple policies eﬀecting the path ranking, the priority of QoS metrics can be
determined ﬂexibly by the local network administration. In general, it can be put below
the policies that specify the peer relationship between ASes deﬁned in [28], so that BGP
routing always converges. Moreover, because the QoS advertising in this proposal is used to
optimize end-to-end performance, its priority can be lower than IGP distance metric which
is used to optimize the traﬃc inside a domain.
Since ABI or DI is no longer a simple metric, we need to ﬁnd methods to compare ABIs
or DIs of diﬀerent paths, so that a path with better QoS can be identiﬁed.
Normalization of 
The value of ρ inﬂuences the length of  in the ABI deﬁnition. For example, a large
probability ρ may lead to a large interval . Thus, if two ABIs have diﬀerent ρ’s, they
can not be compared directly. Unfortunately, we can not always have the same ρ for any
ABIs. There are two reasons: (1) ρ, as a tunable parameter, may be chosen diﬀerently on
diﬀerent links; (2) ρ of a path is the join result of all the links on the path. Therefore, 
has to be normalized to remove the impact of ρ, so that the intervals of two ABIs or DIs are
comparable.
To solve this problem, we can scale the length of the interval || based on the value of ρ.
Intuitively, the larger the ρ, the larger the ||, and vise versa. The primary objective of the
normalization method is to provide a way to make two diﬀerent ABIs comparable, and thus,
it is not necessary to ﬁnd the analytical relationship between || and ρ for any distribution.
For simplicity of analysis, we use normal distribution as an approximation to ﬁnd the relation
between ρ and ||, and use the result for a general case. In Section 6.6.2, our simulation
results demonstrate that this approximation works well for other distributions.
Let us assume b is the instantaneous value of bandwidth, and b follows normal distribution
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N ( bl+bu
2
, σ2). F (x) is the cumulative distribution function of b. Because F ( bl+bu
2
+ 2σ) −
F ( bl+bu
2
− 2σ)  95%, we can assume that 0 < |	|
2σ
< 2. Thus,
ρ = F (bu)− F (bl) = 2
∫ ||
2σ
0
1√
2π
e−
x2
2 dx  0.2 ||
2σ
(4.4− ||
2σ
)
Since |	|
2σ
is relatively small in comparison with 4.4, approximately ρ ∝ ||. We can remove
the eﬀect of diﬀerent ρ by normalizing || with ρ, i.e., the normalized interval length is
||/ρ. Then, the normalized interval is ′ = [bm − δ, bm + δ], where bm = (bl + bu)/2 and
δ = bu−bl
2ρ
. Note that the normalization is only for ABI comparison in this proposal. The
original ABI is exchanged between routers for more accurate calculation. The normalization
of DI is also deﬁned the same as ABI’s.
Weight for Path Selection
With respect to QoS path selection, the paths with large available bandwidth or small delay
are preferred. We also favor the paths which have stable available bandwidth and delay. In
terms of the normalized ABI, the quality of a path is determined by the interval bm and
δ jointly, which reﬂects the average bandwidth and the bandwidth variance, respectively.
Thus, the weight related to ABI is deﬁned as Wb = bm − ηδ = bu+bl−η(bu−bl)/ρ2 , where η > 0
and it adjusts the tradeoﬀ between the average bandwidth and the stability of the bandwidth.
Similarly, the weight for DI (dl, du, ρ) is deﬁned as follows: Wd = du+dl+η(du−dl)/ρ2 . The path
with a larger Wb or a smaller Wd is more preferable. In general, the deﬁnitions of path
weights based on ABI or DI are not limited to these two forms. Other deﬁnitions are also
possible, depending on the purposes of routing, resource reservation or traﬃc engineering.
However, we only discuss the above two deﬁnitions in this proposal.
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Figure 6.3: BGP QoS extension example. ABIs are shown beside links.
An Example
Figure 6.3 shows a simple example of BGP QoS routing using ABI. Let us assume that all
links are bidirectional and the numbers beside each link are the ABI parameters (bl, bu, ρ).
The nodes represent QoS-aware BGP routers. We assume that each node is in an independent
AS. For simplicity, we only consider one destination, D. At ﬁrst, D sends advertisements
to B, C and E, respectively. Upon receiving the advertisement, C installs the path CD
into its routing table with ABI bˆCD = (260, 340, 0.9) and passes an advertisement to E.
When E receives both advertisements from D and C, it ﬁrst joins the ABI of link EC and
path CD to get the ABI for the path ECD as bˆECD = (170, 270, 0.9) ⊕ (260, 340, 0.9) =
(min(170, 260),max(270, 340), (0.9+0.9)/2) = (170, 340, 0.9) 3. E then compares the weight
of path ED and ECD. We let η = 1. Since WED = 180+220−(220−180)/0.82 = 175 and WECD =
160.6, E selects path ED and passes this information to A and C via advertisements. After
the routing process becomes stable, the routing table at each node is shown in Table 6.1. An
‘Active Route’ value (‘Yes’ or ‘No’) in the table indicates whether the corresponding route
is being used or not. All routes marked with ‘No’ are candidate routes4. ‘AS PATH’ is the
full path from the source to node D. ‘Next Hop’ is the next hop, in terms of node number,
of the path. ‘(bl, bu, ρ) / Wb’ are the ABI and the weight of the path.
3ABI join operation method 2 is used here. In this example, if the ’s of two ABIs are disjoint, join
method 1 is used; otherwise join method 2 is used.
4An active route is the route installed in the forwarding table of a router. Candidate routes are all routes
received by a router, which can potentially be used as an active route.
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Source Active AS PATH Next Hop (bl, bu, ρ) / Wb
Route (η = 1)
A Yes ( E D ) E (80, 120, 0.81 ) / 75.3
No ( B D ) B (80, 190, 0.9) / 73.8
B Yes ( D ) D (90, 190, 0.9) / 84.4
No ( A E D ) A (80, 160, 0.86) / 73.5
C Yes ( D ) D (260, 340, 0.9) / 255.6
No ( E D ) E (170, 270, 0.85) / 161.2
E Yes ( D ) D (180, 220, 0.8) / 175.0
No ( C D ) C (170, 340, 0.9) / 160.6
Table 6.1: Example of ABI routing. The content of BGP routing tables at each node for
destination D.
Source Active AS PATH Next Hop (bl, bu, ρ) / W
Route (η = 1)
A Yes ( E C D ) E (80, 120, 0.86 ) / 76.7
No ( B D ) B (80, 190, 0.9) / 73.8
B Yes ( D ) D (90, 190, 0.9) / 84.4
No (A E C D) A (80, 160, 0.88) / 74.5
C Yes ( D ) D (260, 340, 0.9) / 255.6
E Yes ( C D ) C (170, 340, 0.9) / 160.6
No ( D ) D (80, 120, 0.9) / 77.8
Table 6.2: Example of ABI routing. After ABI of link ED changes from (180, 220, 0.8) to
(80, 120, 0.9), the content of BGP routing tables.
6.4.3 QoS Information Update
In the conventional BGP, the path selection process is triggered by a BGP router whenever it
detects a new route or a change (removal or update) of an existing route. If the selected path
is diﬀerent from what is currently used, the forwarding table will be updated with the new
path, and UPDATE messages will be sent to the neighboring BGP routers. In the QoS-aware
BGP, route updates may also be caused by the changes of QoS status. In order to process
such QoS-related changes, both the path selection process and the UPDATE message handling
process in the original BGP should be slightly modiﬁed, while the BGP state machine model
remains the same as [5]. There are two cases in which a QoS-aware BGP router may detect
the change of QoS information. We will handle them separately.
In the ﬁrst case, the QoS information on a logical link has changed. We design a new
process, called linkChangeHandler, to handle such changes. linkChangeHandler will check
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all entries in the BGP routing table which use this link as the next hop. If necessary, the
QoS information of the route is updated and the path selection process is triggered. For
example, in Fig. 6.3, if the available bandwidth on link ED changes from (180, 220, 0.8) to
(80, 120, 0.9), router E will recalculate the weight for path ED as WED = 77.8. Because
WED is smaller than WECD = 160.6, which is a candidate route, router E will change its
route to D by replacing the route ED with ECD. E will also send UPDATE messages to
A and C to withdraw previous route ED and advertise the new route ECD with its ABI
(170, 340, 0.9).
In the second case, an UPDATEmessage is received, which contains the route change or QoS
change information. In the above example, after C receives UPDATE messages from E, C will
simply withdraw its candidate route CED and keep its active path CD unchanged. When A
receives UPDATE messages from E, it will withdraw the path AED, and calculate the ABI and
weight for the new route AECD: bˆAECD = (80, 120, 0.9) ⊕ (170, 340, 0.9) = (80, 120, 0.86),
and WAECD = 76.7. Because WAECD >WABD, A will choose the route AECD and further
send UPDATE messages to B accordingly. After the routing is stabilized, the routing table of
each router is shown in Table 6.2.
The example above shows that additional routing message overhead is incurred due to the
QoS extension to BGP. In order to keep the QoS extension scalable, the rate of QoS-related
route changes should be strictly controlled. In addition to the use of ABI and DI instead of
the instantaneous values, setting up update thresholds is also an eﬀective way to keep the
routing message overhead low. Two types of thresholds, in terms of the path weight, are
used: (1) Link State Threshold (Tl): A small bandwidth or delay ﬂuctuation at a logical link
should not trigger the linkChangeHandler. Only when the change of the weight is greater
than Tl, will the linkChangeHandler process be called. (2) Route Update Threshold (Tr): In
the path selection process, only when the weight of the newly selected path is greater than
the previously installed path by Tr, will the new path be installed as the substitution of the
previous path.
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Another advantage of using update thresholds is to adjust the trade-oﬀ between the
routing optimality and message overhead. In Section 6.6, we will use simulation to show the
quantity relations between the routing optimality and the routing message overhead which
is controlled by the thresholds Tl and Tr.
6.5 Extension of ABI and DI to Histogram
Information
ABI and DI both use one interval to represent the dynamic QoS information. A natural ex-
tension is to employ multiple intervals and the corresponding probabilities to model available
bandwidth and delay. In this section, we introduce Available Bandwidth Histogram (ABH)
and Delay Histogram (DH) to characterize QoS dynamics more precisely.
6.5.1 Deﬁnitions of ABH and DH
ABH and DH can be uniformly deﬁned as a set {(i, ρi)}, where i = [li, ui] is the ith
interval and ρi is the i
th probability that the available bandwidth or delay falls into i. We
use set {(i, ρi)} to approximate the distribution density functions of the bandwidth and
delay.
The length of each interval, |i|, reﬂects the tradeoﬀ between metric precision and pro-
cessing overhead. A smaller |i| can model the distributions of QoS information with ﬁner
granularity, but more system resources have to be consumed in histogram computing and
communication. On the other side, when |i| is large enough that the available bandwidth
or delay is represented by only one interval, ABH and DH degrade to ABI or DI.
In the ABH and DH join operation methods which will be discussed shortly, we require
that the set of intervals {i} is constructed by dividing the space of bandwidth or delay
evenly, i.e., (1) any two diﬀerent i are not overlapping; (2) any two neighboring intervals
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share the same boundary; (3) all intervals have the same length ||. Therefore, we can label
all intervals using positive integers according to their ranks. That is, i = [(i− 1)||, i||].
Examples of ABH and DH are shown in Fig. 6.5, where the horizontal axes represent
series of intervals and the vertical axes represent probabilities. In practice, in order to save
storage space in the UPDATE messages, ABH and DH can be compressed. For example,
the neighboring intervals which have identical ρ can be merged together, and also we only
need to record the intervals with non-negligible probabilities ρi. In the join operation, the
compressed ABH and DH can be restored into the complete forms.
6.5.2 Join Operations of ABH and DH
We follow the same notation: the join operator of histogram is ⊕. Let us assume that the
available bandwidth of two links or subpaths are independent random variables b1 and b2.
The joined available bandwidth is b = min(b1, b2). It can be shown that the cumulative
density function of b is as follows.
Fb(x) = Fb1(x) + Fb2(x)− Fb1(x)Fb2(x) (6.3)
where F· represents the cumulative density function. Thus, if we know the exact distributions
of b1 and b2, the above equation can be used to calculate the available bandwidth distribution
of the joined links.
In ABH, the bandwidth distribution information is represented approximately by his-
tograms. From equation 6.3, we get the probability that the joined bandwidth falls into
interval [x, x +∆x]:
Pr[b ∈ [x, x +∆x]] = Fb(x +∆x)− Fb(x)
= Pr[b1 ∈ [x, x +∆x]](1− Fb2(x)) + Pr[b2 ∈ [x, x +∆x]](1− Fb1(x))
−Pr[b1 ∈ [x, x +∆x]]Pr[b2 ∈ [x, x +∆x]] (6.4)
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According to Equation 6.4, we have the algorithm of ABH join operation, which is presented
in Fig. 6.4. The time complexity for computing the joined ABH is O(N), where N is
the maximum number of intervals in a histogram. An example of ABH join is shown in
ABH-Join(abh1, abh2, abh)
1 s← min {i : abh1.ρi > 0 or abh2.ρi > 0}
2 t← max {i : abh1.ρi > 0 or abh2.ρi > 0}
3 w1 ← 1.0
4 w2 ← 1.0
5 for i← s to t
6 do
7 abh.ρi ← (1− w2)abh1.ρi + (1− w1)abh2.ρi − abh1.ρi · abh2.ρi
8 w1 ← w1 + abh1.ρi
9 w2 ← w2 + abh2.ρi
Figure 6.4: Algorithm for computing abh = abh1⊕ abh2.
Fig. 6.5(a), where the ABHs of Link 1, Link 2, and the joined links are displayed. The
available bandwidth of Link 1 and Link 2 follows normal distribution. We use 100 samples
to generate the histogram. The ‘Joined ABH’ is obtained by using the ‘ABH-Join’ algorithm
and the samples. The ‘Exact Value’ is calculated by using Equation 6.3. This example shows
that ABH (with small number of intervals) and its join operation method approximate the
bandwidth distribution of the joined links very well.
The distribution of the delay can similarly be computed by using the delay probability
density functions of the links or sub-paths.
fd(x) =
∫ x
0
fd1(t)fd2(x− t) dt (6.5)
where f. is the probability density function. d1, d2, and d are the delays of two sub-paths
and the joined path, respectively. DH of the joined path can be calculated by the discrete
version of the above convolution equation. Suppose dh = dh1 ⊕ dh2, where dh1 and dh2 are
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Figure 6.5: Examples of ABH and DH join operations.
DHs of corresponding sub-paths. Then,
dh.ρk =
k∑
i=0
dh1.ρi · dh2.ρk−i (6.6)
The time complexity of DH join is O(N2), where N is the maximum number of intervals in a
histogram. If we apply Fast Fourier Transformation to calculate the above convolution [61],
the time complexity decreases to O(N logN). The example of DH join is shown in Fig.
6.5(b). The delay of Link 1 and Link 2 follows normal distribution. The ‘Exact Value’ is
calculated by using Equation 6.5. The ‘Joined DH’ is computed with Equation 6.6, where
100 samples are used to generate the histograms.
6.5.3 Discussions
1) Using ABH and DH is a practical and ﬂexible way to advertise the detailed statistical
information of bandwidth and delay in routing protocols. The precise probability density
function, which is diﬃcult to obtain, causes too much processing overhead, and thus is
impractical to be used. While, the histogram metrics can limit the overhead by adjusting
the number of sample points and the interval length || appropriately.
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Compared with ABI and DI, the histogram metrics introduce extra processing overhead,
but better performance can be obtained, which is the tradeoﬀ we have to make. It is also
interesting to note that the optimality of ABI may be better than ABH, when || in ABH
is very large. This is because ABI does not ﬁx the position and the length of the interval,
while the intervals in ABH are deﬁned in a ﬁxed structure, dividing the bandwidth space
evenly. Thus, ABI can represent the distribution of bandwidth more eﬃciently than ABH
that only has small number of intervals. The simulation results in Fig. 6.9(a) of Section
6.6.3 veriﬁes this observation. On the other hand, because of the ﬁxed interval structure in
ABH, the intervals from two ABHs are aligned to each other. This simpliﬁes the ABH join
operation. For example, there is only one ABH join operation method; while, we deﬁne two
methods for ABI, based on the relationships of two intervals.
2) By using ABH and DH, we can acquire, from the advertised information, not only
the expected values of the QoS parameters but also the variance and even higher order
moment information, which characterizes the stability of the QoS. The route weight is thus
deﬁned to reﬂect the average value and the stability together: Wb = E[abh] − ηSTD(abh)
and Wd = E[dh] + ηSTD(dh), where E[·] and STD(·) stand for the expectation and the
standard deviation, respectively, which are calculated from the histograms.
In addition to ABH and DH, a simpliﬁed approach is to advertise average values and
variances of the link QoS parameters directly.
With respect to bandwidth information advertising, Average Available Bandwidth (AAB)
of each link can be used in BGP. The average available bandwidth of a route is deﬁned as
the minimum AABs over all links on the route. However, due to the concave property of
the minimum operation, this join method based on AAB can overestimate the real average
values of the route available bandwidth, and thus result in incorrect routing decision. The
reason is, from Jensen inequality, min(E[b1],E[b2]) ≥ E[min(b1, b2)], where b1 and b2 are
available bandwidth of two links. Our simulation results in Section 6.6.3 show that ABH
is better than AAB in providing higher routing optimality and lower resource reservation
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rejection ratio.
In terms of delay, because it is an additive metric, applying Average Delay (AD), Delay
Variance (DV) and the addition operations to BGP advertising can obtain correct results
under the independent link assumption, i.e., E[d1] + E[d2] = E[d1 + d2] and Var(d1) +
Var(d2) = Var(d1 + d2), where d1 and d2 are the delays of two links. If we only consider the
average value and the variance, ADH performs approximately the same as AD and DV.
3) Convergence Property: Average Bandwidth, Average Delay, and Delay Variance, all
satisfy the monotonicity condition of the convergence of path vector routing protocols [62],
and they do not inﬂuence the convergence property of BGP. Thus, the BGP routing is
preserved to be convergent, if Wd or Wb (subject to η = 0) is used. On the other hand,
Available Bandwidth Variance of a route is not monotone, i.e., the variance of the route
bandwidth may decrease when a new link is added to the route5. Therefore, if the bandwidth
variance is involved in the route weight Wb, i.e., η = 0, the path vector routing protocols
may not be convergent. However, in this scenario, our extended BGP QoS routing protocol
can still converge by compounding the route weight, Wb, to the path selection polices of AS
peer relationships, according to the path selection policies described in Section 6.4.2.
6.6 Simulation Results
In order to evaluate the performance of the QoS extension to BGP, extensive simulations
have been conducted. Based on the same routing protocol (BGP) and the format of weight
deﬁnitions, we simulate the performance of bandwidth information advertising by using the
following metrics: link capacity (LC), available bandwidth (AB), ABI, AH, average available
bandwidth (AAB). The related QoS routing protocols are called LCR, ABR, ABIR, AHR
and AABR, respectively, by adding a suﬃx ‘-R’ to the names of the metrics. Similarly, in
order to test delay related metrics, DI, DH, average delay (AD) and delay variance (DV) are
5For example, a bottleneck link with a small bandwidth variance is added to a route which previously
has a large bandwidth variance.
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simulated.
In this section, we discuss three aspects of our simulation results as follows: (1) The
relationship between routing optimality and routing message overhead; (2) The performance
of histogram metrics; (3) The routing results if QoS stability is considered. We demonstrate
that our new statistical routing metrics can ﬁnd much better routes than static metrics and
have much lower message overhead than instantaneous metrics.
6.6.1 Simulation Model
The purpose of the simulation is to study routing optimality and message overhead in BGP
QoS extensions. Based on the BGP routing protocol in [5], three simpliﬁcations are made:
(1) Each AS is simpliﬁed as a single node; (2) We ignore address aggregations; (3) We
consider bandwidth or delay information as the only path selection metric and ignore other
BGP routing policies.
A BGP protocol simulator is implemented based on the simpliﬁed interdomain routing
model. The bandwidth and delay information are advertised using our proposed metrics. The
routes are selected according to the route weight deﬁned in previous sections. For compari-
son, we also simulate the scenarios where traditional QoS metrics are used for performance
comparisons, and the route with the largest bandwidth or the least delay is preferred.
Internet topology generator BRITE [53] is used to generate ﬂat AS level topologies for
simulation. The Waxman model is used and nodes are placed according to the heavy-tail
distribution. Denote the number of nodes in network as n. Four topologies are used in the
simulation, with n equals 50, 100, 200, and 300, respectively. The capacity of each link is
generated randomly from the interval [10, 1050].
The dynamic behaviors of the available bandwidth and delay are modeled with three
diﬀerent distributions: normal, uniform, and Pareto. A random variable, e.g. normal random
variable N (µ, σ), is assigned to each link for generating the instantaneous values of the
available bandwidth or delay. In each time unit, a new value is generated following this
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distribution, i.e. the available bandwidth or delay is sampled for routing purpose on each
link. In every Ts units of time, the parameters of the distributions, such as µ and σ in
normal distribution, are changed randomly. Note: (1) Ts is an average value for all the links.
Diﬀerent links may have diﬀerent periods and may change asynchronously. (2) Ts is the ratio
between the change rates of the available bandwidth and its statistical distribution, and Ts
is usually a large number. We assume Ts ≥ 20 in our simulations.
Two metrics are deﬁned below to quantify the performance of routing protocols:
1. Routing Optimality ξ: Denote β(R) as the average available bandwidth between all
pairs of nodes based on the result of a routing protocol R. The routing optimality of
R is then deﬁned as ξ = β(R)
maxβ
, where max β can be obtained by running Dijkstra’s
algorithm on the network graph with the instantaneous available bandwidth as the link
weight. In terms of delay related metrics, the routing optimality is similarly deﬁned
as ξ = ∆(R)
min∆
, where ∆(R) is the average delay of all source-destination pairs as the
results of R, and min∆ is the optimum results, standing for the minimum delay that
can be achieved.
2. Routing Message Overhead C: C is the total number of BGP UPDATE messages
exchanged in the network per time unit, which shows the cost and convergence speed
of a routing protocol. Because the routing table could be set up by BGP or by static
installation, we only consider the messages which are caused by the QoS information
update.
6.6.2 Optimality and Routing Message Overhead
In order to show the advantages of using our proposed statistical metrics, we present the
simulation results of LCR, ABR, and ABIR to study the relationship between the routing
optimality and the message overhead. In the route weight calculation of ABI, η = 1.
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Performance Overview
The routing optimality and routing message overhead are shown in Fig.6.6(a) and Fig.6.6(b)
with respect to diﬀerent network topologies and values of Ts. normal distribution is used to
model the link available bandwidth.
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Figure 6.6: Performance comparisons of ABIR, LCR and ABR.
In term of ﬁnding the path with the maximum available bandwidth, ABR protocol has
the best performance among the three. If the thresholds (Tl and Tr) in ABR are zero and we
assume that the routing protocol converges fast enough in one time unit, ABR can achieve
100% optimality. The ABR curves, shown in Fig.6.6, have non-zero thresholds: Tl = 20 and
Tr = 80. Its optimality ξ is about 85%. However, message overhead of ABR is still very
large and it increases substantially as the network size increases. Therefore, ABR is not a
practical protocol.
On the contrary, LCR only selects path by the static QoS metric – link capacity. Thus,
there is no route change due to QoS in LCR after the network is set up, i.e. C = 0. However,
because LCR does not adapt to the real available bandwidth, its optimality ξ is only about
50%.
ABIR makes a good compromise between the routing message overhead and the routing
optimality. Its routing optimality ξ is about 75%. Its routing message overhead is far less
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than the ABR protocol. In the worst case of our simulations, where Ts = 20 time units and
the number of node is 300, the routing message overhead incurred in ABIR is only 6.8% of
that in ABR. When the Ts is larger, ABIR has even less message overhead. The advantage of
ABIR comes from the routing based on the statistical properties of the available bandwidth
instead of using instantaneous values. In summary, ABIR achieves higher routing optimality
than LCR with much lower routing message overhead than ABR.
Comparison between ABIR and ABR with Large Threshold
ABIR can substantially reduce routing message overhead by decreasing only slightly the
routing optimality. Although ABR can also control the routing message overhead to a
low level by using suﬃciently large thresholds, Tl and Tr, simulation results show that the
optimality of ABR degrades quickly as the thresholds increase. If the same amount of
message overhead is incurred, ABIR performs much better than ABR in terms of routing
optimality.
Fig. 6.7(a) presents the simulation results of ABR and ABIR in a network of 100 nodes
and the link available bandwidth follows normal distribution. The upper three curves show
the message overhead C and optimality ξ of ABR with respect to Ts. When the C is reduced
(by increasing Tl or Tr), ξ decreases, e.g., when C  2000, ξ = 67%. On the contrary, ABIR,
which is shown as the lowest curve, can achieve 74% optimality with much lower message
overhead.
In Fig. 6.7(b), the relationship between the routing optimality and the routing message
overhead is shown in one curve directly. Higher routing optimality is obtained at the price
of larger message overhead. In the range of the optimality which can be achieved by ABIR,
the routing message overhead incurred by ABIR increases much more slowly than that of
ABR.
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Figure 6.7: ABIR demonstrates better optimality than ABR when incurring the same amount
of routing message overhead.
ABIR in Diﬀerent Traﬃc Distributions
In section 6.4.2, we use normal distribution to derive an ABI normalization method as an
approximation for any general distribution. The simulation results below support that this
approximate method also works well for other distributions. Two bandwidth distributions are
tested: Pareto and uniform. D is the link capacity. For Pareto distribution F (x) = 1−(k/x)a,
k is a random number in [0.1D, 0.9D], and γ is the average value of the shape parameters
a on all links. The uniform distribution is set to the interval [s, s + d], where d = θD and
s is a random value in [0, D − d]. θ stands for the range of the bandwidth in the uniform
distribution.
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 6.8. If the available bandwidth follows Pareto
or uniform(θ = 0.4) distribution, ABIR has similar optimality and message overhead in all
three distributions. However, in the uniform distribution of θ = 0.8, the optimality of ABIR
is almost the same as LCR (shown in Fig.6.6(a)). This can be explained as follows. If θ is
close to 1, ABI of each link tends to have  = [0, D], because ρ is chosen to be around 0.9.
Thus, in this scenario, the ABIs of links actually only reﬂect link capacities. We conclude
that ABIR performs better than LCR, if the available bandwidth is mainly distributed in an
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Figure 6.8: The performance of ABIR in diﬀerent bandwidth distributions.
interval whose length is smaller than D. For example, if θ = 0.4, as shown in the simulation,
the optimality of ABIR is about 80%, much higher than the optimality of LCR.
6.6.3 Evaluations of Histogram QoS Metrics
In this section, we use ABH as an example to study the granularity of histograms and its
advantages over other metrics. In route weight calculation, η = 0. ABHR is compared
with ABIR and AABR (AABR advertises link average bandwidth directly). The available
bandwidth of each link is modeled by normal distribution.
Fig. 6.9(a) demonstrates the impact of the histogram granularity || on the optimality
of ABHR. It is clearly shown that smaller || results in higher routing optimality. When
|| is less than about 200, ABHR has better performance than both ABIR and AABR.
The selection of || really depends on the trade-oﬀ between the processing overhead and
the routing performance. In the following simulations, we let || equal to 50. The ﬁgure
shows that ABIR leads to better performance than AABR and even better than ABHR when
histogram granularity is large. Although ABI uses only one interval to model bandwidth
distribution (actually ABI divides bandwidth space into three intervals), ABI can represent
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Figure 6.9: Evaluations of ABH.
the distribution more eﬃciently and ﬂexibly than ABH does, if they use the same number of
intervals. It is because ABI does not ﬁx the position and length of the interval when deﬁning
the distribution of bandwidth.
Both ABHR and AABR can provide average bandwidth information on a route. In
Section 6.5.3, we argue that the bandwidth values provided by ABHR are more precise than
those from AABR. The conclusion is also demonstrated in Fig. 6.9(b). The horizontal axis
is the averaged standard deviation of the σ parameters of normal distributions on all link,
standing for the link dynamics. In order to obtain errors of bandwidth advertising, time
average of the instantaneous available bandwidth between any pair of routers is calculated
as the precise value. This result is subtracted from the expected value computed from the
ABH in the routing table of ABHR and the average bandwidth in AABR, respectively. The
advertising errors of all router pairs are averaged and the results are shown in Fig. 6.9(b).
ABHR can advertise available bandwidth information much more precisely than AABR,
especially when link available bandwidth changes more dynamically. Our further simulation
also shows that the advertising error of ABIR is between those of ABHR and AABR.
Due to the precise available bandwidth information provided by ABHR, bandwidth reser-
vations can also be beneﬁted. A reservation request will be accepted to further signaling
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process, if the required bandwidth is below λb, where b is the average available bandwidth
obtained from the routing table and 0 < λ ≤ 1. Because AABR over-advertises the average
available bandwidth information, it incurs much more false positive acceptances than ABHR
does. The simulation results are demonstrated in Fig. 6.9(c).
6.6.4 Routing Considering QoS Stability
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Figure 6.10: Performance of routing by using ABI, ABH, DI and DH.
In this section, we show the routing results in scenarios where both the QoS stability of
route and the routing optimality are considered in the path selection process. By adjusting
η, we can change the inﬂuence of QoS stability on route weight calculation.
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Fig. 6.10(a) and 6.10(b) present the routing performance of ABIR, ABHR and AABR.
A larger η leads to preferring routes which have more stable available bandwidth. As has
been analyzed in section 6.5.3, due to the precise bandwidth information advertising in ABI
and ABH, they can ﬁnd routes with smaller bandwidth variance and with better optimality
than AABR, especially when the link dynamics is large.
Fig. 6.10(c) and 6.10(d) show the routing results related to the delay metrics. ADR is
the routing using average link delay; DVR is the routing using the variance of link delay.
In DMVR, the link average delay and the deviation are combined together. Because delay
expectation and delay variance are additive metrics, they can be correctly advertised in
ADR, DVR and DMVR. Not surprisingly, DMVR has similar performance as DIR and DHR
in the simulation. By making use of both average delay and delay variance information in
routing, DIR, DHR and DMVR provide ﬂexible ways to select routes which satisfy routing
optimality and QoS stability constraints. Also, the ﬁgures show that we can increase the
QoS stability of routes by sacriﬁcing a little bit performance in routing optimality. If average
delay is the only metric considered, such as ADR, the resulting routes may have large delay
variance; on the other hand, DVR considers the delay variance only, and the resulting routes
have the worst optimality among all.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, we investigate a very challenging problem in the area of interdomain routing
– extending the existing BGP to support QoS. Two challenges, scalability and heterogeneity,
make this problem very diﬃcult to solve. Finding eﬃcient and eﬀective QoS metrics is im-
portant to tackle these challenges. Thus, we propose two novel compound QoS metrics, the
Available Bandwidth Index (ABI) and Delay Index (DI), to perform QoS advertisement and
route selection in BGP. We further extend ABI and DI to Available Bandwidth Histogram
(ABH) and Delay Histogram (DH), respectively. Our simulation results show that these
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statistical metrics can accommodate heterogeneous QoS information and provide satisfying
performance with low message overhead. Also, they are more informative and can represent
dynamic QoS information more precisely than traditional static metrics (such as link capac-
ity) or some simple statistics based on the instantaneous values (such as average available
bandwidth).
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter ﬁrst discusses several deployment issues of the protocol extensions and conﬁg-
uration of BGP and TCP. Then, we conclude this thesis and provide some directions for the
future research.
7.1 Discussions on System Deployment
7.1.1 Modiﬁcations of TCP
In Section 3.5.2, we present a modiﬁcation of TCP. An additional TCP retransmission is
scheduled before the expiration of the Hold Timer, which can avoid the negative inﬂuence
caused by the TCP conservative retransmission in transient network failures. The TCP needs
to be accordingly modiﬁed to schedule the next packet retransmission in min(rto, Th + tp −
RTT − tn−∆) seconds after sending out the current packet, where rto is the retransmission
timeout used in the original TCP, Th is the period of BGP HoldTimer, tp is the time of
receiving the last ACK from the peer router, RTT is the TCP round trip time, and tn is the
time when the current TCP packet is transmitted. ∆ is a foolproof to guarantee that the
additional packet retransmission is sent out before Hold Timer expires, even if the system
is dynamic and some errors exist in estimating RTT . Typically, we set ∆ to be 1 second.
Th is exchanged between BGP peers when the BGP session is initialized and thus its value
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is known. Other information is readily available from TCP. If this modiﬁcation is applied,
the failure probability of BGP session is given by Equation 3.18.
The modiﬁcation of TCP for improving the BGP session robustness in severe network
congestion needs to change the default values of the maximum backoﬀ counter ζ and the
maximum retransmission timeout Rm. We have discussed this in Section 4.6.4. There is a
tradeoﬀ between the increase of BGP session lifetime and the message overhead incurred,
which is shown in Fig. 4.17(b). The default values are ζ = 12 and Rm = 64 seconds. We
recommend ζ = 30 and Rm = 8 seconds, which can signiﬁcantly increase the average BGP
session lifetime, while the message overhead is acceptable.
The above two modiﬁcations of TCP need to change the source ﬁles of TCP at BGP
routers and recompile the code. They do not inﬂuence the behaviors of BGP and TCP
in normal states, i.e., when there is no network failures or congestion. Moreover, they are
compatible with the original TCP. The BGP routers with the above modiﬁcations deployed
can still communicate with the legacy BGP routers that use the original TCP. This advantage
enables that these modiﬁcations can be incrementally deployed in the Internet.
7.1.2 Conﬁguration of BGP Timers and IBGP Networks
Both Hold Timer and KeepAlive Timer can be tuned to increase BGP session robustness.
On the other hand, Hold Timer also controls the sensitivity of detecting a misbehaving peer.
Although a large value of Hold Timer increases BGP session robustness, it also increases the
delay in interdomain re-routing if long-term network failures happen. Likewise, a small value
of KeepAlive Timer makes BGP session more reliable but more computing and message
overhead are incurred. Based on the models of BGP session robustness in Equation 3.18 and
4.13, we are able to tune Hold Timer and KeepAlive Timer to balance the robustness of
BGP sessions and other system issues such as overhead and sensitivity of failure detection.
The conﬁguration of IBGP route reﬂection networks is based on the IBGP resilience
models and topology optimization algorithms discussed in Chapter 5. The route reﬂection
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networks can be generated from scratch when the fully meshed IBGP is migrated to the route
reﬂection. If route reﬂection network has already been deployed, the current conﬁguration
can be the input for further optimization to ﬁnd a topology with satisfying resilience and
subject to a bounded number of topology changes.
The above conﬁguration of BGP timers and IBGP networks does not require to modify
any source code or semantics of BGP; only conﬁguration ﬁles of BGP routers are updated
accordingly.
7.1.3 BGP QoS Extensions
In order to advertise interdomain QoS routing information, the format of BGP UPDATE mes-
sages has to be extended. In Chapter 6, we have described a new attribute in the UPDATE
message to carry the information of route QoS, e.g., ABI, DI, ABH, and DH. Moreover, at
QoS-aware BGP routers, new modules for monitoring the link QoS information and calcu-
lating the route QoS information are installed.
Since quite a few changes of BGP protocols and system implementation are involved in
advertising interdomain QoS routing information, incremental deployability of the system is
a crucial requirement. Thus, we deﬁne the new QoS attribute to be optional and transitive.
The legacy BGP routers can still interact with QoS-aware BGP routers, but the QoS routing
information is ignored and passed to their peers. As more BGP routers have the QoS feature
deployed, the advertised QoS routing information will become more precise and useful.
7.2 Conclusions
This thesis focuses on modeling and improving BGP resilience, providing a deeper insight
into BGP behaviors when networks are partly failed or congested and extending the capa-
bility of the existing routing system to process resource availability information and handle
network stressful conditions. Our research is based on the rationale that the Internet infras-
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tructure has to be improved in an evolutionary way. Thus, all our approaches concert with
the existing Internet architecture and protocols. The modiﬁcations and extensions were care-
fully designed, with system deployability and scalability in mind. We have shown that The
robustness and the performance of interdomain routing can be increased by understanding
the protocols rigorously and by further engineering the system appropriately.
We studied three kinds of problems in this thesis: the robustness of BGP sessions, the
reliability of internal BGP networks, and advertising interdomain QoS routing information.
The major results are summarized as follows.
1. BGP sessions are sensitive to transient network failures and severe network conges-
tion. We quantitatively established the relations between the BGP session reliability
and the inﬂuential factors: BGP timer conﬁguration, TCP retransmission behaviors,
network congestion, and network failure time. We noticed that the existing TCP is
too conservative in packet retransmission mechanism to support BGP sessions reliably.
In most cases of severe network congestion, BGP session lifetime can be approximated
with exponential distributions and Weibull distributions. Based on these models and
discoveries, we can tune BGP and TCP parameters appropriately, so that the reliabil-
ity of BGP sessions can reach a desired level. Furthermore, we analyzed the interaction
of TCP and BGP sessions and proposed a modiﬁcation of TCP to make BGP sessions
more robust to temporary network failures. This modiﬁcation incurs practically no
extra message overhead and can be incrementally deployed in Internet.
2. Understanding the reliability of BGP sessions, we further studied the resilience of IBGP
networks by applying the cause-based analysis model from reliability engineering. We
aim to understand the impact on reliability when IBGP is migrated from the fully
meshed network to the route reﬂection network, and moreover, optimize for the IBGP
network resilience with the existence of unreliable routers or links, by conﬁguring the
route reﬂection topology appropriately. We ﬁrst deﬁned several metrics to characterize
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the resilience of IBGP networks from various perspectives. Then, We optimized the
IBGP topology according to the typical network failures, such as single router or IP
link failure, single ﬁber cut, etc. Extensive computational experiments conﬁrm that
the resilience of IBGP reﬂection network can be signiﬁcantly improved by proper route
reﬂection conﬁguration. These results provide good references for Internet ISPs when
designing a new IBGP reﬂection topology or improving the existing conﬁguration with
the IBGP resilience as one of the optimization objectives.
3. BGP is extended to advertise available bandwidth and delay information of interdomain
routes. We propose a series of statistical metrics, ABI, DI, ABH and DH, to model
the dynamic QoS information. There are two major advantages by using the proposed
statistical metrics. First, QoS information is abstracted into one or several probability
intervals, and thus the heterogeneous and dynamic QoS information can be represented
more ﬂexibly and precisely. Second, by capturing the detailed statistical property of the
QoS routing information, these new metrics are eﬃcient and they can highly decrease
the message overhead in routing, thereby making the QoS advertising and routing
scalable.
7.3 Future Work
The research on resilient Internet routing is still in its early stage. In this thesis, we studied
this topic from several aspects. Some other open problems still exist. In this section, we
name a few that are related to this thesis.
• We have studied the reliability of BGP sessions and IBGP networks. It is natural
to ask the question, how connections between diﬀerent domains, i.e., EBGP sessions,
inﬂuence the reliability of routing and data communication. From the view of one AS,
it is helpful to set up the peering relationship with other ASes, such that the traﬃc
to and from this AS is least aﬀected, if some other parts of networks fail. To an edge
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AS, the question is how to ﬁnd a set of multi-homing connections with certain cost
constraint to maximize the reliability. At the global Internet level, how can we evaluate
the robustness of whole AS networks? Is it possible to put some incentives in network
operation to make the global Internet evolve to a more reliable state?
• Routing reliability problems become more complex in networks which must comply
with service level agreements. The traditional reliability metrics are usually deﬁned
based on network connectivity or reachability. In network failure scenarios, even if the
network remains connected, available bandwidth on some routes may be very small
and may violate the agreement, because a large number of ﬂows may compete for the
remaining network resource. Thus, the reliability metrics have to be combined with
quality metrics. This observation leads to the resilient traﬃc engineering and QoS
routing problems. For example, how can we balance the traﬃc on edge links in an AS
in variety of network failure states? Can we still guarantee the promised bandwidth
for a ﬂow even if the network is partially failed but the best-eﬀort traﬃc is not too
much inﬂuenced?
• BGP networks are actually overlaid on TCP/IP networks. Because of the interac-
tion of TCP/IP networks and BGP networks, the reliability analysis in BGP becomes
diﬃcult. In application-level networking, such as Peer-to-Peer networking, the same
challenges exist. Thus, it may be possible to apply our techniques in BGP analysis
into the application level that is much more dynamic and heterogeneous. The basic
problems are still how to model the reliability and how to improve it. In addition, as a
unique problem, what is the fundamental limitations on the reliability provided by an
application-level network that is interfered by high dynamics and heterogeneity, such
as frequent network node joining and leaving?
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